The REVIEW *of* RELIGION

Volume II JANUARY, 1938 Number 2

EDITOR
Raymond C. Knox

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Herbert W. Schneider

SECRETARY
Marguerite Block

EDITORIAL BOARD

Salo W. Baron
Cornelius Clifford
Louis H. Gray
Clarence A. Manning
Cyril C. Richardson
William Adams Brown
Horace L. Friess
Eugene W. Lyman
David S. Muzzey
Ryusaku Tsunoda

The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscription: $2.00 a year (foreign, $2.30); single copies 60 cents (foreign 70 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

COPYRIGHT 1938 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

ARTICLES

The Sacrament of Initiation. By PRYOR MCNEILL GRANT . . . 129

Christianity in Germany. By KARL BETH 147

Modernism, Father George Tyrrell, and Miss M. D. Petre. By FATHER CORNELIUS CLIFFORD 159

Theology and Science in Contemporary Platonic Idealism. By HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER 166

COMMUNICATIONS

The Significance of the Oxford Conference. By E. G. HOMRIGHAUSEN 175

BOOK REVIEWS

Valentino Papesso: *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad.*
Swami Nikhilananda: *The Māndūkyopanishad with Gaudapāda's Kārikā and Śankara's Commentary.* (Franklin Edgerton) 184

(Continued on next page)

B. L. Atreya: *The Philosophy of The Yoga-Vāsiṣtha.* (George W. Briggs) 186

Alphonse Mingana: *An Important Manuscript of the Traditions of Bukhārī.* (Arthur Jeffery) 191

Salo Wittmayer Baron: *A Social and Religious History of the Jews.* (W. O. E. Oesterley) 196

M. I. Roztovtzeff, A. R. Bellinger, C. Hopkins and C. B. Welles, Editors: *The Excavations at Dura-Europos conducted by Yale University and the French Academy of Inscriptions and Letters.* (Joshua Starr) 199

Duncan Black Macdonald: *The Hebrew Philosophical Genius: A Vindication.* (Joseph Haroutunian) 203

G. G. Coulton: *Five Centuries of Religion.* (Eugene H. Byrne) 204

Frank Hugh Foster: *The Life of Edwards Amasa Park.* (John Gardner Greene) 208

Walter Marshall Horton: *Contemporary English Theology: An American Interpretation.* (Henry P. Van Dusen) 212

Paul Elmer More: *On Being Human.* (Hoxie Neale Fairchild) 214

Karl Schmidt: *The Creative I and the Divine.* (Edith Watson) 222

John Lewis, Karl Polyani, and Donald K. Kitchin, Editors: *Christianity and the Social Revolution.* (John C. Bennett) 225

Nicol Macnicol: *Is Christianity Unique?* (Alban G. Widgery) 230

A. Eustace Haydon: *Man's Search for the Good Life.* (E. A. Burtt) 234

Book Notes. B. Malinowski: *The Foundations of Faith and Morals.* C. M. Smertenko and G. N. Belknap: *Studies in Greek Religion.* A David-Neel: *Le Buddhisme: ses doctrines et ses methodes.* F. Younghusband: *A Venture of Faith.* P. Brunton: *A Hermit in the Himalayas.* S. L. Caiger: *Bible and Spade: An Introduction to Biblical Archeology.* Z. Cahn: *The Rise of the Karaite Sect: A New Light on the Halakah and Origin of the Karaites.* J.-J. Brièrre-Narbonne: *Exégèse Talmudique des Prophéties Messianiques.* P. Touilleux: *L'Apocalypse et les Cultes de Domitien et de Cybele.* F. Gerke: *Der Sarkophag des Iunius Bassus: Ein Meisterwerk der frühchristlichen Plastik.* W. K. Jordan: *The Development of Religious Toleration in England.* R. P. H. Petitot: *Histoire exacte des apparitions de Notre Dame de Lourdes à Bernadette. Der Stand der völkischreligiösen Bewegung 1937.* W. Hauer, K. Heim and K. Adam: *Germany's New Religion: The German Faith Movement.* S. G. Cole: *Character and Christian education.* E. M. Ligon: *The Psychology of Christian Personality. Etc.* 237

Among the Periodicals 251

THE SACRAMENT OF INITIATION

By Pryor McNeill Grant
Former Director of Boys' Work Bureau, New York City

I

A rite implies something beyond itself. It is that something beyond that ordinarily determines the use to which a rite is put, and which gives to it intellectual status. Initiation requires rites, and these, in principle, are sacramental in character. Christian initiation is concerned, to this extent at least, with sacramental theory and with the symbols of whatever it is that sacraments celebrate. Initiation is not in itself the matter of primary importance, but it may serve to illustrate more general problems of increasingly vital concern for the direction of life and for the understanding of religion.

There is a deceptive factor in sacramental forms not always perceived, even as there is something alluring about ordinary initiatory rites as hints of secret knowledge and privilege. The concentration of interest upon the rite itself, as a way into the thing beyond, usually takes precedent value over the thing itself. In time the rite comes to be celebrated for its own sake without critical inquiry into the function of rites at all. The rite either becomes separated from meaning, and thus ceases to fulfill its proper function as sacrament, or it becomes an end in itself instead of an "outward and visible sign," and thus becomes a culmination instead of an initiation.

In ancient days a mystery was a thing revealed (whether in secret or not), a satisfaction of wonder or emotional need by a clarification. Today it is an altogether opposite thing. It stands for the unknown. Even so it holds no less curiosity, and inspires, or can inspire, no less reverence and awe and faith by reason of this fact. Religious values are in no sense destroyed thereby, or overshadowed, but may even be enhanced and made more rational. Mystery of old was concerned with "the evidence of things not seen." In the newer emphasis it is interested in "the substance of things hoped for." Herein is discovered the basis for a kind of faith that, if properly set forth and symbolized, would constitute a religion truly catholic, in the sense of being hu-

manly inclusive. It is a catholic, not an esoteric, theory of sacraments that is needed. It might be said that there is no catholic religion, because there is as yet no sufficient reverence for life itself to develop, if not catholic rites and symbols, at least symbols of catholic meaning and intent.

The religious endeavor begins and ends with life, and especially with its conditions and unexplained mysteries. It may reach beyond what it knows. Indeed it must. Its imaginative exploration of ideals, its dreams of possibilities, are the fires in which are forged new realities of spiritual experience, which thereafter remain not dreams and figments of the imagination, but true events in the universe, a universe continually rediscovered, expanded, compounded, but never "explained" on the basis of "authority," save the authority of its usefulness as an instrument of revelation. This implies the likelihood that the educational process involved in initiation must be of a graduated sort, and that the body of experience cannot be handed on as a whole, or as a "deposit of truth" to be accepted on external authority, but must be made appropriate to circumstances and conditions proper to the growth experience of individuals. In other words there is a growth in experience, and the "mother" (church or organization) that nurtures that growth must be wise in its estimate of the individual's progress through sensitive and perceiving procedures.

A definition of a sacrament, taken from an orthodox tradition, will illustrate the problem of the symbolization of "grace" in life as here suggested. The Anglican teaching, as contained in the Prayer Book Offices of Instruction, defines a sacrament as "an outward and visible *sign* of an inward and spiritual grace given unto us; ordained by Christ himself, as a *means* whereby we receive this grace, and a *pledge* to assure us thereof." The latter half reflects certain controversies of the Reformation period, but none the less represents the mode of thought in which all orthodox tradition is cast. A sacrament is a *sign* of grace, a *means* whereby it is received, and a *pledge* of its "actual" reception. Furthermore the grace is of a particular kind and quality, namely, grace "given unto us, ordained by Christ Himself." The contradiction between sign and means raises questions rarely observed or stressed. The transformation of the grace of Christ into the *substance* of Grace is a problem in theology not yet given the attention it deserves. Emphasis is completely reversed in the process, and the dynamic value of

moral endeavor is displaced by the forensic importation of a substance, or the equally forensic imputation of a "state of grace."

If the contrast between method and content, symbol and reality, sign and thing signified could be clearly distinguished, it would permit the description, or at least the indication, of some of the issues of life that might be sacramental. The distinction here made must not be confused with the distinction between so-called natural[1] and conventional (or artificial) sacraments. No sacrament is, strictly speaking, natural, because any sign is by its nature conventional. The intent or object of the sacrament may be natural, super-natural, artificial, reasonable, visionary, as the case may be. We have stated above that it seems desirable that Christian (hence conventional, "artificial," distinctive) sacraments should refer to something universal, "catholic," or, if you please, "natural" in human experience.

The Church's practice at the beginning of the fourth century may be chosen quite arbitrarily by way of illustration. It is meant to contain no special significance in itself, but only to provide a point from which to seek understanding of the living function of religion. Whatever may be thought of the sacraments and the settings out of which they grew, or of the occupation of the best minds of ages past with mythological obscurities and philosophical contradictions, there is no possibility of missing the point of their relevance to the life of those who were so occupied.

II

Already there is an odour of blessedness upon you. O ye who are soon to be enlightened: already ye are gathering the spiritual flowers to weave heavenly crowns: already the fragrance of the Holy Spirit has breathed upon you: already ye have gathered round the vestibule of the King's palace; may ye be led in also by the King! For blossoms now have appeared upon the trees; may the fruit also be found perfect! Thus far there has been an inscription of your names, and a call to service, and torches of the bridal train, and a longing for heavenly citizenship, and a good purpose, and hope attendent thereon.[2]

1. On this distinction see a recent article by the Rev. H. G. Hutchinson in *The Modern Churchman*, April, 1937, pp. 23-29, entitled "Sacraments: Natural and Unnatural"; or the classic sermon by Theodore Parker on "Conventional and Natural Sacraments" (in *Ten Sermons of Religion*, Boston, 1852, pp. 312-363).

2. *A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, (Second Series), Vol. VII, New York, 1894. "Catechetical Lectures: *Procatechesis*," 1.

These words of Cyril of Jerusalem, with their ease and beauty, fell upon expectant ears. The group to whom they were spoken were *competentes* gathered on a Sunday in the Spring of 348 in the great Basilica of the Resurrection, built by Constantine on the site of the Holy Sepulchre thirteen years before. It is a scene to be entered into with imagination. The persons in it were preparing for initiation into the Christian Church. The "mysteries" of the society were not yet revealed to them, but they had been accounted worthy of their revelation and would be admitted to them when the days of preparation, just begun, should be completed.

This day of instruction was in a real sense a day of beginning, but it was also the culmination of a period of inquiry, decision, and testing both by the individual and the officials of the Church. The groups in question consisted of catechumens, and more particularly of competentes, for it was the beginning of Lent, and they had "inscribed their names" for initiation at Easter. Easter was the customary time for admitting new members to the Christian community. Indeed Lent grew into "a Church season" out of the period of preparation required for initiates. If for any reason, such as illness, a neophyte could not participate in the ceremonies on Easter Even, it was permitted on a later day in Eastertide. Pentecost, being the last solemn festival and associated so intimately with the resurrection, became the latest day to which admission could be postponed. In time, it became, along with Easter, one of the set days for initiation. In the East, the Epiphany, as the festival of the birth and the baptism of Christ, was likewise marked for this purpose. This followed naturally from the fact that baptism was a symbol of regeneration and "second birth." These festival days became in time the statutory seasons for admitting persons to the Christian community, but Easter was for long the only and, always the chief, time for initiation. Occasion allowed individuals to be baptised otherwise, but the corporate and social aspects of initiation in early days may be contrasted with the individualistic theories and customs that have characterized the admission of persons to the Church since.

Neither the assemblies nor the "mysteries" of the Church were open to everyone. They were private, and in some respects, secret affairs, in accordance with the spirit of the times. Some were concerned primarily with a doctrine of one God as a protest against polytheism and blind

fate. Some laid stress upon a message of salvation from the tyranny of demons, sin, and death, and others upon an ethical ideal of holiness, self-control, love, and brotherhood. But all held out a promise of redemption from an evil and oppressive world, and of resurrection after death. Whatever the emphasis, people were led by a desire to share in the protections and benefits of the society that held the key to these things. The Christian society, therefore, had its own methods of admission and its disciplines of preparation.

Cyril gives solemn warning to the catechumens gathered for instruction about revealing to outsiders the things he is to teach them.

> When, therefore, the Lecture is delivered, if a Catechumen ask thee what the teachers have said, tell nothing to him that is without. For we deliver to thee a mystery, and a hope of the life to come: Guard the mystery for Him who gives the reward. Let none ever say to thee, What harm to thee, if I also know it? So too the sick ask for wine; but if it be given at a wrong time it causes delirium, and two evils arise; the sick man dies, and the physician is blamed. . . . But thou art now standing on the border: take heed, pray, to tell nothing out; not that the things spoken are not worthy to be told, but because his ear is unworthy to receive.[3]
>
> These Catechetical Lectures for those who are to be enlightened thou mayest lend to candidates for Baptism, and to believers who are already baptized, to read, but give not at all, neither to Catechumens, nor to any others who are not Christians, as thou shalt answer to the Lord. And if thou make copy, write this in the beginning, as in the sight of the Lord.[4]

Admission to the catechumenate had ceremonies significant enough to be called a sacrament, and which were treated as such. As has already been noted, these ceremonies served to mark persons as Christians. Cyril refers to his catechumen hearers as possessed of the new Name, the dignity, given by Christ, of being called Christians.[5] "The Sacrament of the Catechumens" consisted of the insufflation with a formulary of exorcism, the signing with the cross on the forehead, and, in the Roman rite, the administration of salt.[6] The candidates were gathered outside the assembly place and were brought in before the congregation one by one.[7] The priest first breathed into his face to frighten

3. *Ibid.* 12.
4. *Ibid.* 17.
5. *Ibid.* "Lecture X," 16.
6. L. Duchesne, *Christian Worship: Its Origin and Evolution, London,* 1904, p. 296.
7. St. Augustine, *de Symbolo,* i, I. Quoted in "Catechetical Lectures: *Procatechesis,*" 14.

the evil spirits away. He then made the sign of the cross upon the forehead saying "In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." The Greek *Euchologion* describes it thus: "And the priest breathes upon his mouth, his forehead, and his breast, saying, Drive forth from him every evil and unclean spirit, hidden and lurking in his heart, the spirit of error, the spirit of wickedness, etc."[8] The meaning of such acts and words is given by Tertullian: "All the authority and power we have over them [demons] is from naming the name Christ, and recalling to their memory the woes with which God threatens them at the hands of Christ as Judge. . . . So at our touch and breathing, overwhelmed by the thought of those judgment-fires, they leave the bodies they have entered, at our command, unwilling and distressed, and before your very eyes put to an open shame."[9] In Cyril is found a further vivid touch: "For in like manner as those who are skilled in the goldsmith's craft throw in their breath upon the fire through certain delicate instruments, and blowing up the gold which is hidden in the crucible stir the flame which surrounds it, and so find what they are seeking; even so when the exorcists inspire terror by the Spirit of God, and set the soul, as it were, on fire in the crucible of the body, the hostile demon flees away, and there abide salvation and the hope of eternal life, and the soul henceforth is cleansed from its sins and hath salvation."[10]

The exorcisms were enforced on all converts, and even upon children of Christians, before being baptized. During the catechumenate they were repeated, especially during the more intensive period of preparation for initiation. From Cyril, it appears that the candidates were exorcized one by one before each catechizing.[11] The catachumens were dismissed before the mysteries in the Mass, and in various other ways were made to realize that there were yet other conditions to be fulfilled for complete membership in the Church. The catechumenate was an important institution in the early church but by the middle of the sixth century it had disappeared."[12]

As already noted, one might continue a catechumen for a long time before seeking the privileges to which initiation admitted. Each year

8. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. VII. "Introduction," p. xx.
9. *Ibid.*, p. xxi.
10. *Ibid. Procat.*, 9.
11. *Ibid.* 14.
12. Duchesne, *Op. cit.*, p. 202.

at the stated seasons those who desired it, and could satisfy the requirements, "enrolled their names" and became competentes. For these special preparations for baptism, consisting of a series of instructions, exorcisms, and ascetic disciplines, occupied the season of Lent. "Those who are coming to Baptism must be constantly engaged in prayers, fastings, kneelings, and watchings, together with confession of all passed faults."[13] The expectation was that those entering upon this more intensive program would be initiated into all the privileges and rites of the Christian community at Easter. These ceremonies included baptism, confirmation, and first communion. Initiation consisted not of baptism alone, but of all three rites performed in conjunction with one another. From the earliest times a more or less lengthy preparation was required. It was the season's first formal gathering of competentes that Cyril was addressing in the above passage.

The final scrutiny was on Easter Even before baptism was administered. The last exorcism was then very solmenly pronounced by a priest in place of the ordinary exorcists. On this occasion the candidates were gathered in ranks. The priest, passing along the rows, made upon each the sign of the cross and placed his hands on the head of each with the words:

> Take notice, Satan, that punishments are threatening you, torments are threatening you, the day of judgment and of punishment are threatening you, the day that is about to come like a burning furnace, in which eternal destruction will come for you and all your angels. Therefore, accursed one, pay honour to the living and true God. Pay honour to Jesus Christ his son, and pay honour to the Holy Spirit, in whose name and power I command you to go out and depart from this servant of God, whom today the Lord Our God Jesus Christ has deemed worthy to call to his sacred grace, and to the benediction and water of his baptism, that he may become his temple through the water of regeneration for the remission of all sins in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is about to come, etc."[14]

One can catch the spirit of this day from Cyril's closing exhortation. Lent was at an end. The early dawn of the great sabbath, Easter Eve, had broken, and the day long awaited had come.

> And now, brethren beloved, the word of instruction exhorts you all to prepare your souls for the reception of the heavenly gifts. . . . But now

13. Tertullian, *de Baptism*, c. 20. Quoted in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. VII, "Introduction," p. xviii.

14. Duchesne, *Op. cit.*, p. 303.

the holy day of the Passover is at hand, and ye, beloved in Christ, are to be enlightened *by the Laver of regeneration*. Ye shall therefore again be taught what is requisite, if God so will; with how great devotion and order ye must enter in when summoned, for what purpose each of the holy mysteries of Baptism is performed, and with what reverence and order ye must go from Baptism to the Holy Altar of God, and enjoy its spiritual and heavenly mysteries; that your souls being previously enlightened by the word of doctrine, ye may discover in each particular the greatness of the gifts bestowed on you by God. . . . And after Easter's holy day of salvation, ye shall come on each successive day . . . and if God permits, ye shall hear other lectures; in which ye shall again be taught the reasons of everything that has been done.[15]

Then followed the actual baptism. Each was thrice immersed, or placed under openings from which streams issued, or in some instances water from the font was merely poured over them, while the formula of baptism was uttered. Upon the conclusion of this, the neophytes were brought to the chapel adjoining the baptistry where, at the door, they were presented to a priest who annointed each of them on the head with the fragrant oil with the words:

God omnipotent, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has regenerated you by water and the Holy Spirit, and who has given unto you remission of all your sins, himself seals you with the chrism of safety unto life eternal.[16]

After being annointed they put on new white garments symbolic of their new birth, re-entered the basilica in procession, and for the first time took part in the holy mysteries. After making their communion they were given a drink composed of honey, water and milk, and were blessed by the bishop. The ceremonies lasted until the dawn of Easter, so that the beginning of the new life into which they had just been initiated coincided with the traditional hour in which the risen Christ first made known his saving power and triumph over death.

For these neophytes the octave of Easter was an unbroken festival. On each of the eight days they made their communion wearing their white garments. Each evening they attended vespers, and after the *Magnificat* performed a kind of pilgrimage to the baptistry and chapel, reviewing the scene of their baptism and confirmation. It was during this week that the most solemn instruction in the holy mysteries took place. It was in this week that Cyril's "Mystagogic Lectures" were delivered. From them the clearest picture of the Eastern rites may be obtained.

15. "Catechetical Lectures," No. XVIII, 32.
16. Duchesne, *Op. cit.*, p. 314.

III

These scenes depict the Church and its initiatory practice as it emerged into the status of imperial recognition and triumph. When normal church life became concerned more with the nurture of children than with adult converts, the rationale of the prevailing system was upset. When the barbarians broke over the boundaries of the Empire, they were often absorbed by wholesale acts of initiation. In either case the elaborate scheme of instruction, which St. Cyril's "Catechetical Lectures" illustrate, disappeared, or was reduced to the teaching and recital of the Creed and the Lord's Prayer. The catechumenate was retained in form for several centuries, even when its serious use had disappeared, and infants were solemnly inducted, being called upon by deputy to profess their faith in, and recite, the creed. The scrutinies were retained chiefly for the ceremonies of exorcism.

After a time the catechumenate, as a period of probation, disappeared altogether and the rites which composed it were compressed into a mere introduction to the baptismal office. The title of *ordo ad faciendum catechumenum* was retained, but it consisted of only one exorcism, and a reading from the Gospel was substituted for the former rather elaborate scheme of instruction. The anointing, and the renunciation of Satan were placed immediately before the act of Baptism. Baptism came to be administered at times other than Easter and Pentecost. The influence of the former custom was reflected in the omission of the blessing of the font, water already consecrated being used. Furthermore, increase in the frequency of Baptism, and the extension of the Church organization, caused Baptism to be performed without the bishop. Confirmation thus became separated from the service of Baptism, being deferred until a convenient time, or, in the case of children, until they reached "years of discretion." With the separation, came also the delay in First Communion. The primitive initiatory rite, which consisted of Baptism, Confirmation, and First Communion as one act, became completely broken, except in the East where the right of confirming was delegated to priests, using oil blessed by a bishop.

The changes that lie between the early and modern rites of Christian initiation are chiefly matters of form and custom. They have necessitated some problems of theological explanation, such as the necessity of Confirmation and its relation to Baptism. But on the

whole, a Christian of the fourth century could exchange place with a Christian of the twentieth, or vice versa, without intellectual shock. Or more properly, they could exchange and accommodate themselves to their rites. The difficulties of acceptance would involve the social situation of the two periods, not the doctrine or intention of the rites themselves. The catechumen from fourth century Rome would be puzzled by the fact that he or his child should be exorcized only twice or thrice, and then so mildly, but he would hear some of the identical curses that were used in his time.[17] Furthermore he would understand the Latin used, at least if he were allowed to read it, which could hardly be said of his *confrère* of the twentieth century, by whom the understanding of religious rites would appear neither expected nor desired by his religious mentors. Formerly exorcisms were in the vulgar tongue and had a powerful effect, because demons were believed in with unquestioned literalness. Exorcisms affect his enlightened brother of the twentieth century, who does not believe in demons, chiefly because they are recited in a strange language and are awesome in their utterance. It would be wrong for him, furthermore, to express disbelief in anything the Church, now grown infallible, declares, either directly or indirectly, to be true. Exorcisms there are in the twentieth century, but chiefly for the reason that there were exorcisms in the fourth century, or second, or first. If indeed the person translated from early times to the present considered himself possessed of a demon he could still have twenty-five pages of exorcisms said over him, all out of the official *Rituale Romanum*.[18]

This would be possible in the East as well. "In the Orthodox Church there prevails a conception that mental diseases are not uninfluenced by demons. The first duty of a parish priest called to visit such a patient is to read upon him the exorcism. Of these there exist in the *Euchologion* two sorts, i.e., the Small Exorcism and the Large. The first are attributed to St. Chrysostom and the second to St. Basil. . . . There exist in all Greek dioceses chapels which are especially used by the mentally deficient. . . . In these chapels it is usual to find wells, the water of which, called Agiasma, is believed to have the healing property. To such chapels are sent the mentally unwell, accompanied by their relations, to stay forty days, and use the waters, and all means of intercession for their recovery. The patients also drink the

17. *Rituale Romanum*, pp. 9-11.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 340-365.

water every morning fasting. This water is also poured on the head of the patient. If there are lucid moments, the priest endeavors to give counsel in the confessional. He administers Holy Unction and the Blessed Sacrament. The Blessed Sacrament is received many times. Fasting is a requisite necessity, not only for the patient, but for his relatives too."[19]

The Anglican Church is, in theory, not removed from comparable commitments,[20] and in all of its branches there is agitation over the subject of faith healing, which often includes mild equivalents of exorcism.[21] In no public service however does direct exorcism occur. A fourth century visitor would find in the Anglican order of Baptism nothing beyond a renunciation of "the devil and all his works." But that is unsoftened and is apparently meant literally.

He would be at home, however, in the Roman and Eastern Churches. In the latter the demons are still spoken to in the familiar terms of early days. At the reception of a catechumen the priest loosens the candidate's girdle, disrobes him, takes off his shoes and turns him toward the east (in plain dress, without girdle, without covering for the head, barefoot and with arms hanging down), breathes thrice in his face, crosses him thrice on the forehead and on the breast, lays his hands upon his head, and recites long prayers of exorcism.[22]

The renunciation of Satan in the Roman rites of Baptism is preceded by an exorcism, and the ceremonial touching of the ears and nose of the person by the priest with his thumb moistened with saliva. The Christian from the fourth century, if he closed his eyes and was not annoyed by strange pronunciations, would feel completely at home. With encouragement, he probably could be made satisfied with the Anglican modification of the *traditio symboli* in the question: "Dost thou believe all the articles of the Christian Faith as contained in the Apostles Creed?" But what he should believe of theological import he would find to be held important in every modern rite, and he would discover that neither its form or content had undergone important change.

Extraneous matters gain importance in one form or another. For instance, the rubrics preceding the order of Baptism in the *Book of*

19. W. L. L. Clarke, Editor, *Liturgy and Worship*, New York, 1932, p. 479.
20. Canon 72 (1604).
21. *Lambeth Reports*, 1908, 1030, 1930. Also Clarke, *Loc. cit.*, ff.
22. Nicholas Bjerring, *Offices of the Oriental Church*, New York, 1884, pp. 83-87.

Common Prayer make careful distinction between public and private Baptism, and give clear warning of the absolute importance of the sacrament. Baptism normally is a public ceremony. Exceptions are allowed only for reasons of "urgency" or "necessity." Since publicity is nowhere declared essential to the efficacy of the sacrament, questions immediately arise as to the primary purpose of the rite. Being an initiation into a society, members of the society naturally celebrate its enlargement by being present. But the "urgency" or "necessity," referred to in the rubrics as justifying private Baptism, reaches beyond the social courtesies of initiation and introduces the problem of the effect of Baptism, or its omission, in the event of death. The social aspect of the sacrament is overshadowed or displaced entirely by the question of what happens through Baptism to the soul of the person involved. Is Baptism meant to induct life into a mystical mode of existence, or fortify one against some fateful event of after-judgment, or has it reference to qualitative aspects of life in this world? In the history of the Church such questions have been answered solely in theological terms. What a soul is, its nature, source, purpose, destiny, as well as the relation of sacraments to the salvation of souls are matters upon which theories have been built that have governed the religious life of the West. Why is Baptism so "necessary" that a private and urgent service must be held for persons "in danger"? What is the necessity and what the danger? These questions are not raised to be answered, but to point the fact of emphasis upon a theological scheme which obscures entirely the original and essential function of the rite in social life.

It is in the Eastern Church alone that Confirmation, or holy Chrism as it is there called, follows immediately upon Baptism. The rapid growth of Christianity after its official recognition in the fourth century, and the gradual increase of infant over adult Baptism, together with the retention by the bishops of distinctive sacerdotal powers, created a problem of making available the proper minister to confer the full privileges of the Church to each new initiate. In the West it led to a separation of Baptism and Confirmation, while in the East the difficulty was solved by permitting the priest to confirm with oil blessed by the bishop.

The question of the proper age for Confirmation, when considered at all, centers almost invariably upon the age at which the doctrine and grace of the sacrament can be absorbed. It is not concerned pri-

marily with the things upon which life at the various stages of its growth feeds. There is a thing called grace, dogmatically defined, historically certified, and a rite, wherein that grace is imparted, called Confirmation. There is young life growing up, which, as conceived, needs that special grace in order to secure membership in a spiritual society accounted necessary for eternal salvation. A certain amount of understanding on the part of the candidate, while not necessary in parts of the Church, is always accounted desirable. The problem becomes one of deciding at what age the grace may be applied, or imparted, with the best results, results being sometimes counted in terms of moral qualities to be displayed in the future lives of the persons in question, but more frequently in terms of a forensic security in a supernatural sphere. It is in these ways that the religious rite of Confirmation is allowed to function. Values of simple human qualities are displaced or distorted, and primacy given to a transaction of a mystical character.

The order of Confirmation in the Roman rite is very simple. The laying-on-of-hands is not bestowed individually but collectively. This custom dates from the fourteenth century. The bishop stands with his hands extended over the kneeling candidates while he says or sings, in Latin, a prayer for the sevenfold gifts of the Spirit. With the recitation of this prayer the bishop strikes each candidate gently on the left cheek saying, "pax tecum" (a survival of the rite of exorcism), after which the service ends with a blessing.

In the Anglican Churches the emphasis is much more upon the moral and self-dedicatory meaning of the rite than in the Roman or Eastern uses. In them concern is obviously more with the idea behind the phrase "years of discretion," a fact due to the influence of the English reformers who stressed instruction rather than sacramental grace, or at least desired to combine instruction with sacraments. The bishop addressing the candidates collectively asks: "Do ye here, in the presence of God, and of this congregation, renew the solemn promise and vow that ye made, or that was made in your name, at your Baptism; ratifying and confirming the same; and acknowledging yourselves bound to believe and to do all those things which ye then undertook, or your sponsors then undertook for you?" In the *American Prayer Book* the candidates are asked further: "Do ye promise to follow Jesus Christ as your Lord and Saviour?"

These questions indicate something of what the Anglican Church

intends by the rite, and the appeal it is designed to make to those who come to it. What the questions call upon them to ratify is another matter and, in theory, can claim little over other rites, but they tend to project the idea that responsibility devolves upon those who are made partakers of the benefits of the sacrament. In contrast, the Roman office, appointed officially for children of seven, said or sung in a language of which probably not a word is understood, can possess meaning for them only through ceremonial. The wearing of white veils by girls and armbands by boys, the bouquets of flowers, and the excitement and elation of new clothes, all lends spirit to the occasion, but the intellectual side of the initiation has not received adequate revision for children. The determination of "what a Christian ought to know and believe to his soul's health" is set forth in all parts of the Church primarily in terms of the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments. The ancient *traditio* still forms the kernel of what is regarded as the substance of the Christian religion. The custom of infant Baptism caused instruction to follow Baptism, but the instruction itself, both in content and form, continued to be that originally intended for adults *before* Baptism.

Since the sixteenth century, the form of instruction has been chiefly that of catechisms. The Lutherans, Anglicans, Presbyterians and Roman Catholics developed them, although they differ much in content and purpose. The Catechism of the Council of Trent, for instance, is designed not for catechumens but for the clergy in preparation of instruction. This and the Lutheran and Westminster Catechism became theological treatises. The Catechism in the *Book of Common Prayer* alone achieved the conciseness of an instrument of instruction for children.

Modern Christian initiation is becoming constantly less impressive. It has none of the tremendous meaning which early Christian initiation had for those who accepted or witnessed it, chiefly because it is almost completely irrelevant to the life and need and thought of the world in which it is performed. If it be considered in terms of response to felt need it has little or no place whatever. It is a dead thing, but a dead thing in the midst of a welter of pulsating life fraught with immense possibilities for the spirit. That is its essential tragedy, and a challenge to some better way of understanding both life and religion. Religion is moribund, not as a result of conflict with science, but by reason of its blind misconception of its own nature and function. Not infre-

quently it appears apprehensive to the point of paranoia and is thereby defensive, apologetic, protective, saying all sorts of unlovely things about its "enemies," but thereby betraying only its own inner sickness.

Meanwhile youth stands challenged by a future unparalleled in history—a future not full of easy promise but of tasks to be faced.

IV

Clearly youth is the battleground of contending groups in the new national movements of the world, and initiations have been devised by them for achieving their partisan ideals. The contrast between these ideals and those which Christianity, at its best might set, is significant. It is the contrast of particular theories of political organization, nationalistic cults, class struggle, as against the freeing of life—the life of everyone—to realize the dreamed and undreamed possibilities of human existence. It is now Italy, Germany, Communism, Fascism, Nazism, or some other narrow or special loyalty, each standing, fighting, forcing a way, and setting itself *contra mundum*. Each of these groups seeks to indoctrinate the next generation, and condition it to the narrow confines of cults that merely aggravate the conflict of interests and loyalties. The fundamental emotions, manners, ideas, and celebrations of whole nations are being regimented in ways that only self-interest can keep apart. Young life is being initiated with sweeping effectiveness, and the initiation is into ways of life and thought that violate the age-long hope of peace and freedom. Thus, the need of symbols that consecrate life in its universal moments and movements, lifting it up to the best that has been and can be, claiming all men for its adventure is not a matter of individual or academic interest. It is a demand that holds within it the future of civilization.

In the face of this need it is pathetic to cast even a superficial glance over what religion now does, or leaves undone, in the initiation of boys and girls into life as it perforce lies before them. The alternatives of victory and defeat, of happiness and unhappiness, of service and selfishness, of character and degeneracy, would seem sufficient to inspire a passionate concern for the problem. In the newer movements it is expressed in the most absolute of partisan terms, a partisanship that suppresses all competing ideas or arrangements. It is not life that is believed in or dreamed of, but rather a particular regimentation of it.

But the religions of the state that have emerged since the war have

made the same mistake that religion before them made and herein lies their essential and fatal weakness. Symbols that properly merely point to ideals have passed over into existential certainties that, while they cannot claim the dignity of being metaphysical, are so real that nothing else may be taught, discussed, or voted on. Commitments are sought and given. Young minds are shielded from knowing anything outside a schedule, and life in its free movements and searchings is sacrificed for the doctrine and the aim of the cult.

But these religions have at least shown appreciation of the growth process and the importance of initiation. In Italy, Russia, and Germany, for instance, youth organizations exist for boys and girls from eight years old. Legal status for the Italian youth organization was secured by a national law promulgated in 1926 setting up the National Foundation Balilla for the Physical and Moral Education of the Youth. The youth of Germany, drilled and disciplined as for war, is garbed in military uniforms, and conditioned psychologically for conflict. And Russian youth is likewise drilled and regimented.

These are but inadequate references to the idealogies into which youth is being initiated, and the methods used in doing it. In contrast, the churches may claim a decidedly different idealogy, but the principle involved is the same. In both, sacrament and thing signified, whether it be sheer myth or supposed reality, are identified. "Truth," as something already known, is insisted on. It is this "truth" that is propagated; and the conflict is between one "truth" of this character and another. A better sense of truth is needed, and a clearer conception of the function of sacrament. The religions of state have demonstrated how to capture youth. Even the Roman Catholic Church, which has long been credited with genius in impressing unformed minds, is now eclipsed by these newer violations of human personality and freedom. But all such attempts, whether Catholic, Evangelical or Totalitarian, are essentially violations of personality. They are not based upon faith in life or its possibilities. The wisdom that is needed is the wisdom to perceive the possibilities of personality at each stage of its development, to understand the relations between it and the conditioning circumstances of its hindrance and flowering, and then to maneuver and subordinate all other things to its fullest and freest development in every man. Intelligence, knowledge, reverence, and the fundamental of all virtue, humility, come into play, and nothing

in the past, or in the imagination of poets, need be overlooked or disparaged in the establishment of the ideals thus implied, and forever in the process of being enlarged.

So far as initiation is concerned, which, in a summary sense, is equivalent to education itself, it is a matter of recognizing more clearly the significance of the growth process. The recognition of it by the religions of state is a matter of expediency, not of genuine and reverent regard for human life itself. Children and adolescents are important as the next generation of adults. The difference between these state cults and the Church is, in principle, a difference in the doctrine to be propagated; but both are efforts at indoctrination.

Paucity of religious imagination, or imagination of any kind, in relation to the growth process of childhood and adolescence, in countries not given over to fascism or communism, is almost startling when contemporary social customs and institutions are surveyed. The lack of pageantry and symbolism, as aids to the surer achievement of selfhood, marks the age as peculiarly drab, and might themselves account for the disappointing mediocrity that is the accepted lot of countless young people (and therefore of adults) in the modern world. The list of things used to stir growing life and set its feet in beauty upon the mountains is both short and seemingly accidental. The customs and institutions found in it are pitifully inadequate for the task which they so courageously face. They are not, however, to be criticized, because they were not designed with the total task in view, but grew out of partial and local efforts to meet the needs of youth. "Character building" agencies such as the Scout movements, boys clubs, etc., school commencements and patriotic rites, Father and Son Banquets, Mother's Day, hobby clubs, young peoples' fellowship groups in churches all but exhaust the list, except for numerous variations.

The Scout movements, magnificent in their successful serving of many boys and girls, are much more definitely designed to initiate young life into nature than into society. This has its value, given the artificial setting of modern existence, and is not to be minimized nor despised. But compared with the larger and more crucial need of bringing youth through early and middle adolescence, and to show it life in its deepest meanings and possibilities, they perform only a partial service. They have a romantic appeal of proven value, but, because left by society to do what only society itself can do properly,

they issue all too often in social futilities that defeat the devoted energies and hopes of those who work in them. As special services to boys and girls they need to be continued and enlarged, but the contrast between the spiritual need and possibility of adolescence and the small part which such movements can meet without transforming themselves, makes clear the necessity and opportunity of more inclusive conceptions of young life and its service.

Most of the "character building" agency programs and religious fellowship groups find justification and satisfaction in diverting the time and energies of young people into harmlessly happy channels in place of others that are viewed apprehensively as evil. Such is the approach made to adolescence generally. Its successful negotiation is treated as if it were a chance affair. Some people get through to adulthood "safely" and honorably. Others just don't, or they "settle down" later, after a series of episodes and activities regarded as more or less "natural," but also clearly regretable. Why or how some "get through" while others do not is a question asked only rhetorically. Good inheritance, economic resources, etc., seemingly account for some, but they fail equally to account for others. In the general arrangements of life, adolescence is left to its own peculiar workings. It is a dark age in the growth process, and neither society as a whole, nor any of its institutions, has given serious attention to its illumination, or offers confident aid to the ever new generation struggling through it.

This is obviously a situation in which an intelligent society cannot continue to acquiesce. It is pre-eminently the task of religion to set the stage whereon selfhood can be dramatized in such wise as to achieve, for the general lot of mankind, new qualities of integration. The conditions of its dramatization, and of this achievement, needs to be set forth in undisguised seriousness against unlimited horizons. The moods of youth, met with belief and sympathy, can carry through to the realization of idealisms hitherto abstracted out of life, and relegated to realms of forensic celebration and contemplation.

The attempt can be little more than suggested here, but it points the way to the only revival of religion that holds value for the world of modern outlook. The old is dead, whether or not voices exist to cry long life to the new. Religion has before it an undreamed future for such as will begin with life, believing in its adventure and its possibilities.

CHRISTIANITY IN GERMANY

By Karl Beth

Professor of Religious Psychology and Dogmatics, University of Vienna

Does the German majority today wish to forego Christianity? Are they longing for some ancient Nordic belief rather than for Christianity? If the question is asked in Germany, no definite answer will be given. The rulers are, as rulers must be, relentlessly buttoned-up, and the various sections of the church really do not know what is going on. That is the strange situation. At any rate, a large portion of the population does not seem to be interested in maintaining the Christian type of state and nation; on the other hand, some ecclesiastical circles, the Confessional Front (*Bekenntnisfront*), aim to save the Christian religion by conserving every bit of genuine Protestant dogmatism. And aside from these two sections, what a jumble of lukewarmness and indifference! Unquestionably Christianity is in a difficult position. To be sure, no one can give definite statistics regarding the adherents of recent German Anti-Christianity and heathenism. But as far as I can see, this is not the issue, but rather what is the intention of the government. And as to this, there is no doubt that the ruin of Christianity is decided upon in case it refuses to forego its freedom, independence, and influence. But this seems impossible, because the religion of Christ's Gospel can exist only by claiming the absolute totality of the evangelical principles of living for all human conditions and affairs. State and church, law and gospel have clashed. Only a religious system which does not claim total authority could be permitted.

First we must know what is chosen as the substitute for Christianity. Of course, there are also those who deny all religion and do not care for a substitute. Some of these are sly materialists and recommend a kind of myth and worldview (*Weltanschauung*) as a screen for unbelief. Others, propagating a kind of disbelief, cast out the person of Jesus, because he is suspected of Jewish descent. Others go farther and undertake to purge the entire Gospel of all Judaistic tendency and of quotations from the Old Testament, although they claim to offer a "Christian" gospel. These tendencies cannot be brought into a unified description, because they do not have a common germ or kernel;

in fact, most of them do not have a kernel. For the greater part they have set out to banish monotheism in general, for they assume that the belief in one Father-God is Judaic. They do so in consequence of their ignorance of a simple fact of comparative religion, namely, that belief in one God is general among peoples of different stages of civilization —a belief that is not adopted, but indigenous, or that monotheism belongs to the most ancient (because necessary?) concepts of life and the universe. Not knowing what religion actually is, those uninformed spiritual leaders attempt magical substitutions.

Is this not the beginning of the end of culture? History teaches that every advanced culture runs into ruin when it changes to magic. It will endure only as long as it remains free from magic and is permeated with ethics. Ancient cultures have disappeared on account of being influenced by magic; for the future favors only an ethical culture. Christianity's speedy victory has been the result of the ethical content of its principles. Where and when its ethical ground was badly appropriated, there and then Christianity soon had to withdraw, particularly in favor of Islam. Even in our generation the struggle between cultures often means the struggle between magic and ethical religion. One must take this point into due consideration, in order to recognize where the present age may go, unless it holds to certain conditions of a really spiritual cultural progress. As we face Neo-German happenings we are again confronted with the question: Is Oswald Spengler right in prophesying the ruin of occidental culture in the near future? And is the crisis that is brought on for Christianity in Germany just now the beginning of the disintegration of Christian culture in the occident? Will the occident, if it is not previously destroyed by its own rivalries, run, all sails set, into a spiritually conditioned dissolution, just because it abandons the Christian principles?

The German Protestants do not see clearly what is happening to their religion. In the background of their assumption is the hope that the *Fuehrer* will ultimately stand for his inbred Catholic faith; or, since the persecution of Catholics seems to demonstrate that the contrary is true, and that the *Fuehrer* has actually become sympathetic toward Protestantism, he will at least privately grant everyone freedom of faith. Many, to be sure, cannot conceal from themselves that, although the state assures again and again that religion is merely a private matter, totalitarian rulers cannot rest there. As examples one

may refer to Alfred Rosenberg, Reichsbischof Mueller, and Ernst Bergmann, the three men who work in harmony with the intention of the government to prepare the religious revolution; also to Baldur von Schirach, whom Hitler appointed leader of youth, and who declared that faith in Hitler should be the faith of youth, and that this faith should embrace all youth. Hence youth is educated away from Christianity. The time does not seem far distant when a generation shall have grown up that does not have the slightest idea of what Christian religion means. It was tragic in the very outset of Reichsbischof Mueller's activity that he had been appointed by Hitler to combine the standpoint of the church and that of Rosenberg upon the neutral basis of an "average faith." Hitler gave ready ear to both Rosenberg and Bergmann. But as their opinions could not be evaluated as Christian in any respect, Mueller's work was doomed to fail. What, then, is the aim of Rosenberg and Bergmann? That must be briefly explained.

According to Alfred Rosenberg the people of today, at least the German people, do not need a religion, but a myth. For man is not to live on the reality of God and God's word and power, not on heavenly realities, and not from actual divine sources is the German man to draw the energies which enable him to fulfil his duties of fashioning the German domain. Therefore it is not divine revelation on which he lives. Rosenberg denies all reality in the idea of God and leads people to think in the same manner. Myth rises out of race and blood, producing splendid prototypes of what race and blood can create, showing the lines along which future stages may be reached. Those prototypes will enable the German superman to create all the important shaping forces within himself. In the realm of religion Luther and Meister Eckehart are the most important examples of the German superman, teaching what German honor and freedom mean. Both Eckehart and Luther freed themselves from the fetters of dogmatic thought in the church and found their way back to the divine sources within. Doubtless Eckehart is one of the most independent religious thinkers of the Middle Ages, a real shaper of his own original feelings, and hence a very instructive writer on the spontaneous interpretation of what piety means. However, the reader of Rosenberg's *Myth of the Twentieth Century* wonders how it is possible for Rosenberg to ascribe the example of Eckehart, his authority, to the race-

religion, for Rosenberg's quotations from that master's works show that he is not in the least able to understand what Eckehart reveals regarding man's relation to God. He does not even realize that the "spark in the soul," which for Eckehart is the profound "ground of the soul," that eternal piece of Divine Being, is the point where man, when he considers himself, discovers his own connection with God. For Rosenberg that spark means nothing more than the "metaphysical simile of the idea of honor and freedom" (*Mythus,* p. 217). What Eckehart is saying has been well explained, e.g., by the American scholar Anna Groh Seesholtz in her excellent book *Friends of God*[1] (p. 68), as follows: "Eckehart has two bases for his experience of union with God, namely, the 'image' or 'spark' or 'ground' in the soul, and the person of Christ." With Rosenberg the spark in the ground of the soul is "an expression of the blood-myth," or of the "belief that nordic blood represents that mystery which replaces and overcomes the ancient sacraments" (*Mythus,* pp. 129, 680). However, Rosenberg does not require historic truth, and rejects fundamentally each trial of historic critique in advance. "That which I claim in my *Mythus* and regard as integral for our epoch, that would obtain credit even if the whole historic approval be rebutted in all points" (*Mythus,* p. 6). His only aim is that Protestantism, which has remained half work and "has failed in respect of religion," must be eliminated. Protestantism has failed especially because it has "substituted Jerusalem for Rome as a center" (*Mythus,* p. 129). The Old Testament has ceased to be a book on religion at all. Instead we need a "Fifth Gospel" that is empty of everything judaizing and depicts Jesus "as we need him, all the lot of rubbish from the Near East and Africa being eliminated" (*Mythus,* p. 74), with which the Gospel, he says, is overloaded. To the Jesus who is required for the man of our age his painful dying is irrelevant. For only because he lived as a hero "he became the God of Europeans, although until today in an abominable odd distortion" (*Mythus,* pp. 391, 604). Emphasizing the hero quality means especially that Jesus must not be evaluated as redeemer, since that idea of redemption is an un-German one, which humiliates man to a dependent being, whereas he must be in control of everything.

It is illuminating to notice that the same thoughts have been uttered by one of the most prominent spokesmen of the "German Faith"

1. Columbia University Press, 1934.

(*Deutsche Glaubensbewegung*), Count Reventlow, in the following words: "Men do not feel in need today of a redeemer or savior, that idea is of no religious value. This, however, is no obstacle to acknowledging the Person of Jesus because of his directive importance, and certain words of Jesus are as important to me as some sentences of the Vedas, of Plato, or the loftiest German mind."[2] It seems evident therefore how close the New Myth is to the so-called pagan movement, a branch of which, the "Neo-German-Christ-Faith Movement" (*Neu-Deutsch-Christ-Gläubige Bewegung*), Count Reventlow is representing. Here the main point in which various sections of New German Thought agree may be recognized. The hero ideal is to be taken from several selected examples, and from Jesus in so far as he is previously made to conform to the posited Aryan ideal.

Also the "German National Church" (*Deutsche Nationalkirche*), founded by the philosopher Ernst Bergmann in Leipzig, is quite closely related to Alfred Rosenberg. Bergman made use of Hermann Wirth's interpretation of ancient north-German (Nordic) runes. Jesus might be a good example of chivalric heroism: "Christ and Mary, no longer deities, became realities within us, namely moral patterns for our action; Mary's life for women and mothers, Christ the chivalrous helper, not the sufferer nor atoner, for men and heroes" (*Die Deutsche Nationalkirche,* p. 104). "Fundamentally, one can still be a Christian today only figuratively speaking" (p. 105). "Christianity and belief in God, public conventionalities, archaic forms of religion, have lost their meaning amid the carnage of the world-war" (p. 105 and 123). The fact that Christianity in its traditional form failed, and was felt to be failing during the great war and all its consequences, is here imputed to Christianity itself, instead of to its traducers and wrong interpreters and promoters. All these groups are characterized by their negative attitude toward the Christ of history, and the same is true of Wilhelm Hauer, the leader of the "German Faith Movement." In the affirmative sense they agree in praising the eagerness manifested in finding the way of heroic honor without divine grace and in avoiding any transcendent reality.

It is difficult to say in what numerical proportion the groups that oppose Christianity stand to one another. The party around the *Haus Ludendorff*, i.e., those totally pagan persons who go so far as to scorn

2. Quoted from Wilhelm Hauer's periodical *Deutscher Glaube,* Number 1, p. 17.

the Gospel, number 75,000 subscribers to the Ludendorff weekly, which would mean about half a million adherents. The adherents of Hauer and Bergmann seem to be more numerous. These two leaders have adherents also in several unions that have grown up like mushrooms, keep aloof from the church, and make the youth of the land their particular mission-field. Such unions are the Norse Movement of Bernhard Kummer, the Northern Religious Circle of Seiberts and Kusserow, the Pure-Race (*Rassenrein*) Religion of A. Dinter, the Wotan Society, the Baldur League, the Northern Faith Community of Friedrich Schultze, editor of the "Rig"-leaflets, the Religion of the Young Pagans, the German True Team of Kurt Mengele, the German Believers of Wolfgang Ebert, the German Faith Union of the painter Ludwig Fahrenkrog, the *Edelgarten-Buchgemeinschaft* of Horst Poser, the German Order or the German Circle, found chiefly in Scandinavia and Holland, the Order of the Nordungs. Besides these there exist some branches of the Eagles, Hawks, Wanderers, etc. Common to all is the doctrine that man is bound to "the gods of his own blood," and that therefore foreign gods, like that of Mount Sinai and Golgotha, must be effaced. The influence of these unions is great, and largely molds the thought of the oncoming generation. For, since the education of youth is in the hands of the Youth Leader, Baldur von Schirach, and since Hitler early in 1937 committed the "control of the whole of intellectual and spiritual education" to Alfred Rosenberg, who is also "the superintendent of all spiritual education and instruction in world-view" (*Weltanschauung*) not only in the N S D A P-Party, but in all branches of equal rank, as well as in the *Kraft durch Freude*,—it will probably not be long until a generation has grown up that has received no regular religious instruction at all. The schoolmasters who teach religion are compelled to teach primarily belief in the totalitarian state.

To all observers one of the most difficult questions is the relation between the groups mentioned in the preceding paragraph and the "German Christians" (*Deutsche Christen*). And yet this relation will decide whether the Christian faith will continue in the future to be the dominant religion. There is no uniformity among the "German Christians;" not even in their principal forms are all the differences among them expressed, and the differences are not small. In their beginning, doubtless, they felt themselves to be the introducers and

preservers of a better Christian religion than that which had been; that is to say, they claimed to be presenting at last that interpretation of the Gospel which is the absolute result of the historic and critical investigations which theology has made for more than a century. They regarded themselves as the entitled successors of scientific liberalism in theology. Therefore, those who observed from a distance could come to the conclusion that these were the rightful custodians of that "positive Christianity" spoken of by their weekly organ, published in Berlin. On the other hand, they, too, attempt to reduce to a minimum the value of Old Testament religion, and deny the real and historically organic connection of the Gospel with the Jewish prophecies and expectations. It is well known, that the northern group of the "German Christians" made special efforts to acquire a new and positive understanding of the Old Testament foundation, while the other group at the very outset declared the impossibility of holding a non-Aryan foundation, or of finding an Aryan foundation in the Old Testament. How narrow and shallow in this respect the breach between these two main divisions is, may be imagined when one considers that Reichsbischof Mueller is the patron of both, the two divisions of "German Christians" and the Bergmann National Church. Thus the opposition to all real Christians gets its strength from the person of this patron of both, the "German Christians" and the German National Church. What, then, is the attitude of the "German Christians?"

In order to learn to know that attitude, we must first call attention to the "Church-Movement German Christians" (*Kirchenbewegung Deutsche Christen*), who since January 1933 have propagated a purely Aryan Christianity through their weekly *Christian Cross and Swastika* (*Christenkreuz und Hakenkreuz*). How Christian is the intention of this movement, is shown by the fact that they take as their symbol a combination of the heathen cross and the cross of Golgotha; that the name of the weekly was changed (early 1937) to *German Piety* (*Deutsche Frömmigkeit*), and that the former *Letters to German Christians* has been changed to *The National Church* (in accommodation to Ernst Bergmann's *Deutsche Kirche,* for the realization of which they claim to be working). This alignment of the "German Christians" is guided by Bishop Coch in Weimar (Thüringen), and its center is Dresden.

Doubtless it was initially a deed of clemency when Reichsbischof

Mueller paralleled this movement with the "Reichs-Movement German Christians" (*Reichsbewegung Deutsche Christen*), in order to soften the anti-Semitic tone, and to satisfy those who missed in the purely Aryan religion the historic foundation of Christianity. The leader of this alignment, W. Rehm, was anxious to affirm the value of the prophets, and some other parts of the Old Testament, for the piety and morality of the New Testament religion, and in stating this to maintain also the fundamental difference between the two Testaments. Rehm's weekly, *Positives Christentum,* was able to appear for two and a half years, after which it was discontinued.

The two alignments of the "German Christians" were and are bitterly opposing each other, and through them the tendencies of the Aryan religion are carried into the congregations also, the lay circles being too weak to avoid bewilderment. Hitler yielded to the impetuous petitions of the stormy masses by appointing the *Reichskirchen-Minister* Kerrl (Sept. 30, 1935), who created as his agency a State-Church-Committee and appointed as chairman General-Superintendent Zoellner, a man in his seventy-eighth year, and proven in many ecclesiastical struggles. The first effect of this measure was that the domination of the "German Christians," which had already become inordinate, was suppressed for a short time. For these new committeemen were not the "German Christians," but were taken from among the old believers, so that "the Church," the traditional Christians, took new hope for their cause.

Nevertheless, the work of concord among the parties would not prosper. Both alignments of the "German Christians" entered a particularly strong phase of their mutual contention. For a while the northern alignment succeeded in being acknowledged by Zoellner; the Weimar, or Thuringia, Christians contended that the northern alignment is not really Christian at all, but mostly Semitic, basing their belief upon Old Testament history.

In this situation the Reibi (i.e., *Reichsbischof*) Mueller convoked, without asking Kerrl, an assembly of all "German Christians" in the Wartburg city, Eisenach, on the birthday of Luther (November 10, 1936), where he himself enforced peace. The resolution of the "German Christian Unity" was signed by persons from Anhalt, Baden, Bayern, Danzig, Hannover, Hessen, Mecklenburg, Nassau, Pfalz, Rheinland, Saarland, Sachsen, Thüringen, and Westfalen. Besides these regional representatives there had been added three special

names: Superintendent Hossenfelder of Berlin, Regierungsrat Leffler of Weimar, and Pastor Weidemann of Bremen, Mr. Rehm absenting himself and his branch withdrawing.

It is evident that this union-conference, united in this way with the sole exception of the small part that had just split off under Rehm, was a strong indorsement of the "German-Christian-Movement." Strong in opposition, they then incited a series of events to enervate "the Church." The Council in Lübeck removed eight clergymen at one time without salary, and the edict was published that "functions exercised by any one of these removed pastors after December 31, 1936, would have no legal recognition, and baptisms administered by them would not give admission to the church." The Reichs-Church-Committee interceded for the eight, but without success. What was more serious—when chairman Zoellner arranged for a visit to Lübeck, he was forbidden to go. It now became clear to all, that Reichsminister Kerrl stood strongly by the "German Christians."

Consequently Zoellner could do nothing but withdraw, which he did, February 13, 1937. This was the signal for Hitler to announce new elections in the church to soothe the excited masses. But since it was evident that the government protected only the "German" and "Aryan" forms of belief, the Confessionals (*Bekenntnisfreunde*) declared that they would not attend the elections, because the state is not entitled to dominate the church. Only one small group of the Confessionals, following the lead of the *Allgemeine Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung* (Leipzig), made their peace with the government and accepted the elections as the "beginning of a great hour for the church."

Acts immediately following proved this group to be wrong. Minister Kerrl did not hesitate to show distinctly that it was the intention of the state government to eliminate the old faith, and to substitute for it a religion that might be regarded as a possible combination of Rosenberg and Bergmann and Hauer, and that the name "German Christians" would serve only as a banner for a chiefly pagan undertaking. He addressed the heads of the provincial church committees as follows: "The Catholic bishop, Count Galen, and the Protestant general-superintendent Zoellner would teach me what Christianity is, namely, that its substance is to recognize Jesus as the Son of God. *That is ridiculous and incidental.* The influence of the person of Jesus on oneself, and a Christianity of action—that is all."

No less clear is the utterance of Leffler in his small book *Christ in the Third Reich of the Germans*. After paying some tribute to anti-Semitism by answering the "unsolvable question" whether Jesus was a Jew with the assertion: "Amid the Jewish nation Jesus was the greatest Anti-Jew; by his deed of love he became for all times the most positive Antisemite." Leffler speaks in devotional terms: "The crucified God arises to the salvation of the whole world, as the victorious, risen, world-conquering God. Thus the life, the suffering, the resurrection of the Savior is the comprehensive Word of God in human form, by which the universe was made. You are redeemed. Therefore we hurl ourselves unbroken against the world." *Sic!* Are all the dogmatic terms of which Leffler, the non-theologian leader of the "German Christians," makes use more than quotations? Will this representative of Aryan and anti-Semitic Christianity sincerely lay stress upon Christ's divinity and his identity with the Creative Word through which the world was made? If so, it seems that for Leffler Jesus' divinity is not so utterly ridiculous as it is for Kerrl. But on the other hand, the program of the Thuringian "German Christians" has no place for such a theology. Or are we to assume that this line of Leffler's writings was traced as a pacificatory measure just before the elections?

The facts have spoken. The elections have been postponed from week to week; they may be held, which is noteworthy, when conditions are more promising for the result aimed at. In a recent sermon pastor Martin Niemoeller, a strong champion of the Confessional Church, said to his congregation that as soon as all the leaders of the Church, the "Confessional Church," are in prison, the government will call the elections.

After all, what is the outlook for Christianity in Germany? Prominent men do not conceal from themselves that divergent parties are co-operating to banish the inherited religion and to weaken the church. It must not be overlooked that this aim will the sooner he realized as wide circles have long been disgusted with the officially taught Christianity, because they feel that sincere love for truth ought to find a different utterance of the very essence of Jesus' Gospel in its various forms; and, what is more, they feel that there has not been, at least for a rather long period, sufficient stress laid on the severe demands of the Gospel, and on the realization of the kingdom of God among men; and that hence these demands must be retrieved, re-thought, and reiterated in a new way and in holy earnestness. The church will regain

the full confidence of the masses, and their willingness to follow, only when it itself strives earnestly to meet the evangelical demand to follow Jesus in everything, and to make an end of every kind of sham Christianity.

On the other hand, the German government places all Christian quarters under vehement persecution. The situation of Christianity is highly dangerous; even worse than during the reign of Emperor Diocletian in the fourth century. For, just as then, the state suppresses Christianity because its essential claim to regulate all human affairs is incompatible with the "totalitarian state." But what is more, the condition is much worse for two reasons: (1) The church of today, hitherto accustomed to rule and to have its needs cared for has abruptly, without any preparation through preliminary distresses, fallen into this recent hardship, its relation to the state having been reversed over night. (2) Recent Christianity is no longer guided by laymen religiously stimulated and emotionally stirred, but by an organization of ecclesiastical functionaries—a Church of Functionaries!—in which the purely religious stimulus has changed to lukewarm observances and so-called morality. Devotion and moral sense take revenge on those who devitalize their substance.

The hour of the church has arrived; the church must undergo self-examination. Perhaps the measure of suppression is not full enough yet to bring about the necessary inner assembling of the forces of all who want to be Christians. Perhaps the burden is not heavy enough as yet to effect the outward unification of the Christian world in order that there may be built out of its own pews, and from its own members, that potent phalanx that shall shatter the foe. Else whence the fear lately expressed by the most courageous Paster Niemoeller, that separation from the state would rob the church of its means of existence? This fear shows how far the church people of Germany are removed from the idea that the church must create within itself the source of its perseverance. Such consciousness seems to be lacking. When once the church shall mean as much to the people as sport does, for instance, then its separation from the state will be welcomed! Otherwise, if it is not able to procure the necessary strength to make Christianity important, it has no right to exist.

In order to carry out this experiment, a spiritually motivated reorganization of the Protestant church is necessary. The world of present-day Protestant Christianity cannot even approximately be like

the world of its Founder's day, nor like the world of Protestantism's advent. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the new conditions under which we and our children must expect to lead our religious life. This is, however, an essential attribute of true divine revelation. Revelation never remains the same through the centuries, but takes on new aspects in its progressive development. For history has taught—and anyone can recognize it from the very concept of revelation itself—that the revelation in the holy Gospel is too sublime to be completely exhausted in a single interpretation. No, it is one of its peculiarities that it must be understood anew from time to time, as each age lifts parts of it into new relations and new significance. This necessity for re-thinking and re-interpreting and re-assimilating revelation is evidence of the fact that revelation is the deed of the eternal God Himself; that the Eternal poured forth his own Self in historic form. Revelation is the infinite and infinitely enduring self-expression of the Eternal, the full clearness and extent of which cannot appear at any single time or place of the finite world. We always look through shadows when we observe divine acts. The Eternal can never be completely revealed in temporal moments. Even though God has resolved to reveal his being, or will, or power, we can at best behold only shadows cast by the Infinite Being. The Infinite needs, as it were, infinity to become finite. The Gospel, as such a procedure of the Infinite, is being introduced, as it were, into the finite world through an infinite process—*sit venia huic paradoxiae*—in order that it may become able to pour out its own abundance gradually into our human finiteness. Each epoch of history means a new phase of such outpouring of parts of the infinite content; each means another demonstration, by God's grace, a special adaptation of a part of the Gospel's inexhaustible truth. In his direction of mankind God is ever endeavoring to shape new occasions for man to gain further understanding of his eternal revelation. Our age must be conscious of this in order to conceive its high duty of re-interpreting the Gospel. But all forces of all Christian nations must co-operate to gain the greatest benefit from the new phase of revelation given in the persecution of Christianity. A nucleus must be formed from which the newly envisioned energies of Christ may work toward the union and higher development of Christianity; a nucleus like that which the prophet Isaiah foretold, when he named his son Shear-Jashub, i.e., "a remnant will return."

MODERNISM, FATHER GEORGE TYRRELL, AND MISS M. D. PETRE

By Father Cornelius Clifford
Lecturer in Philosophy, Columbia University

It is nearly a generation ago since the movement known in our latter-day religious world as Modernism passed breathlessly through its acutest and most disquieting stage and then began to decline. If its echoes continued to attract notice for a few years in Italy, Germany and France, it soon came to be thought of as just one more disturbing episode in the long battle of the Christian faith for that *twofold hearing* in the intellectual centers of the world without which, as its earliest heralds invariably announced, it could never become the essential substance of a believer's life. That twofold hearing involved, in the first place, the need of an unprejudiced heart; and, in the second place, the inner and subtler hearing of *a man of good will*. Pius the Tenth, who, in spite of the private sneers of a few of Tyrrell's continental friends, was a man of singular insight in all matters bearing upon the actual Catholicism of his day, vigorously summed up the essential affirmations of the movement in two famous documents. In so doing, His Holiness, albeit unwittingly, gave it a nick-name by which it is still remembered by many minds obviously out of touch with that devout and high-minded Pontiff's intuitions. After the dissensions which the *Lamentabili*, issued by the Holy Office, aroused for a space, and with the unhesitating condemnation embodied in the Encyclical *Pascendi Gregis*, which came out soon after, Modernism as a movement in the age-old Church passed somewhat sullenly into silence. The only notable publication which has appeared in recent years to break that silence is M. Loisy's *Memoirs pour servir à l'histoire religieuse de notre temps* in three volumes, the last of which appeared as recently as 1931.

The English Jesuit, Father George Tyrrell, who died in mid-July 1909, has often been referred to, and also in many quarters has been explicitly named, as the "onlie begetter" of Modernism as a rational and saving apologetic for the Christian faith. This, of course, is far from being true. That unhappy eminence belongs to no one individual, but to a group of Catholic scholars on the Continent—to M. Loisy,

perhaps, in the first instance, and to one or two Italian priests who took the bold step of outlining a novel Scriptural exegesis, based upon a modified and Italianate Hegelianism of the Croce type by which they attempted to reconcile the ancient historic faith and its Conciliar definitions through the centuries with the newer "new learning" that was coming in yearly in such volume out of Protestant Germany. All this, of course, is threadbare history, but it will enable us to form a judgment of Miss M. D. Petre's *My Way of Faith*,[1] which appeared as recently as last December. Miss Petre belongs to a distinguished family whose members have played a not unimportant part in the religious and social history of England for fully four centuries. Her book is of great interest, though marred, here and there, by an exhibition of naïve and, for the most part, harmless, egoism which goes far to explain not a few of the sorrows and misunderstandings of the latter years of her life. As more than a good half of the book deals with difficulties and raises issues on which Modernism threw a confusing half-light during its brief ascendency over a small group of important English Catholics in Father Tyrell's day, it will not be amiss, we feel, to offer a word or two of explanation, not altogether in rebuttal; but, rather, by way of calling attention to the fact that Roman authority saw deeper and spoke with more clarifying precision than Miss Petre does in her somewhat misleading version of the complicated story.

Modernism was not, nor is it now in those Anglican, Lutheran or even Hebrew and rabbinical quarters where it is still pursuing its haphazard way, a perfectly simple thing. On the contrary, its deeper implications, its more fundamental assumptions, link it with problems that have not by any means been settled once for all by those post-Kantian solutions which are accepted with such naïve finality by the majority of our youthful candidates for academic distinction in philosophy either here or in Europe. We moderns often smile at the *jurare in verbo magistri* type of intellect prevalent in the classical periods of the Middle Ages. The chivalry of discipleship, however, is not such an unworthy thing, nor is it peculiar to any one school, though "authority" be sometimes born of it. Aristotle was calumniously denounced in his day for thinking cheaply of his great master, Plato; and in our own more shrunken times the vogue of a great name in philosophy is notoriously as fleeting as the modes of women's coiffures

1. London: J. M. Dent & Sons; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1936.

or the extravagances of fashion in Easter hats. It remains true for all that, however we may resent the suggestion, that the abiding problems of epistemology, ethics and metaphysics have not been made fully intelligible in Germany or by German minds in the nineteenth century. If we have placed metaphysics last in that triad of "fundamentals," it really comes first in significance. Few, if any, of the early Modernists had any real concern for those *notiones primigenae*, which the Neo-Scholastics of our time have made so much of, and out of which a newer reading of the old Aristotelian *positions* has been derived. Father Tyrrell had, during the years that preceded his more critical and challenging work, i.e., from 1892 to 1899, or thereabouts, an openly avowed distaste for any discussion of these ideas.

He was, at this time, so far as he could be induced to look into this "region of sub-reality," a vague and adolescent pragmatist with a certain admiration for Maurice Blondel, for the distinguished Oratorian, Père Laberthonniere, and his friends and co-workers on the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, and, notably, for Henri Bergson. No matter what view one may take of Father Tyrrell's metaphysics, his habitual attitude towards those theories of knowledge which were linked with the revival of Thomism under Leo XIII, was in no better case. It is true that he came to think better of St. Thomas in after years; so much so, indeed, that the then Father General of the Society, Father Luis Martin, is reported to have said to Cardinal Vaughan that Tyrrell was under the delusion that he knew more about the real Aquinas than all the Commentators of his own order combined. When one recalls that Suarez, Vasquez, Didacus Ruiz, Toledo and the two de Lugos had described their unending folios as just so much "commentary" on the original *Angel of the Schools*, one can begin to understand better the real point of His Paternity's amazement. Perhaps such dearth of sympathy in this direction will go far to account for Tyrrell's critical antagonism in many a private conversation during these years to Newman's conception of doctrinal development and of the great Cardinal's attempted solution of the problems of assent.

His mind, whether he knew it or no, was rapidly moving to a repudiation of the apologetic processes dear to the heart of the old-fashioned scholastic theologian and—what, in the event, proved to be of more tragic consequence to himself and his admirers—to an ill-suppressed contempt for the stereotyped officialism, as he charac-

terized it, of the various Roman congregations of the day. He was out of touch with authority, in fine. After he had turned the last corner of his career he was smarting continuously under a vague impression of *opposition* in every ecclesiastical quarter in which he desired to express himself: *opposition* from the Society, and especially from some of its German representatives, either lent to the English Province or domiciled for their own particular work in England; *opposition*, almost, to the "hierarchical and Roman Church and all its works and pomps." How are we to label such a stand? Was it one of unbelief? Was it, coupled with certain defiant challenges in his later books, one of heretical aberration for which he would offer no laudable repentance? Was it temperamental contumacy, or flat and uncompromising rebellion? The story of his death-bed that Miss Petre gave the world in the *Autobiography and Life*, which she edited with somewhat intemperate emphasis a quarter of a century ago, scarcely affords ground, even at this distance of time, for an altogether comforting answer. Perhaps the real solution of the tragic enigma, if solution it may be called, must be found in Father Tyrrell's temperament, and not in his ultimate and conditioning death-bed performance.

In spite of his outward and bafflingly quiet demeanor, Father Tyrrell was not a meek man. He came of an intransigent and Protestant Irish stock; yet he was gifted with an intelligence far above the average University type of his day, though he was not a university man himself. His face was not a prepossessing one; neither was it altogether reassuring. He had the cold unrelenting gray-blue eye of the fanatic; tempered by a courtesy, however, in which he seldom failed, until one touched him to the quick. He could then be ironically, almost rudely, defiant. His passion for discipleship had this distressing note about it that he could be satisfied with a following of the injudicious, the crass-minded and the incompetent. His subtlety and power of instant analysis were almost uncanny; yet he could betray at times a hasty acquiesence in sweeping anti-Christian inferences that amounted almost to credulity. This mental weakness often astonished his familiars until they came to know that there were unexpected limits to his erudition; as when he had gone galloping, as was his wont, through a book like President White's *Warfare between Science and Theology*. White's work first appeared in 1896, but it does not seem to have come opportunely to Father Tyrrell's notice until some seven years

later when it made a profound impression on him in his then disturbed state of mind. The present writer has in his possession, among other correspondence of Father Tyrrell's, a letter asking him pointedly whether he had really considered the facts and the general theme of the work. That challenge was one more instance of the old precipitancy of assent that often characterized him in debate. He assumed in his haste that all historic *opposition* involved a dialectic of irremediable incompatibility. In this it is hard to avoid the inference that he was as completely an unscientific victim to his own assumptions as the hapless theologians in question were. This same significant trait may be detected in the posthumous contribution which Mr. L. P. Jacks, Editor of the *Hibbert Journal*, printed as the first article of a Supplementary Number some time in July 1909. The publication consisted of some eighteen essays written by men of many Christian, or only half-Christian, shades of opinion on the central theme of *Jesus or Christ*.

There Father Tyrrell describes his own contribution as *The Point at Issue*. He takes the Nicene definition and carries it over a long waste of Gospel criticism until he sets it down, in not irreverent parallelism, with the findings of Albert Schweitzer's *Von Reimarus zu Wrede*. (A work since translated into English under the title of *The Quest of the Historic Christ*.) The gulf thus bridged in two or three lines of print is not to be measured in years, but in phases and planes of thought; while its impassability, in the concrete, may be divined, if one will only read "as I (i.e., Father Tyrrell) have done, first, the Third Part of the *Summa* of St. Thomas Aquinas" and then Schweitzer's account of the "oscillations and progress of Gospel criticism" in the work in question. Progress, in the context, would seem to be a daringly overweighted word, for it is rich in assumptions! "The main difficulty of the doctrine of Christ's Godhead," Father Tyrrell had pointed out on the previous page (13) "as understood by the Creeds, is a rational one; *sc.*, Can we attach any intellectual meaning to it at all? Have we concepts answering to our words? If not, can we intelligently affirm or deny what conveys no more meaning to us than the proposition Christ is X." To the same *Hibbert Supplement*, Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J., then in his sixty-fourth year, who occupied a position of much greater prestige, both spiritually and intellectually than Tyrrell ever achieved, and whose scholarship, in spite

of passing and youthful impressions to the contrary, was of a much more solid type, also contributed an article which bore the straightforward title of *One Lord Jesus Christ*. It was in the veteran's best manner. It betrayed, too, evidences of learning every bit as wide and much more classic than Tyrrell's showiest; even if it was not so impressively up-to-date. Apparently it directed the bulk of its argument to the Reverend R. Roberts of Bradford, whose article in the January *Hibbert* had created so much angry comment in English non-Catholic centers that the Editor of the *Hibbert*, with his flair for *actualité* in these matters, promptly conceived the idea of the supplementary number. Not a few of the younger members of the English Province, however, were persuaded that Father Rickaby had Tyrrell's position in mind from first to last. That may well have been true; except that Father Rickaby and the majority of his fellows in the English Province were under the influence of that chivalrous, if unwritten, pact of silence with regard to Father Tyrrell's long litany of misunderstandings, which is one of the finest things that a mere outside chronicler has to record of them. They had stretched Christian and catholic forebearance almost to the breaking point. Tyrrell himself knew this and was not ungrateful.

As one reads Father Rickaby's article one becomes gradually aware of a mind in rebuttal; a mind which is as full of religion as it is of learning and loyalty, and with a fine, and quiet regard for what some would call the higher logic of the heart. The reply is the reply of a soul habitually steeped in a sense of nearness to some great Presence, some higher Reality, which is more of a Person than the conscious person who himself is aware of It. This is not to say that the argument is a mystical argument, for the words *mystic* and *mysticism* are fluid words in these days, devoid for the most part, of tangible significance. Father Rickaby's reasons imply more than they seem to infer. They are freighted with a kind of devout impatience, as though they would flout the sort of mind that sees things disparately, as it were, and unlinked with the larger meanings of the Whole.

And so, whether Father Tyrrell was the real opponent that his older *confrère* had in mind, one thing, at least, ought to be clear to the reader of both their published views: the duality between the Jesus of the Gospels and the Christ of the Christian Church turns out to be no real duality at all. The proposition *Christ is X* may be, if examined in

kindness and good will, an inferentially orthodox, if unusual, expression of the age-long doctrine of the union of the two natures in one Person; or it may be an unadulterated and somewhat flippant confession of hopeless and irreligious agnosticism. By faith we affirm the reality of both natures, the human and the divine; and by faith, too, we affirm the truth and the uniqueness of the living Union; we know nothing whatever about the *how* or the *manner* of this Union. That is a Mystery the solution of which the believer must wait for until he too "goes back to the Father."

THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY PLATONIC IDEALISM

By Herbert W. Schneider
Professor of Religion, Columbia University

It is now about a century since Emerson delivered his Divinity School address; it is about half a century since Royce published *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, and about a quarter of a century since the appearance of his *The Problem of Christianity*. To these landmarks in the religious history of American idealism may now be added two significant revisions,[1] which clearly mark a new turn in a distinguished tradition. Inspired by recent developments in science, emancipated from much of the subjective psychology in which idealism had been enmeshed, the systems of Professors Boodin and Schmidt culminate in a vigorous assertion of religious faith and a doctrine of God, which prove not only that idealism is still alive but also that it has a genuinely religious vitality. In the end these new versions of idealistic faith strikingly resemble that of Emerson, but the paths by which this end is reached are just as strikingly new. The publication of Boodin's *God* and Karl Schmidt's *The Creative I and the Divine* may therefore serve as a fitting occasion to call attention to the changes that have come over idealism since Royce, and to note the distinctive traits of this idealistic theology as an expression of both the Platonic tradition and the romantic spirit of contemporary science.

Foremost is the emphasis on creation. Creation, or cosmic guidance, is defended by Boodin against evolution, both deterministic (preformation) and emergent, whereas by Schmidt it is conceived even as a divine *fiat*. Nothing more dramatic has taken place in recent intellectual history than the exit of evolution from the philosophic stage. Recall how Royce struggled, apparently in vain, against the evolutionary concept, how but a few years ago all criticism of evolutionary method seemed carping and quibbling, how after the battles of the nineteenth century evolution could smile complacently at all its foes.

1. John Elof Boodin: *God and Creation. Three Interpretations of the Universe.* New York: Macmillan, 1934. *God and Creation. God, a Cosmic Philosophy of Religion.* New York: Macmillan, 1934. Karl Schmidt: *The Creative I and the Divine. Introduction to a Systematic Philosophy.* New York: The Dial Press, 1937.

Idealism itself, since Hegel, has been preoccupied with the laws of the Spirit in history. No one has denied evolution since then, but every one has repudiated it. It may be accepted, but it has nevertheless lost the moral and religious importance that it unquestionably had a generation ago. Individual variation, which Darwin calmly took for granted, now seems exciting. Attention is centered, not on the material of history or the environment of the organism, but on the living agent; not on causation but on action. God reveals himself in action. *Am Anfang war die Tat.* We have returned to the enthusiasm of romanticism. It is not a mere return, however; the century of preoccupation with the temporal process had its sobering influence. For now the world of activity is not set over against the world of idea, rather it is the activity implicit in understanding that is the chief object of enthusiasm. It is active reason that reveals God. "The human intellect is at home in nature. . . . While the human mind is a local emergence, it finds that its structure is universal, i.e., it applies not only logically but everywhere. This is no accident. The emergence of mind locally may be due to temperature conditions, but its relevance is universal. Hence we must conclude that it owes its character to cosmic genius. On the basis of present science we are justified in ruling out emergence by accident, i.e., without cosmic guidance, as incredible."[2] This does not imply pantheism, or God's omnificence, to use Santayana's term. God is not the universal cause, but the creator, the creative agent. Or in Schmidt's words, God is actuality creating reality.

> God creates all reality. We recover Him therefore not merely in ethics; though it has been and still is the conviction of many thinkers that the realm of ethics is His special domain. . . . We must find traces of Him in all His creations; and, if we speak of His Will or His Power, it must be felt in all domains of reality. In cosmology He is primarily the Logos Who accounts for the reasonableness of the physical universe, for the possibility of bending "brute facts" to the command of physical laws. . . . In ethics God appears as Eros, Love, as the urge toward the good, which may be foiled and frustrated, but which we assume as present in ourselves and others. . . . In the world of art it is not so much the "numinous," inspiring awe, which reveals His presence; it is rather the fact that we can delight in beauty; that there is such a thing as taste. . . . All truth and existence come from God; there is no other source. In traditional language: there is grace, and without it we are nothing; there is revelation, and without it we know nothing. All comes from God, all leads to God, all ends in God; there is

2. Boodin, *God*, pp. 58-9.

nothing beyond Him—no knowledge, no goodness, no beauty. The firm confidence in this is faith.[3]

To be sure these last sentences sound like pantheism, but not if we remember that in Schmidt's terminology existence means reality, systematic existence. Appearance, illusion, experience, evil, these "are," in a sense, independently of God; they are the locus of his activity, the material of creation. They are not created.

And this takes me to a second important characteristic of this idealism—pluralism. Boodin is a dualist: God and matter both are real and necessarily imply each other. Schmidt is a pluralist, believing in as many independent universes as there are autonomous "generating problems." Empirically he emphasizes four chief universes: the world of physical objects generated by the problem of "funding" or "saving" sense experience; the world of ethics generated by the problem of creating a perfect community; the world of art generated by the problem of creating beauty; and the world of psychology, generated by the problem of recovering actuality, "the creative center from which all reality issues." But any number of generating problems is possible. The important point to be noted here, however, is that the world of faith, of religion, is not an independent world, generated by a particular problem. God is "the fundamental hypothesis" implicit in the solution of any problem. "God is not a reality. . . . He is not an object. . . . God is not the good. . . . God is not the beautiful. . . . He is not even directly known. . . . We know what He *does*, we recover what He *is*."[4] "In a sense we may say He unites in Himself, as creative center, the various universes, which, as such, remain distinct and separate."[5] The various universes are united, therefore, only in the sense that they are all creatures of reason, revelations of creativity. In Boodin's cosmos there is more structure. In addition to the basic dualism of form and matter, there is a "hierarchy of fields" of creation (*God*, p. 69). In both systems, however, there is an irreducible pluralism. God must "suit his creativeness to his material" (*Three Interpretations*, p. 445). And Schmidt remarks very pointedly, "It takes at least two worlds for the possibility of error" (p. 196). God exists *in* his world, in other words, and it is *His* world only in the sense that

3. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 277-9.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 275-6.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 278-9.

He knows how to make worlds out of chaos. Not only are these idealists conscious of their departure from Royce and the others who have struggled painfully to solve the problem of evil on the basis of an absolutistic monism, but Boodin makes a careful and highly instructive analysis of the history of Christian theology,[6] in which he attempts to prove that Christianity is really dualistic.

The biblical tradition, which has been nominally accepted as divine authority by orthodox Christianity, is dualistic. . . . II *Maccabees* 7:28 reads in the standard English version: "I beseech thee, my son, look upon the heaven and the earth and all that is therein, and consider that God made them of things that were not (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων)." The phrase "out of non-beings" clearly shows Platonic influence, and it might very well do so since the book was written in the first century, A.D. With Plato non-being does not mean nothing, but the world of flux as opposed to being, the realm of Ideas, of order and form. The *Vulgate*, the Latin translation by Jerome, renders the critical part of the passage, "God created them out of nothing (ex nihilo fecit illa Deus)." The Latin had no equivalent for the Greek non-being, and so a mistranslation finally determined Christian theology on this point. Why an ambiguous passage in an unimportant book—never recognized in the Hebrew canon of the Old Testament—should be given such weight in face of the clear dualism of "Moses and the Prophets" can only be accounted for by the will-to-believe what suits our prejudices.

There is no doubt a real kinship of intuition between Plato and the scriptural tradition. In either case cosmological dualism was the result of ethical dualism.

The two great traditions—*Genesis* and Plato's *Timaeus*—furnish the true intuition which must be the basis of the philosophy of creation. They set forth the eternal faith in value and meaning in the world in which we are placed. But they also recognize that in our world there is resistance to the realization of ideals. There is always the relatively unformed which must be induced to take on order. Without the ordering genius of God the world would be chaos. Order is not completely realized in our world because of the resistance which the lower offers to the incarnation of the higher. This inertia is characteristic of nature everywhere, but it is most strikingly manifested in the resistance of human wills to the ideal order for which God and his ministers work. Yet this pluralism is the condition for the realization of the great ethical drama.

. . . The struggle between good and evil is felt to be more than a human struggle. It is enacted on a cosmic stage. "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now," waiting for "the glorious liberty of the children of God," to use the language of the first Christian theologian, St. Paul.

6. *Three Interpretations*, chapter 10, "Creation in the Hebrew and Christian Traditions."

We have seen that both Jewish and Christian theologians, at the beginning of the Christian era, followed the dualistic tradition of Plato and the Hebrew prophets. But with the third century the monistic conception of creation—creation out of nothing—won its fateful triumph.

I regard it as a tragedy that Christian theology foresook the sound intuition of the prophets of Israel and of Plato that this is a dualistic and pluralistic world. . . . It is easy to see how the monistic doctrine, i.e., the doctrine of creation out of nothing, arose historically. It had, no doubt, its historical justification as an offset to Manichaean dualism which would have been fatal to the development of Christianity. But the consequences of the monistic doctrine are none the less tragic. Its logical offspring is the doctrine of predestination with its absolute fatalism which robs human life of all its moral significance. This tragedy is the result of abandoning the sound intuitions of human experience upon which the prophets of Israel and Plato built their religious views of the universe. The church would speak with the wisdom of God while really it has as its authority only the interpretations by human thinkers and mostly second-rate thinkers at that. No sanction by the most powerful institution that ever existed can raise the faltering and confused efforts of human minds into divine wisdom. The wiser course is that pursued by the great creative geniuses—the prophets of Israel and Plato—who started from human experience and tried to discover a religious theory that would meet human needs.[7]

This whole chapter, which is really a philosophy of the history of philosophy, abounds in fresh insights and interesting perspectives; suffice it, however, to point out only that we have here a competent and impressive revival, from an unexpected quarter, of Platonism, Manichaeism, or Averroism, or call it what heresy you will, to plague orthodoxy.

In Schmidt's system God is little more than the "guarantor" of human creativity, not unlike the Oversoul of Emerson. His essence, though this is strictly unknowable, is freedom. Freedom in and through us creates the architecture of reality. In Boodin's system, on the other hand, God is essentially the principle of form, structure, organic wholeness. According to Schmidt God creates order; according to Boodin order is itself creative. It is impossible here to review Boodin's argument, only its bases and conclusions can be stated. It is based ultimately on the doctrine that matter (by definition, it seems to me) is not dynamic. Matter is inertia, chance, mechanism. It can be investigated adequately by mathematical physics, possibly (and ideally) by sheer mathematics. Matter is pliable but not creative. It must be

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 422-3, 426, 426-7, 428, 480-1.

guided. Spirit is the name we give to the guiding power or principle. Spirit as here conceived is not timeless, eternal, self-contemplating, Aristotelian, actuality; it is temporal, living, moving. Boodin is emphatic in asserting the reality and importance of time in the spiritual even more than in the material realm. God is the form of time or, in terms of physical analysis, the space of time.

> If we conceive space as the universal matrix of order, then corpuscular matter becomes the amorphous plural material, with its indeterminacy and inertia, but also plasticity to be ordered in the lattice-work of space. If, however, we recognize the facts of change and emergence everywhere, we cannot suppose that space is a stereotyped order. Space is not absolutely and eternally figured in such a way that mere variation in position means variation in structure. This is contrary to evidence. The same structure can be repeated wherever the conditions are appropriate. Space must be capable of being all structure at any place. This structure must be a hierarchical (i.e., hierarchical from our finite perspective of evaluation from our plural frames of reference. Hierarchy could have no meaning within the harmony of the life of space when considered as it is for itself.) dynamic structure. It must have cumulative temporal direction. . . .
>
> Space must be present to matter, not merely neutrally but constructively, yet not coercively but persuasively (as Plato would say). The dualism of matter and space becomes the dualism of matter and spirit—matter being the plural and indeterminate which is to be ordered, and spirit being the ordering genius.[8]

Space, as in Henry More, Newton, Edwards, and other Platonists, is divine. Space gives form to time, not eternally but continually, creatively, *in* time. This spatial whole is living. It is not a single living organism, not a world soul; it is alive in a vaguer sense, as a living community, or a dramatic unity. In fact, the life of God *is* a drama, a tragedy. "To say that a living spirit operates in the world is not saying that the world is one living thing" (*God*, p. 134). "The universe may behave as a living whole without being one organism, provided that it is controlled by spirit" (*God*, p. 135). "But we must remember that a real being is more than a field. It must have its individual aspect. God, to be a creative artist and the Saviour of those who seek, must be more than an impersonal field. He must be in some sense personal as well as omnipresent. But how this can be, our limited minds cannot fathom" (*God*, p. 128).

Apart from this vague reference (which is indeed difficult to

8. *God*, pp. 147, 148-9.

fathom), there is no insistence on the personality of God. In fact, were it not for this passage, I should have supposed that Boodin would agree with Schmidt in regarding personality as an all too human attribute for God. Certainly the whole drift of the argument is away from personalistic idealism. The problem of saving individuality in both God and man, which worried Royce so persistently, receives scant treatment here. The individual's duty is to "co-operate with the whole" (p. 85), and the whole exists strictly for the sake of the whole. The individual has freedom only as he can "think and appreciate through a sharing of cosmic structure" (p. 94).

This may be sufficient exposition to convey to the reader the general conception of God under consideration. Unfortunately I can give no adequate account here of the painstaking and expert way in which both philosophers have utilized contemporary physical and mathematical science. The chief aim of such an idealism, one would conclude from these expositions, is to formulate the faith which is actually inherent in the scientific pursuit of truth. It is above all a theology for natural scientists, and its chief polemic is against those naturalists who are so engrossed in their subject-matter that they forget themselves and their activities when they try to give an account of reality. The naturalism or materialism against which this idealism is directed seems to me in large measure a bogey. I can not put it better than Professor Boodin does himself: "Energy apart from organization is an abstraction" (*God*, p. 56). The same is true of inertia. According to Professor Boodin a strict materialist must believe in mere chance motion; any concession to law or structure is a concession to "mind," for, says he, "how can the measure and order of matter be derived from matter?" (*God*, p. 131). Matter, as he conceives it, formless, sheer inertia, is not the matter of any known materialist. And it need not surprise us to find that Professor Boodin in his *Three Interpretations of the Universe* finds that there have been no pure materialists or emergentists. All believe in natural law; and law simply *can not* be natural, i.e., material. Now, whether matter can do what it seems to do, whether matter is essentially orderly or has mind, is in the last analysis a terminological dispute hardly worth entering upon. The real point is that God, spirit, mind, in these systems is a name for the orderly ways of action which are exhibited in nature. Mathematics, as Platonists have always felt, is divine; their God naturally "geometrizes."

There is a question of fact, however, in this analysis, namely, whether mechanism should not be regarded as divine on the same account. To associate mechanism with chance motion is certainly not just to the facts. Similarly to rule out of mechanical behavior all ends makes machines unintelligible. Mechanical action is the very antithesis of random motion. Machines are organizations with identifiable functions or products. They, of all things, should be regarded as evidence of God using matter creatively. Professor Schmidt, in arguing that ends belong wholly to ethics and not to physics, says, "There is no proposition in physics which states, and proves, that engines ought to run" (p. 202). And yet, in a significant sense, it is precisely this proposition which every physicist assumes. An electron that does not "run" as an electron should must be given another name. An engine that does not run is no longer an engine. Mechanisms define norms, and what is more, they define them mathematically. The more mechanical the operation, the more precision in the measurement. In short, mechanism is the very perfection of order and has always been allied both in fact and in theory with mathematics. Hence I find it difficult to reconcile the creative God with the God who merely "geometrizes." More generally, a thinking spirit, whose action is in a significant sense free, should be more clearly distinguished from the intelligible order or structure of the world, which, though it may be fittingly called objective mind, is not cosmic thought. In so far as the idealist preaches the creation of systems of thought or other communities of action he is expressing, though in an ancient, now largely foreign, tongue, the actual ideals and faith of natural scientists, the worship (though not the cult) of truth. But in so far as he identifies man's work in creating thoughtful systems with those physical or even biological structures that have been created by God, he, more than the materialist, runs the risk of confusing mechanical order with creative procedure.

The impersonal use of Spirit by Boodin, inspired by Plato's *Timaeus*, and the impersonal Reason of Schmidt, inspired by Kant and Natorp, have long been useful categories of philosophical analysis; but they also have long been confusing to Christians, who imagine that the Platonic God is their God. Platonic idealism, as exhibited in these two works, is an impressive mythology of science and of the love of truth in general. As such it is a genuine creation, a work of God. But it is not a philosophy of religion, least of all of the Christian re-

ligion. It is itself a particular religion, a system of faith, created for a special community and exploring a particular "field." It is not an accident that Platonism here grows out of the love of natural science, since its original home (especially in this Artistotelianized version) was among the Greek scientists. And it is no accident (whether it be a tragedy or not) that more popular religions believe in less scientific gods. Since Kant idealism has drifted into a position antithetical to physical science; it sought a stronghold in moral reality and even cast aspersions on the physical order. In America Emerson and young Royce typified this transcendental disdain for natural science. The Royce of *The Problem of Christianity*, largely under the influence of mathematics and of Peirce, returned to the community of science as the prototype of the community of saints. In these works of Boodin and Schmidt idealism turns once more to the idealization of science, the religion of the *Timaeus*, of Newton, and, I suspect, comes closer to the spirit of the Enlightenment than the avowed scorners of materialism would feel free to admit.

COMMUNICATIONS

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OXFORD CONFERENCE

By E. G. Homrighausen
Assistant Professor of Church History, Butler University

The Oxford Conference on Life and Work, held in England last summer was not a complete or self-sufficient event. It was only a significant crystalization-point in a process of ecumenical Christian thought about the world-situation that is facing the Christian faith. And since the Christian faith is iself so closely related to the social expression through which it has been preserved, and through which it functions in the world, Oxford had to deal with the Church.

This process of Christian thought, crystalized for a time in Oxford, is not complete by any means. Those who were present went away feeling that the work had only begun. We parted after we had just arrived at a point of common understanding. We were face to face with the fact that ecumenical thought and life for non-Roman Christendom has merely been inaugurated, and now needs to be pursued with caution if we are to keep the unity we now have, and with great speed, if we are to make the Christian truth of import and effectiveness in a world that is fast forming new social, religious, intellectual and moral patterns. "Ecumenics" will not only need to become a major subject of interest in churches and theological schools, but it will need to become a major spirit that shall temper every phase of Christian thought and life. At Oxford we saw the promised land of Christian faith; not a Utopia, but an "Ecumenia."

Oxford was a gathering of selected Christians from the various Churches (except the Roman Catholic and the German Evangelical), and world Christian movements, representing not only high scholarship and technical knowledge, but minds which had been made dynamic by the Christian way of direction, the Christian morale and the Christian motive. One should not say "Christian," for that has the tendency to particularize and canalize the Gospel of God into molds too limited. For at Oxford we did take for granted, through sincere faith, that the Way of God in Christ is The Way of God for the whole world. The Gospel is not meant for the Church to hoard, but for the

Church to mediate, and only in so far as the Church is a true, obedient witness of that Gospel can it be saved. I think we might fairly say that the representatives at Oxford held to this faith. There were no delegates at Oxford who would be inclined to doubt the Gospel's relevance to the present situation, or its absolute validity in the salvation of individual and social life. They may differ as to their interpretation of the Gospel's expression in the world, but not as to their faith in its absoluteness.

The Roman Catholics were interested, and some of their laymen worked on preliminary reports. There were many who said we should not think of Christian unity only in Evangelical terms. We must keep the door towards Rome open. No unity dare eventually be less than truly Catholic.

The chief objective of Oxford was the present world situation, and the threat it offers to the Christian faith and Church, and to a world that dares to build its life on any other basis! The present "world" has grown secular, and has grown so while under the nominal influence of Christianity. This secularism has invaded the walls of the Church. It has created chaos and confusion in community life, until vast areas of human life have thrown away their freedom as they have abandoned themselves with uncritical loyalty to a totalitarism Massman, in whom they expect to find security and salvation. These totalitarian movements are lead by men who either deny Christianity an existence, or subordinate it to their secular faith. Christian ideology is hardly at the heart of these movements. These modern states have become rival churches, with rival faiths.

All this danger comes at a time when the Church is divided, and at a low ebb in theological vitality and vigilance and confessional militancy. And it comes at a time when vast areas of human society have been either openly or subtly de-Christianized, and these vacuums of de-Christianized areas have been filled with a secular philosophy, or theology, of life. Christianity today finds itself at the "end of the Christian era," increasingly on the defensive and in the minority. A new temper must be born in the Church, that until recently has gone from victory to victory, and now faces one of its major struggles for existence. It is not merely the existence of the Church which is at stake, but the Church's God-entrusted ideology. Therefore, the major subjects discussed at Oxford had to do with the modern state, community

life, the social and economic order, education, war and peace, and the world of nations, or the problem of internationalism (universalism).

It is unfortunate that the German Evangelical Church delegation could not be present. But the remark of the Archbishop of Canterbury is true, namely, that they spoke more eloquently by their absence than by their presence. The shadow of the German Church struggle, and the realization that the absence of its delegates was a concrete example of the urgency and seriousness of the general subject, helped to temper the discussions. When the Free-Church delegates from the German Methodist, Baptist and Old Catholic Churches offered a protest against the resolution of the Conference to send a personal delegation to the absent German Confessional brethren to express our sympathy, it caused some concern. There are two sides to the German Church case, to be sure. But it was rather a questionable thing for these Free-Churchmen to say that, if the German Evangelicals would preach the Gospel and straighten out their own house of theological confusion, their delegates might have been at Oxford as the Free-Churchmen were! It made many feel that the Free-Churchmen *had* to say what they did to remain in good graces with the German government. And it was hardly the proper thing, for the sake of the Gospel in Germany, to discredit, at this time, those German Evangelicals who were standing for the faith at great cost. (I saw personally what the German press made of these Free-Churchmen's statements to discredit the German Evangelicals.) And it hardly behooves Free-Churchmen, who represent only a few thousand Christians in Germany, to speak the authoritative word for the Church to which the great majority of German Protestants belong. The German Free-Church delegates might have helped the cause by voluntarily remaining at home in sympathy with their Confessional brethren. True, there are two sides to the case. The German Evangelical Church *is* largely to blame for its own plight. Its old official and legal tie-up with the state is largely to blame for its lack of freedom today. It wants to be the peoples' Church, and yet be free. The German Church is a pitiful spectacle. It wants to be a help to its people in the new Germany, and yet to do so, it must dilute its Gospel. It has old ties binding it to the State, and these have bound its hands and made its religion too formal and official. And yet, it wants to be free. To do so it will need to support itself voluntarily, —and it cannot. And to free the Church from the State may result in

denominationalism, with its issue in a religious and factional division of its people. In many ways its present situation looks quite hopeless. But all this is hardly reason enough for the Free-Church delegates to say what they did.

In spite of the absence of the Roman Catholics and the German Evangelicals, the reports of the various sections are indeed gems. They are Protestant Evangelical encyclicals! For years to come those who wish to know the Christian judgment on the world at the present time will turn to these reports and find in them the Christian mind. These reports were drafted in a realistic spirit, and yet in a spirit that was united in Christ. We were in Oxford as Christians, and not as expert technicians. Every line of the reports was gone over again and again, until it seems that there is scarcely an unnecessary word in them, and not a necessary phase of the subject omitted. They represent distilled thought, checked and counter-checked, until the expressions were satisfactory to the group. Again and again arguments arose, but always in the best of spirit, and tempered with the thought that this was a Church Conference, and not one of scientific experts. I do not think that we allowed our expert scientific judgment to be spoiled by religious sentiment, nor our religion to be tempered by a science that was less than genuine science. We were Christian *and* scientific realists!

Of course, there was no talk of techniques. How could Oxford decide what technique Germans living in Rumania might employ in Christian action, or what techniques Americans might employ living in the United States? Such a task is the perennial one of the Christian living in his particular environment under the dominance of the Holy Spirit and in the light of transcendent commands. To have attempted such concretions of the Gospel would have been impossible in the time at our disposal. And Oxford could not be a finished Conference to settle all things "once and for all." Its business was not to give a revelation!

The Conference spirit, however, was one of urgency, tolerance, and unity. All felt the Gospel had too long been on the defensive and now needed to affirm itself. But none believed the Gospel has the *specific* way out. It has the all-qualifying tempering reality. Of course, some were inclined to take the Gospel at its face value and attempt to live its absolute commands. This was especially evident in the discussion on peace and war. Canon Raven was an outspoken pacifist. But

even so, the pacifist of today is hardly the naïve pacifist of a few years ago.

Oxford realized that unity is not something we create. Unity is something that is already there, its foundation is already laid. Progress in ecumenicity must now be made on the basis of what unity we already have. This unity came to expression in the periods of worship at St. Mary's Church, where a profound unity was experienced by all who affirmed faith in, and devotion to, common realities.

There were no sticklers for certain points of view in Oxford. We were faced with great schools, or traditions, of thought. Among these were the neo-Calvinists, the neo-Lutherans, the Anglicans, the Orthodox, the Scots, the English Free-Churchmen, and others. The Barthian influence does not aim to be a separate school, but a ferment. Its ferment was in evidence in all schools, but least of all in the American. This, however, was not divisive; it was rather complementary. The large American delegation startled the continental and British delegations, and filled them with fearful suspicion! The American business genius and its desire to go into action without serious thought, was feared by many abroad who did not want Oxford to be a conference of hasty action so much as a conference in which the Church might discover itself, come to some common fundamentals, and develop some "cohesive power" and "resistant strength" in general definitions. Americans, with their lack of a Church-idea, might thwart the development of group-loyalty, and dissipate the Conference into a hash of personal opinions about specific action. The Americans learned a great deal from the continental and British theological and churchly traditions. For one thing, the Americans (I speak especially of the Free Churches in the United States) were "corrected" time and again, by being shown that before we can act, we must know *why* we act, and that there is an action that springs from *Christian* sources, and an action which looks equally good on the surface that springs from *other* than Christian sources. And they were shown that Christian action is the result of group (Church) action, and not only that of individuals.

On the other hand, continentals and British were confronted by the American insistence that we must not stop with theological definitions, nor with an individual salvation, nor a salvation of the Church as Church. There are *fruits* of the faith as well as *roots*. There must be some simple essentials of faith upon which we can agree, and from

them proceed to necessary and urgent action, even though we must leave the details of the faith to be worked out, if they *can* be worked out, for the generations yet to come. It is to be regretted, however, that the American temper in this matter was not more unified, and did not have abler representatives. Of course they were overawed by the official appearance of the Conference, and somewhat abashed by the display of ecclesiastical dignity. And the Americans were very patient and charitable. Further, the theological maturity of the Conference was such as to put many Americans into theological water beyond their depth—or rather into somewhat strange waters. (Some Americans called all continental approaches Barthian!) And then, the turn toward theological conservatism is so marked everywhere, especially abroad, that to attempt to stem its tide on its own hospitable soil, or speak against it, is to be branded as an antequated liberal! I, for one, found the Conference complementary as regards schools of thought. It did sometimes appear that the predominant influence of conservative theology, church tradition and old-world mentality made many Americans feel that it would be of little help to especially liberal American Protestantism or practical American Christian unity. And yet, I have heard Anglo-Catholic leaders say that the Oxford Conference was a "wash-out," primarily because it never did get down to the essential thing the Church today faces, namely, theology and churchly tradition, and a unity that binds it *back* to the historic streams of Christendom. I heard this sentiment voiced by many orthodox. And so unclerical a leader as T. S. Eliot remarked that there was not enough theology at Oxford! The Americans, he said, contributed to that calamity.

I came away feeling that Oxford revealed the next steps that need to be taken by American Evangelical Protestantism. And those steps are not to become more of what we are, but to begin a deeper development of theology and churchliness that shall link us with the Christendom from which we are isolated. We must realize that our type of Free-Church Christianity is a small minority compared with the Christianity of the world. Yet, we must keep alive that which is distinctively American for the enrichment of the Church universal. Whatever "American Christianity" is, it needs articulation. But that is contingent upon defining what it is. And we must be very careful that we do not regard the free Protestant Churches in America as the only types of

American Christianity. We have millions of Orthodox, Anglicans and Roman Catholics in our midst. But what is it we in America have discovered in the Gospel that is needed for a full and rounded catholic nature of the Church? That task remains to be done. It has not yet been done. This is why Christianity abroad is suspicious of us. I wish we had been able to present at Oxford just what this "American Christianity" is in a truly theological and intellectual fashion!

Some regarded the reports as unduly pessimistic analyses of the present-day world. The word "sin" was frequently used! Some of the Paris Orthodox group thought that these analyses were typically Marxian in their negativism, and might play into the hands of red critics. But, in justification, let it be said, the reports are realistic. The world would have little respect for the Christian judgment if it sentimentally glossed over stark, evil realities. Yet, it must be said, Oxford did not condemn communism or fascism or capitalism totally. It did, however, set up standards whereby any social system may be judged as to its un-Christian elements. Further, the Church was not spared in criticism. It was felt by some of the churchly tradition that we must not criticize the Church. It cannot sin! In a sense, the Church of the living God cannot sin. But the human side of the Church has been disobedient, and, perhaps, through that disobedience, counter-churches (totalitarian states), are today rising, based upon pagan foundations, which are giving people that which the Church through disobedience, or desire for secular comforts, has failed to insist upon. Before the world can be recalled to the Church's Gospel, it was repeatedly said, the Church must first of all itself return. And to be of greatest benefit to the world, the Church must become Church, through repentance and obedience. In spite of such realistic criticisms, the Church was looked upon as the only agency through which God chooses to make His will known. For whoever has "God for Father must have the Church as Mother" (Calvin).

We worshipped together, but we had no Conference communion service! The Lord's Supper was administered according to the Anglican rite by the Archbishop of Canterbury, but a special dispensation had to be granted to allow non-members of the Anglican Church to partake of the communion. Some felt that they did not want communion on such terms, with the attendant humiliation involved. Others chose to take it for the sake of the spirit of unity prevalent at

Oxford. Some, realizing that unity would be an accomplished fact if all could commune together, regarded the Anglican Church as perfectly within its right in such an action, for such action is practiced (and should be practiced) by many Churches not Anglican. (Of course, the Anglo-Catholic group within the Church of England sent a stiff protest to the Archbishop for his admission to the eucharist of the dissenting Christians. It was felt by many that Oxford and Edinburgh drove a deep wedge between the Anglo-Catholics in that Church and the moderate party.)

A serious criticism, of course, was the inadequate representation from the youth, lay and younger Church groups. But if this is the case, it must be remembered that this is not Oxford's fault. It is the fault of an inadequate concept of the Church on the part of those churches sending delegates. Further, most of the churches represented at Oxford conceive of the Church in terms of ordained men standing in holy orders. As such, women are simply not eligible. A larger concept of the Church and its ministry is needed here before this criticism can be overcome. As it is now—woe unto any Universal Council that invites too many delegates from outside official Church quarters, for such action would mean the withdrawal of large Church groups who would regard such a conference as no longer representing *The Church.*

Oxford provided great stimulus, especially to minority groups. It gave them, as it gave all Christian groups, succinct and distilled judgments to take home. Many churches today cannot engage in action because of political coercion, and they have nothing left but to stand and give their witness. Such judgments, based upon ecumenical foundations, are stimulating. The bulwark of comradeship of the Church catholic is a mighty thing in the face of a chaotic world that needs true integration around the God Who is God, Who alone can give true meaning and release for the life He created.

Oxford voted, of course, to combine with other world Christian movements, so that all these independent efforts might be under one federated roof. This is a good thing, providing the various group-interests are not *fused* into a gigantic *organization.* We need unity, but no secular union for the sake of power. Even the Christian man dare not be surrounded with too much power, for the temptation of the will to power can corrupt even a holy Church! Yet, the move to federate these universal bodies is an expression in concrete form of our

convictions. For Oxford did not end with mere judgments, it proceeded to the next action. All thought and life should be action, said Dr. T. H. Oldham, especially in these days of activistic philosophy on the part of great leaders.

The best part of the Conference, in many ways, was becoming personally acquainted with world personalities, and hearing them in informal debate. If such conferences as these are to be held more frequently in the future, as is now planned, it is to be hoped that many more leaders in the Churches may be exposed to their ecumenical contagion. The greatest task remains to be done. It is to take the rich treasures of Oxford and canalize them so that they may enrich the life and faith of every last Christian who belongs to The Church, and to whom the Oxford heritage belongs above all others. The average lay-person is greatly interested in the issues of Oxford, for he lives in them and he must do something about them, or God's truth will not become flesh.

Chāndogya-Upaniṣad. Traduzione, Introduzione e Note, di VALENTINO PAPESSO. Bologna: N. Zanichelli, 1937. vii+235 pp. L. 15.

The Māndūkyopanishad with Gaudapāda's Kārikā and Śankara's Commentary. Translated and annotated by SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. With a foreword by V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER. Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1936. xliii+359 pp. $2.50.

The Chāndogya is one of the best-known of the Upanishads. It has been repeatedly translated and extensively discussed. This Italian translation could hardly be expected to contain much that is new to scholars. It is however an excellent work. The author has not neglected much of value in past publications. He shows scholarly competence and independence in his interpretations. His introduction is an intelligent and penetrating sketch of Upanishad thought as a whole, which deserves to be read by all who are interested in the subject. He seems, however, to have overlooked at least two articles dealing with the interpretation of parts of the Chāndogya: one by Hanns Oertel, in *Ehrengabe für Wilhelm Geiger*, Leipzig 1931, 134 ff., and one by the present reviewer in *JAOS* 35.240 ff. If Papesso had read either of these, I think he would have changed his translation at least of 6.2.3, and probably of some other passages.

The Māṇḍūkya Upanishad is, in contrast to the Chāndogya, a brief and in itself not very important work. For some reason, however, perhaps just because of its extreme brevity, it was used by the much later philosopher Gauḍapāda as a peg on which to hang his Kārikās, a celebrated and highly important work of the strictest non-dualistic (*advaita*) form of the Vedānta philosophy. This was then provided with a commentary which goes under the renowned name of Śankara. Swami Nikhilananda, a member of the Ramakrishna Mission now in the United States, has published the text of the Upanishad and the Kārikās, with a translation of both and of the commentary. The work was worth doing, for no good rendering of either the Kārikās or the commentary exists in English, and Deussen's German rendering of the Kārikās (in *Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda*) is not provided with the commentary.

The first thing to emphasize is that the reader will find in this work

not Upanishad thought, but the thought of the much later Advaita Vedānta. To some, especially Hindu adherents of the latter, this may seem a distinction without a difference. But, in common with most western and many Hindu scholars, I hold that there are very important differences. What Gauḍapāda and Śankara did was to develop and carry to their logical conclusion certain tendencies which existed, but only in a vague and inchoate form, mixed with inconsistent tendencies, in the Upanishads.

It has been pointed out by Deussen that Śankara's commentary on the Brahmasūtras, which are regarded as the oldest systematic work on the Vedānta philosophy, never quotes or mentions the Māṇḍūkya, although it is full of countless quotations from most of the Upanishads. Deussen accordingly expresses some doubt (not shared by Swami Nikhilananda) whether the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya and on Gauḍapāda is really by Śankara. Certain it is that many works which had nothing to do with him came to be attributed to his distinguished name. It must, however, be admitted that, in any case, the philosophic position of both the Kārikās and the commentary is essentially that of Śankara; so the question of authorship is not of great practical importance.

More important is the date of both works, and the related question of Buddhist influence. Gauḍapāda is said by tradition to have been Śankara's teacher's teacher; and Śankara is usually dated about 800 A.D. Nikhilananda (p. xiii) says that "some eminent scholars" (who?) "push back his date to the second century B.C.," and that "their contention cannot be lightly brushed aside" (but why not? we should at least like to know their reasons). Again (p. xvii) we are told that "some recent researches" (by whom? none are named) "reveal that [Gauḍapāda] lived long before" Aśvaghoṣa (about 2d century A.D.) and other Buddhist writers. Such dogmatic and unsupported statements hardly further the cause of learning.

The well-known Hindu scholars, Das Gupta and Radhakrishnan, believe that Gauḍapāda was profoundly influenced by Buddhist thought. Swami Nikhilananda attempts an elaborate refutation of their position in his Preface. Some of his arguments are individually effective. I agree, for instance, that one should not hastily assume that the word *buddha*, when used by Gauḍapāda, refers to the founder of Buddhism. (But Nikhilananda himself, with at least equal rashness,

makes the same assumption when it suits his purpose; so at iv.99, where he renders *naitad buddhena bhāṣitam* "This is not the view of the Buddha." I consider this interpretation most unplausible, if only because it totally dissociates *buddhena* from *buddhasya* in the first half of the same stanza.) On the whole I am forced to feel that the arguments for Buddhist influence on Gauḍapāda are stronger than the Swami's counter-arguments. The title of Gauḍapāda's fourth chapter, *Alātaśānti*, seems to me, for example, pretty certainly a Buddhistic trait; at least the *alāta-cakra*, "fire-brand-circle," is a standard Buddhist metaphor from very old times, and so far as I know it is by no means commonplace in Vedānta or other orthodox systems.

There are many difficult passages in the Kārikās, and I must confess that not a few of them still remain obscure to me. The Swami's translation follows the commentary very strictly—more strictly than I should consider desirable at times; I am obliged to feel that the commentary sometimes misinterprets the Kārikās, and perhaps oftener leaves hard spots without real interpretation. Much remains to be done before we can hope to have a really thorough elucidation of this text. But I am grateful to the Swami for his valuable publication, which will certainly do much to stimulate interest in this important and relatively neglected work of Indian thought.

FRANKLIN EDGERTON

Yale University

The Philosophy of The Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha. By B. L. ATREYA. Madras: Theosophical Publishing House, 1936. xlv + 717 pp. Rs 12.

The *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* is little known or understood in the West. Winternitz and Farquhar notice it; Professor Radhakrishnan gives it but scant reference in his *Indian Philosophy;* and Macdonell does not mention it at all. Dr. Dasgupta, on the other hand, in the second volume of his *History of Indian Philosophy,* devotes more than fifty pages to a closely analyzed and condensed survey of its contents. This was the first extended account to reach the West. The author of the volume under review says that he has the distinction of having presented the work for the first time in a systematic and comprehensive form "before the world."

In India the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* is popular with those who seek liberation through knowledge, just as the *Rāmāyaṇa* of Tulsidāsa is with

those who follow the way of *bhakti*. The work goes under various names, the principal one being *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmayaṇa*. Because of its popular appeal it has been translated into Hindi and Urdu. Such English translations as have been attempted are unsatisfactory. There are abridged forms of the work.

Dr. Atreya dates the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* somewhere between Kālidāsa and Bhartṛihari, between the early fifth and the beginning of the seventh centuries. Professor Dasgupta is in general agreement with this. Dr. Radhakrishnan, in a "Foreword" throws doubt upon this date, without offering an opinion. It seems clear that Vasiṣṭha lived before Śankara.

Of the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha*, Dasgupta says: "One of the peculiarities of this work is that it is not a philosophical treatise of the ordinary type, but its main purpose lies in the attempt to create firm conviction on the part of the readers by repeating the same idea in various ways by means of stories and elaborate descriptions often abounding in the richest poetical imagery of undeniably aesthetic value, hardly inferior to that of the greatest Sanskrit poet, Kālidāsa."[1]

Vasiṣṭha's work, which is divided into six chapters and runs to about 24,000 double lines, lacks system. His method hardly admits of it. Although he holds that all experience is personal or individual, he thinks that hints can be given that may suggest what one would like to convey to another; hence his resort to stories and analogies. The author, who summarizes fifty-five of the stories, ought now to furnish us with the text and exact translation of them all.

Dr. B. L. Atreya is assistant professor of philosophy at the Benares Hindu University. This work represents his thesis for the degree of Doctor of Literature. The work is a worthy venture and shows thorough preparation. Throughout he furnishes summary translations of passages from the text, with the Sanskrit passages in the footnotes. He has mastered a wide range in philosophical theory and quotes at length from the great Indian systems of thought and from the works of a large number of Western philosophers. Throughout he has been at pains to trace identities and similarities, between verses and passages of the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* and corresponding passages in *Upaniṣads*, in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*; and, in appendices, with minor works of Śankara, Sūreśvarācārya, Gāuḍa-Pāda, Bhava-Bhūti,

1. S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1922-32, II, 239.

Bhartṛihari, Kālidāsa and Bhāravi. In attempting to put the teachings of Vasiṣṭha into systematic form, he has allowed himself to carry repetition of ideas and expressions to too great length. However, his work is comprehensive and thoroughgoing, and introduces us to an Indian philosopher of the younger generation, who has been lecturing and writing on the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* for some time.

Rāma, the hero of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is here introduced, much as the Buddha was, as a young man disturbed with questions about the meaning of life. He comes to his father, Daśaratha, with his problem, and is referred to Vasiṣṭha. Rāma says: "What use is there of our life here, when we are all born to die? Life is momentary and is fastly passing away. It is a doll in the hands of death. Our mind is so restless, that it never finds lasting repose in anything. Our desires are insatiate and always jump from one object to another. The body is an abode of disease and suffering. Childhood is beset with want of strength and wisdom. Youth, in itself evanescent, makes our minds polluted. In youth, we become slaves to the person of women, which appears charming only for a short time but turns destructive of health and happiness soon after. There is none whom old age does not overcome. Our existence is a mere mockery. Our enjoyments are the source of our own pain, and our desires and ambitions allure us to ruin. Our own senses are our enemy. The splendor of all objects is flickering. Thus there is nothing in life in which a sensible man can find solace. I, therefore, want to know, if there is any state of existence attainable which is above the sufferings and sorrows of life."

Vasiṣṭha offers as a solution to the youth's problem, to this utterly pessimistic view of life, a downright idealistic view of existence. The medium of bondage is the perceptible universe, which really does not exist at all. There is only a deep and static entity which manifests itself as another, and which, through this dynamic aspect of itself, appears as ever active mind. However, what appears is altogether non-existent. The ultimate, indefinite and indescribable, which is pure extinction or pure intelligence, remains always in itself and does not really suffer any transformations. Yet, out of the first movement of this entity arises ego (which is nothing but ultimate entity). Then gradually a world appears or evolves. It is a pure conceiving, imagining. Whatever else (than ultimate entity) "appears" does not exist at all, it is all mere mental creations. It is by the realization that this

world-appearance has no possibility of existence that the false notion of ourselves as knowers ceases, and there is emancipation (even though the false appearance may continue as such). Mind (*manas*) is the important concept in the system; but it is merely a name. It does not exist outside of, or subjectively inside, us. It is a hypothetical entity. Within *manas* the source of bondage seems to be desire. And the aim of the *Yoga* is to eradicate this element. The search is for a desireless state. An interesting tenet of the system is that the adept may realize the full fruits of this discipline in this life, and, as a *jīvan mukta* have all of the effects that otherwise he would seek through desire, but without the entanglement of the soul in bondage. Vasiṣṭha "assures us that every desire of whatsoever kind of every individual shall be satisfied. . . . All that any individual wants to experience and realize shall be experienced and realized. . . . All desires, however great and unattainable their objects may seem to be, however the 'nature of things' may go against them, and however conflicting their consequences be with the 'finished reality,' shall be fulfilled if they are earnest and sincere. Even merely passing wishes are also to be granted a passing fulfillment. All that we wish to possess and enjoy shall be in our arms, however impossible it may apparently seem to be. A scientist, a philosopher, a politician, and a reformer will see himself crowned with success in his efforts. A lover will be in union with his beloved, and every one will find what he seeks, . . . because our objective experience is shaped in accordance with our demands, our desires and our aspirations. . . . His life is really the beautiful and happiest life, whose mind never gives up the vision of reality; who sees things rightly; who never feels that he has done anything; whose mind is never attached to anything. After death he enjoys conscious identity with the Absolute in a bodiless existence, and as such, he is the *Brahman*." But this is, after all, the construct of non-existent mind (*manas*). "The kernel of Liberation according to Vasiṣṭha is *conscious realization of complete oneness with the Brahman*." It is of interest to note that "some freed sages continue to exist as Cosmic activities, disseminate knowledge and help other individuals in working out their Liberation. Vasiṣṭha, Kṛṣṇa and Buddha are some examples."

The world of appearances, and consequently bondage, may be said, also, to exist simply through ignorance. And, from this point of view, the aim of the *Yoga* may be to destroy ignorance through knowledge,

"knowledge" which is not the antithesis to ignorance, but rather an intuition.

The *Yoga* of Vasiṣṭha, which differs in detail from that of the other systems, offers disciplines which lead the mind backward through unconsciousness to an absolutely transcendental and indescribable state of the soul. The *manas* is brought to a standstill; because, since *manas* creates the world, it must be stopped down, thereby eliminating the world of experience. Since ignorance of the Self is the cause of misery, the *affirmation* of the identity of self with Self must be repeated until it becomes *knowledge* of that identity. *Samādhi* is a super-conscious state, just the ultimate entity. "The existence of the mind, individuality or ignorance is not at all felt in that experience."

Vasiṣṭha offers a series of seven stages on the way to release, the last of which is the realization of the mystic experience of Union. The series exhibits subtle psychological analyses. The way of knowledge is the stepping-stone to ultimate "knowledge" which is intuition. This *Yoga* recognizes the validity of supernatural powers.

There are many points of interest in this system, such as the doctrine of origination of the multiple worlds of appearance, creations of Cosmic Mind, and their relation to those created by individual minds; free will; the identification of *Karma* and *manas* and the consequent denial of the eternity of the causal series; the two points of view, that of the individual and that of the Absolute; and the doctrine of "sport" as an explanation of the manifestation of the Absolute. The usual analogies, such as that all things made of clay are potentially in the clay, are used to establish truth; and there is the constant shift, an ever present device in this kind of exposition, from small to capital letters in the use of terms, in which the implied differences are not always recognized.

Much of the last chapter, "Critical Estimate of the Philosophical Position of Vasiṣṭha," seems to be beside the mark, being of the nature of a statement of Dr. Atreya's positions in the light of the teachings of various writers, rather than an estimate of Vasiṣṭha's work as such.

This volume must remain for the present our chief source of reference (in English) on this subject. There is a place, however, for a treatment of the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* less condensed and abstract than that of Dr. Dasgupta and less repetitious and more concise than that of Dr.

Atreya. And it would seem that the author of this study might well work it out.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS
Drew University

An Important Manuscript of the Traditions of Bukhārī. By ALPHONSE MINGANA. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., 1936. 45 pp. 10/6.

A new vista into the history of the codification of Muḥammadan Tradition has opened up by the recent publication by Dr. Mingana of the Central Colleges Library, Birmingham, England, of nine facsimile pages of a new Manuscript of a portion of the Traditions of al-Bukhārī. The MS forms part of a collection acquired by Dr. Mingana in the Orient, and on palaeographical grounds can be dated about 1,000 A.D., being thus by far the oldest MS of al-Bukhārī known to be in existence.

Tradition shares with the Qur'ān the basic position of source material for Muḥammadan Theology and Jurisprudence. These two sources alone have universal recognition. There are Schools which recognize other sources, but these are a matter of dispute, and Qur'ān and Tradition are alone accepted without question by all Schools.

Tradition is available to us in six canonical collections, but the most important of them all is that of al-Bukhārī, a Persian Muslim savant, who was born in 194 A.H. (810 A.D.) and died in 256 A.H. (870 A.D.), after having travelled over the greater part of the Islamic world gathering Traditions from over 1,080 living authorities. Out of his collection of 600,000 such Traditions, he selected by certain critical processes some 7,397 which satisfied his canons of authenticity, and published them, digested under heads convenient for the use of Jurists, in his work called the *Ṣaḥīḥ*.

In the world of orthodox Sunnī Islam this book stands next to the Qur'ān as a work of edification, as well as a source book for the studies of theologians and jurists. Like the Qur'ān it is read aloud in mosques and in private homes as a pious exercise. Like the Qur'ān it has specialists in its recitation. Oaths may be taken on it as they are on the Qur'ān. Like the Qur'ān it has become the subject of innumerable Commentaries. Probably no book apart from the Qur'ān is so frequently quoted in orthodox Muslim circles. Among all the schools

of Sunnī Islam it stands first among the six Correct Books of canonical Tradition.

The text transmission of the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī, however, presents an interesting problem. All texts of the *Ṣaḥīḥ* lithographed in the Orient follow the text established by al-Yūnīnī, who died in 701 A.H. The same Yūnīnī text lies at the basis of the three great Commentaries on the *Ṣaḥīḥ*, by al-'Asqalānī (†852), al-'Ainī (†855), and al-Qasṭallānī (†923), so that the Yūnīnī text may be called the *textus receptus* of orthodox Islam, and is the text that has been used in the building of the theological and juristic structure of Islam from the eighth Islamic century onward.

The Commentators on the *Ṣaḥīḥ*, however, knew that the Yūnīnī text had a history, and frequently note readings from older stages in the transmission of the text. Also on the margins of MSS of the *Ṣaḥīḥ* it is not at all uncommon to find notations of variant readings going back to older authorities. In fact there still exist MSS which represent not the text of al-Yūnīnī, but the rival text of aṣ-Ṣāghānī (†650), which was somewhat older and represents a slightly different line of transmission. Moreover, in 1928 Lévi-Provençal commenced the publication at Paris of a photographic reproduction of the Western or Maghribī recension of the text from an old MS at Fez. This is the recension of Ibn as-Sa'āda (†477) which was established at Murcia in the year 492 A.H. (=1099 A.D.), and for a time was dominant in the Western area of Islam.

Al-Bukhārī himself apparently committed nothing to writing. His *Ṣaḥīḥ* was transmitted orally to his pupils, who in their turn transmitted the text to their pupils, and so became what we may term the first line of transmitters. These pupils seem to have been very numerous, but only four of them have left any trace in the subsequent literature. These are—

Al-Bazdawī (†329)	An-Nasawī (c.290)
An-Nasafī (†240)	Al-Farabrī (†320)

Of these, an-Nasafī died before al-Bukhārī himself, and an-Nasawī not long after, and though some sources give us the names of pupils who heard the *Ṣaḥīḥ* from them and from al-Bazdawī, they are merely names, and count for nothing in the further transmission of the text.

The only one of this first line of transmitters whose text survived

was al-Farabrī[1]. We have no written form of his text, but he handed it on to his pupils, eight of whom had further influence on its transmission, and who may be termed the second line of transmitters. They are—

i) al-Mustamlī (†379): ii) as-Sarakhsī (†389): iii) al-Kushmaihanī (†388): iv) Ibn as-Sakan (†353): v) al-Marwazī (†371): vi) Ibn Shabūya: vii) al-Jurjānī (†373): viii) al-Kushānī (†391). No written text was provided by this line of transmitters, but they in their turn handed on their text orally to a third line of transmitters. Al-Qasṭallānī in the Introduction to his Commentary on the *Ṣaḥīḥ*, gives us a table of the important members of this third line of transmitters.

a. from al-Mustamlī—Abū Dharr (†434) and al-Hamdānī (†487).
b. from as-Sarakhsī—Abū Dharr (†434) and ad-Dāwūdī (†467).
c. from al-Kushmaihanī—Abū Dharr (†434) and al-Ḥafṣī.
d. from Ibn as-Sakan—Ismā'īl as-Saffār.
e. from al-Marwazī—Abū Nu'aim (†400): al-Āṣilī (†392) and al-Qābisī (†403).
f. from Ibn Shabūya—as-Sairafī and al-Hamdānī.
g. from al-Jurjānī—Abū Nu'aim (†400) and al-Qābisī (†403).
h. from al-Kushānī—al-Mustaghfirī.

Al-Kushmaihanī (†388), al-Āṣilī (†392) and Abū Nu'aim (†400), who were contemporaries, seem to have exercised a dominant influence on the transmission of the text, and with them must be bracketed al-Qābisī (†403), whose text was said to have been corrected by al-Āṣilī. Their readings often appear on the margins of MSS, though it is doubtful if any of them made a written text.

We first get definite traces of a written text in the case of Abū Dharr (†434) whose text on the one hand was the basis of the recension of Ibn as-Sa'āda (†477), and on the other of that of Abū'l-Waqt (†533) who also transmitted the tradition of al-Dāwūdī. With this fourth line of transmitters we thus reach the stage of editors of the text in the

1. Al-Farabrī is said to have been the last to hand down the *Ṣaḥīḥ* from al-Bukhārī himself (Ibn Khallikān, 683: al-Qasṭallānī, *Irshād as-Sārī*, I, 39) and Diyārbekrī *Khamīs*, II, 351 says expressly that he was the only one through whom the text of the *Ṣaḥīḥ* spread, a statement which is confirmed by the notice in as-Sam'ānī *Ansāb* 422a. It is noteworthy that the name of al-Farabrī appears in the *isnāds* studied by Ben Cheneb in his paper "De la transmission du Recueil de Traditions de Bokhary aux habitants d'Alger" in the *Recueil de Mémoires et de Textes publié en l'honneur du XIVe Congrès des Orientalistes*, Alger, 1905, pp. 114 ff.

proper sense. Famous among such editors were as-Sam'ānī (†562) and Ibn 'Asākir (†571), who drew from Abū Dharr and al-Āṣilī, the former, indeed, being noted as dependent particularly on the work of Abū'l-Waqt. The text of the above-mentioned al-Yūnīnī was drawn from as-Sam'ānī and Ibn 'Asākir, though he also drew from al-Āṣilī and Abū Dharr, directly or indirectly. The text of aṣ-Ṣāghānī seems to represent more particularly the text tradition of al-Kushmaihanī.

We may represent the situation in diagram—



Al-Yūnīnī's text had a great reputation in the Orient because of the notion that for the vowelling and editing of his text he had the advice and help of no less a person than the famous grammarian Ibn Mālik (†672). It comes to us, however, from the end of the seventh Islamic century, depending on the fifth line of transmitters, even if the editor was able to consult readings of the fourth line of transmitters. It is interesting to note, however, that through different lines he is able to tap the text tradition of each of the five lines of descent from al-Farabrī.

Ibn as-Sa'āda's text comes to us from the middle of the fifth Islamic century, and through Abū Dharr takes us back to three of the pupils of al-Farabrī. The new text of Dr. Mingana, however, comes from the latter half of the fourth century and directly from al-Marwazī from al-Farabrī. Its significance for the history of the transmission of the text is thus obvious, for apparently it represents the actual text of Al-Āṣilī (†392).

When we examine the text of this new MS we find certain peculiarities which are also an indication of age. In the ordinary editions of books of Tradition it is customary to find after the names of the early Muslim saints, pious formulae, such as "upon whom be Allah's blessing and peace;" "may Allah bless and save him;" "with whom may Allah be pleased," etc. In this new MS such formulae are used regularly after the name of the Prophet, but are omitted after the names of the early worthies of Islam. The use of such formulae after the name of the Prophet seems to have begun quite early, but there is a little evidence that its extension to the names of the Companions and early saints was only becoming general towards the end of the fourth Islamic century. It certainly would not have been customary when al-Bukhārī died in 256 A.H. and its absence in this MS is thus an indication of an early text tradition from the author of the *Ṣaḥīḥ*.

Similarly in the form of the *isnād* we have an indication that the text is early. In the printed texts of the *Ṣaḥīḥ*, each tradition begins—"There related to us So and So from So and So" etc., through to the end of the *isnād*. In this text, however, every Tradition, whether it be a long one or a very short one, is introduced by the words "Al-Bukhārī informed us, saying—there related to us So and So." The printed text, being an edition of a text of al-Bukhārī, based on sources already existing in written form, had no need to preface each Tradition with the statement that al-Bukhārī was the source. The Mingana MS, on the other hand, is just what we should expect in a first putting down in writing of an oral tradition, for the oral tradition would naturally mention each time the name of the ultimate source. Dr. Mingana, indeed, argues that such an introductory formula implies also that the writer himself was an important Traditionist giving his text of al-Bukhārī, not from some written source, but as he had received it orally from his master.

Two other characteristics distinguish it from the Yūnīnī text. The first is that the sections do not occur in the same order as in the printed texts. The MS is unfortunately fragmentary, containing only three *kitābs*, that on *zakāt* (alms) which is complete, that on *ṣaum* (fasting) which is incomplete at the end, and that on *ḥajj* (pilgrimage) which is incomplete both at the beginning and the end. The order in which these come, however, is clear, and we find that the section on *ṣaum* precedes that on *ḥajj*, whereas in the Yūnīnī text *ḥajj* precedes *ṣaum*,

and there is a marginal note by a certain al-Mas'ūbī who compared this copy with a copy in the handwriting of Abū'l-Waqt, that in that copy the section on *ḥajj* followed that on *zakāt* and preceded that on *ṣaum*.

More important, however, are the discrepancies in the text. The actual *matn* of the Traditions is not so very different in the two texts, but there are sometimes considerable divergences in the wording. The order and arrangement, however, differ, the *isnāds* do not always agree, and whole Traditions which appear in the printed text are not to be found in this new MS. Dr. Mingana prints in parallel columns a passage from the printed text and the corresponding passage from his MS, so that the difference is plain to even the uninstructed eye.

This only means, of course, that the text of the *Ṣaḥīḥ* was for a considerable period in a fluid state, and it was a priori likely that a text such as that of al-Yūnīnī, which drew from several lines of transmission from al-Farabrī, would be likely to contain slightly more material than a text which derived from al-Farabrī through the sole line of al-Marwazī. Dr. Mingana has given us only nine pages of facsimiles on which to work, but it is obvious that the work is of such importance that we must have a complete facsimile edition. Then, when the results of a minute comparison are available, search can be made in the East for other MSS, and a real beginning made at the task of settling the earliest text of this most important of all the works on Muslim Tradition.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

Columbia University

A Social and Religious History of the Jews. By SALO WITTMAYER BARON. 3 Vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937. xiv + 377; x + 462; xii + 406 pp. $11.50.

This fine work deserves, and will receive, a hearty welcome from all, and they are many who are interested in the world-subject of perennial importance with which it deals. We have here a work which, in its way, is unique; it is, at any rate, very doubtful whether any other book has ever been published which approaches and handles the subject in the way that Professor Baron does. The central theme, as the author says in his Preface, is "the inter-relation of social and religious forces, as exemplified in the long historic evolution of the Jewish people;" and this is set forth with great knowledge and consummate skill; the

reader's interest is riveted throughout. The method of division into sections and subsections, with their appropriate, and often explanatory, titles, will be of great convenience to readers.

The opening section on Jewish Society and Religion is in the nature of a general introduction, in which special stress is laid on one of the great outstanding facts which figures throughout Jewish history, namely, the way in which the nation has always overshadowed the individual; the tremendous significance of this is realized as we proceed. Other topics are, of course, touched upon in order to indicate what is in store for the reader.

With the second section begins the study of the Biblical history of Israel. To give a conspectus of this in about a hundred pages with the insight and clarity here exhibited is remarkable; one's interest never flags. It is true that in a number of points there will be dissent here; that could not be otherwise in the present condition of Old Testament study; many matters are touched upon of which the reader would like to hear more; and frequently statements are made for which further substantiation would have been welcome; but we fully realize that Professor Baron had a big task before him, and could not devote as much space to the earlier centuries of Israel's history as the purely Old Testament student would have liked. We are grateful for the section, "The Expansion of Judaism," which deals with a period—post-exilic times to the eve of Christianity—of which we have all too little knowledge. But a great deal has been done in gathering together all the available material. As Professor Baron says: "Through the cooperation of Christian and Jewish theologians, historians, and philologists, all deeply interested in the origins of Christianity, the rise of Pharisaic and Talmudic Judaism, and the extraordinary story of the Roman Empire in the period of its greatest glory, there has arisen a literature of real distinction." Professor Baron's familiarity with this literature, and his own researches, make this section of special interest. One criticism we must make here: it is often not quite clear to which particular time during this 300 years' period reference is being made.

After the section entitled "The Great Schism" (somewhat painful to Christians), we come to "The World of the Talmud;" and here begins that part of the work in which Professor Baron is at his best. What to many people not conversant with the history of those times is a puzzle, namely why and how Babylonian Jewry came to occupy its

predominant position, is admirably set forth by Professor Baron; many points of interest regarding the Roman and Persian Empires during the first three centuries of Christianity are dealt with, and make the whole matter very clear.

The Talmud furnishes us with some excellent principles and maxims on the subject of education; these are briefly, but instructively referred to. Thus, for example, it is pointed out that the rabbis "in a truly oriental fashion, encourage oral study, however noisy, as a mnemotechnic help." What a grand thing it would be if in these days the rule were generally followed (not only in respect to Jews) that "as long as he lives, every Jew must set aside for daily study as much time as he can possibly afford." Further, we are informed that "the semi-annual *Kallah* gathering enabled men of various walks of life, residing in distant parts of the country, to devote a month, or a part of a month, to concentrated study and exchange of thought with one another, under the experienced guidance of the greatest rabbis of the generation." It is small wonder that "in the period of the Talmud, Jewish learning penetrated still deeper into the masses, in a day when extreme illiteracy was widespread in the Mediterranean world, and when the Imperial City had only begun to establish schools for the wealthy and the middle class." The whole section is very informing, though, being written from the purely Jewish point of view, only the excellencies of the Talmud are brought out; so that, without some knowledge of this monument of Jewish learning, one is apt to get a somewhat one-sided view of it.

Then we come to the rise of Islam, and the relations between the Jews and the Mohammedans during the subsequent centuries. It is most useful to have this little known subject so clearly presented, especially as the social side of life is so well dealt with. The Professor is evidently more kindly disposed towards Islam than towards Christianity; that, at all events, is the impression gained. This concludes the first volume.

With Volume Two begins the history of medieval Judaism. In the opening section Professor Baron presents us with an illuminating picture of the Jews in Europe during the Middle Ages. In writing on the "Wandering Jew," he says: "In these words is well epitomized the greatest transformation in the life of medieval Jewry. It was in medieval Europe that the Jew became the 'Wandering Jew.' Anti-

Semitism had existed in one guise or another, wherever Jews lived in dispersion. . . . It is in western European Jewish history, however, that we find an unparalleled succession of expulsions, readmissions and enforced baptisms." It is a terribly sad story, and the saddest part is the action of the church which so often belied its faith and principles in its treatment of the Jews. Professor Baron points, however, to a redeeming feature in the section on "Close Judeo-Christian Relations;" here various facts are mentioned which throw a pleasanter light on medieval Jewry. There is much of great interest in this part of the book, of which we may mention, for example, what is said about the Marranos, and Marrano religion; and religious controversies. In the whole of this part of the book Professor Baron's fair-mindedness and moderation must be highly commended.

In many respects this second volume is even more interesting than the first; every phase of Jewish life is admirably dealt with: the ghetto, the later emancipation of the Jews, and, still later, Jewish nationalism, all subjects abounding in interesting details. The mass of material is far too great to be even mentioned in a review.

Indispensable to the reader is the third volume. Here we have a great mass of notes on the text of the preceding volumes; they are of profound usefulness, and give one some idea of Professor Baron's colossal reading; they take up nearly 200 pages. Then comes the Bibliography, of which it is impossible to speak too highly; it is a perfect marvel of industry, and of the greatest value to students. A first rate Index concludes this splendid piece of work, for which we express our deep gratitude to Professor Baron.

W. O. E. Oesterley

London University

The Excavations at Dura-Europos conducted by Yale University and the French Academy of Inscriptions and Letters. (Preliminary Report of the Sixth Season of Work: October 1932-March 1933.) Edited by M. I. Roztovtzeff, A. R. Bellinger, C. Hopkins and C. B. Welles. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936. xx + 518 pp. + LIII Plates. $7.50.

It is no accident that the excavators of Dura have unearthed sensational finds each season. The situation and history of this frontier-post on the Euphrates were such that the Parthian rulers, the Roman garri-

son, and the native Semites all had ample opportunity to leave their cultural monuments there. The goddess *Tyche* showed her solicitude for the archaeologist in the remarkable preservation of three religious structures: a church, a temple of Mithras, and a synagogue. The Christian building, treated in the Fifth Report, is the oldest of its class which has survived; the Mithraeum will be described in the forthcoming Seventh Report, while the section on the synagogue forms the *pièce de résistance* of the present volume.[1] The description of this ancient Jewish building is written mainly by H. F. Pearson (History and Architecture) and C. H. Kraeling (The Wall Decorations), with notes on the inscriptions (Greek, Aramaic, and Pehlevi) by other scholars.[2]

The synagogue of Dura was originally built about the end of the second century A.D., adjacent to the city wall. It was entered by a semicolonnaded courtyard and consisted of a main chamber surrounded by a stone bench, half a meter in height, and two smaller rooms adjoining. The synagogue faced east so that the worshipers looked in the general direction of Jerusalem. After having been used for a full generation, during which it went through several major alterations, it gave way to a more elaborate synagogue built on the same site. The construction and decoration of the later building took a surprisingly long time. An Aramaic inscription on one of its ceiling tiles bears a date equivalent to 245 A.D., but some of the murals were freshly painted when the final siege of Dura commenced eleven years later.

The decoration of this later synagogue has attracted wide attention. Its rare murals—about half of the complete decoration—owe their preservation to the fact that the Roman defenders blocked them up with mud-brick to support the city wall against the Parthian attack in 256. While the individual scenes only occasionally attain an artistic level, the whole undoubtedly constituted "a brilliant scheme of pictorial decoration unfolding before the eye of the worshipers the pageant of Israel's national and religious history." Biblical scenes are, to be sure, portrayed on some of the mosaic pavements of the Palestinian synagogues of the centuries immediately following. At Dura,

1. A fly-leaf bears the following note: "Chapter X, The Synagogue, is printed separately and may be obtained from the publisher bound in paper."

2. A Hebrew liturgical (?) fragment on parchment was also found in the ruins; pp. 417-19.

however, we know that the portrayal of living creatures was a definite departure, for the older synagogue had geometric decorations only. Thus, the implied liberalization of the second of the Ten Commandments at this point in the Diaspora may be dated almost to the quarter-century. Why and to what extent this development occurred among the Jews of the Roman Empire are questions which are now under discussion; their solution could not, of course, be attempted in this preliminary report.

The murals of the west wall are all but completely preserved, the three horizontal zones exhibiting thirteen scenes. Several of them are devoted to the life and time of Moses, beginning with his infancy. The Aaronic priesthood, the vicissitudes of the Ark of the Law, the anointing of David, the Temple of Solomon, and the career of Elijah are other themes portrayed both on the west and the remains of the other walls. For the interpretation of the scenes Kraeling and others have rightly resorted to the contemporary Jewish Biblical exegesis, the *haggadah*. The eagles perched on the dais-steps of Solomon's golden throne, and the reappearance of that throne in the scene of Ahasuerus' court, are examples of the influence of haggadic tradition. It is safe to assume that in the mind of the average Jew the graphic details of the national lore blended with the Biblical material.

Pearson and Kraeling[3] have both done a fine job on the synagogue section, and we may confidently expect the larger final report to be the definitive treatment of the Dura synagogue.[4] More stress, it is hoped, will be placed in that work on the reflection of the Dura environment in the Jewish decorations. The following examples, which apparently for technical reasons are noted only in other parts of the volume, rather than in the chapter devoted to the synagogue, may serve as

3. Kraeling also contributes the section on the unique fragment of Tatian's *Diatessaron;* pp. 416 f.

4. The debate over the interpretation of certain scenes is continued by Lietzmann, who examined the originals in Damascus, in his review in *Gnomon*, XIII, p. 236. Kraeling's bibliography (p. 338, n. 1) omits his own paper in which he ingeniously argued for the theory that the Dura synagogue was modelled after the Tent of Meeting: "The Earliest Synagogue Architecture." *Bulletin* of the American Schools of Oriental Research, no. 54 (1934), pp. 18-20. See also H. Rosenau, "Some aspects of the pictorial influence of the Jewish Temple," and "A Note on Synagogue Orientation," *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society*, XVI (1936), pp. 33-36; *Quarterly Statement* of the Palestine Exploration Fund, LXVIII (1936), pp. 159-60; Th. Ehrenstein, *Ueber die Fresken der Synagoge von Dura Europos* (Vienna, 1937).

concrete illustrations. The uniforms and arms worn by the Philistine and Israelite soldiers in the synagogue murals are modeled after those worn by the oriental auxiliaries of the Romans, specimens of which were found in the mines dug under the city wall during the final siege of 256 (p. 197). The evil eye occurs as an apotropaic decoration not only in the synagogue but in the Temple of the Palmyrene Gods and elsewhere in Dura as well (p. 156). The painting of Aphrodite Urania and attendants in the "House of Roman Scribes" is a highly relevant parallel to the synagogue painting of Pharaoh's daughter (named Batyah in the *haggadah*) and her maidens finding the infant Moses (p. 281).

Before concluding this review, it may be permissible to make a few observations of a technical kind. The reading of the Aramaic inscription bearing the year 245 (when the later synagogue was practically completed) offered in this volume is not entirely satisfactory. Both Obermann and Torrey promise to publish fuller discussions, and meanwhile a member of the expedition, du Mesnil du Buisson, has presented his own reading, which differs considerably.[5]

It should be observed that it is no longer correct to speak of a synagogue at Delos (p. 337), since the most recent study has shown that the building is more probably a temple of Zeus Hypsistos.[6] The repetition of *Aaron* for *Aron* (*ha-Kodesh*) (pp. 343, 371) is a disconcerting typographical error, and the Aramaic texts are marred by two misprints (p. 390, end of line 4; p. 395). Finally, one must question the wisdom of excluding the material in the various texts, other than the Latin and Greek, from the otherwise commendable Indices to the volume. However, such incidental defects must be judged of relatively little importance, considering the great intellectual and technical care which has been lavished on this rich Report.

Joshua Starr

New York City

5. "Sur quelques inscriptions juives de Doura-Europos (Syrie)," *Biblica*, XVIII (1937), pp. 153-73. It may be noted that this article also supplements Kraeling's discussion of the decorations. Incidentally, it is to be regretted that the two large colored plates reproducing synagogue portraits, Aaron and an unidentified figure, in Roztovtzeff's article "Dura-Europo," *Enciclopedia Italiana, Appendice II* (1935), pp. 166-69 are not contained in the present volume.

6. B. D. Mazur, *Studies on Jewry in Greece* (Athens, 1935).

The Hebrew Philosophical Genius: A Vindication. By DUNCAN BLACK MACDONALD. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936. x + 155 pp. $2.50.

This book by one of the foremost Semitic scholars of our day is an unusual undertaking. The ancient Hebrews are known to have had a genius for morality and religion, but few seem to suspect that they had also a "philosophical genius." Professor Macdonald sets himself to show that the Hebrews had a "biological metaphysics," based upon the "given concrete facts of the physical world" and "the equally given and assured facts of personal experience, their own emotions and ideas" (p. 5). Their "absolute" was a "personality" whose will and judgments and actions with regard to them were matters of primary interest in their thought concerning Him (pp. 9-10). Thus the Hebrew God was absolute as a sovereign person, and not as abstract and impersonal ultimate being. The author points out that God was becoming and not being. He acted in history and according to the demands of a given situation in human life. One wishes that the author had developed this theme through a more systematic treatment of the works of the Hebrew historians, prophets, and lawgivers. Also, one wonders if the Hebrew view of history justifies the conclusion that "they were Heracleitans and had no question that all things were flowing, changing, becoming" (p. 16). In the field of emotions and ideas, Professor Macdonald points out that the Hebrews were aware of and concerned themselves with "life," "conscience," and "evil in man" as "essentially stupidity." However, the evidence given by the author does not convince me that the Hebrews spent much thought on these things *as such*. Especially outside of the Wisdom Literature, they seem to have been concerned with them in connection with Yahwe, their sovereign Lord.

Professor Macdonald seems to consider philosophy primarily in the sense of thinking on reason "as an independent instrument of investigation" (p. 33). Therefore, most of the book is concerned with the Wisdom Literature, both Biblical and non-Biblical. In this connection, the Hebrew philosophical genius seems to find expression in the conviction that "the absolute and ultimate is the command of Jehovah but man possesses in his mind a quality—reason, commonsense, understanding—to aid him in carrying out those commands and to be a discipline for him in life" (pp. 32-33). In Proverbs 8 and Job 28, the

author finds a highly developed doctrine of "eternal reason." He believes that the Hebrews arrived at a conception of personalized and eternal wisdom, independently of Greek thought. However, one still wonders how the aphoristic proverbs of the earlier Hebrews developed into sustained discourses on wisdom.

Professor Macdonald has given us an interesting and enlightening analysis of "The Wisdom of Solomon," in the light of Greek thought, especially of Platonism. He shows that the conceptions of the soul and of immortality, of God as "artificer-artist," of genesis and corruption, in *The Wisdom*, are derived from Platonism. He finds that this book is influenced by the Greek ideas of virtue and virtues, justice, education or discipline. It seems to me that "The Wisdom of Solomon" is didactic and directly moral in its purpose. The "true beginning" of wisdom "is desire of discipline. . . . And love of her is observance of her laws" (Chapter 6). Hence, "Solomon" might be classified as a Stoic-Hebrew, rather than as a Platonist. I think his method of thinking and instruction should be distinguished clearly from the Platonic-Socratic method of arriving at truth through the dialectical method of the Platonic dialogues.

In conclusion, even at the risk of speaking beside the point, I wish to express my regret that Professor Macdonald defined philosophy so as to omit systematic discussions of the profound criticisms of life in the works of the Hebrew prophets, historians, and lawgivers. It seems to me, for instance, that the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah were great critics of history and the human heart (as different from the critics of ideas among the Greeks) who gave most striking expression to what might be called "Hebrew philosophical genius." However, this is a matter of one's definition of philosophy. We are grateful to Professor Macdonald for his "vindication" of at least a portion of Hebrew thought. It is a joy to come across a great scholar who will treat the Hebrew mind with a reverence analogous to that which the philosophers offer to Plato and Aristotle.

Joseph Haroutunian

Wellesley College

Five Centuries of Religion. By G. G. Coulton. Volume III, *Getting and Spending*. Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936. li + 747 pp. $12.50.

This volume, the third by the same author under the general title, to be followed by a fourth now in preparation, will be of great interest to all having any desire to know more of the Middle Ages, whether they be scholars, students, or merely general readers. To all who wish to understand the ideals, the struggles, the successes, and the failures of one of the most significant aspects of medieval life—monasticism—it will be invaluable if it is borne in mind that the emphasis in the book is on the failures. If there is in it small comfort for the unrestrained enthusiast, there will be, on the other hand, little solace for those who are inclined to condemn all that pertains to the life of the cloister provided the entire volume is read with care. And carefully it must be read, since the mass of material presented includes hundreds of examples of the failure of monastic institutions to live up to the ideals; upon these the seeker after derogatory evidence may easily fall with avidity while overlooking the highly important yet somewhat submerged passages wherein, often in a sentence or two, Dr. Coulton touches upon another side of the picture. Of this danger the author warns his readers in the preface when he says that unless the Introduction and the concluding pages are read with care the volume may lend itself to misapprehension; otherwise they will fail to see what he has set out to attempt, or to be able to judge how far he has succeeded. Those who have read the preceding volumes or are familiar with the author's views (and the strictures of some of his critics) will in all probability be surprised at the mildness of the prevailing tone of the present volume, in which there are few if any traces of that bitterness toward the religious of the Middle Ages of which he has been accused, and be it said, with some justice. True it is that frequently enough one expects the well-known blast to appear in the next paragraph, yet it never quite does, and instead there comes from time to time a statement or two concerning the uplifting, if too often futile, efforts of high-minded men to bring practice more nearly into accord with the ideal. In the field of monasticism the author tells "as in others, the two extremes stand out crudely, and are easy enough to paint. The real difficulty is to seize the features of the average man, who after all, shows us the real type. Every great institution has its notable extremes of good or evil; that which we most want to grasp is what is hardest to put into words, or even to focus in thought. What sort of being was this average cloisterer? What sort of life did he or she

lead, day in, day out, as compared with ourselves and our own lives? Let us face these monks directly, and by the directest methods, starting not from any assumption of their strangeness, but rather assuming their likeness, their almost identity with ourselves." There lies the author's aim. To this extent he has succeeded: he leaves us with a deeper sympathy for the innate weakness of human nature when it is engaged in a struggle for eternal life, imbued with high aspirations but handicapped by all the ordinary and many of the extraordinary temptations of a material existence. Perhaps that is a little more than the author intended. At the end of this very interesting book the reader in truth is left in wonderment at the similarity of the problem of reconciliation between ideal and practice in the Middle Ages and today. One sees here a remarkable institution founded upon faith, self-denial, and service, rising in its best period to great heights, failing in the end to justify its existence in the eyes of the contemporary world as that world altered its aims and its methods of accomplishment thereof. Subjected to disease within, to attack from without, monasticism was faced in the later centuries of the Middle Ages with a grave dilemma: self-reform, at which there were many valiant efforts, none wholly successful, or submission to reform by external powers which it believed to be inimical to its objectives, uncomprehending of its problems. When the first alternative failed and the second was resisted further decay and possibly dissolution followed. The good was destroyed with the evil. It is a tragic story, tragic because through all the centuries there was repeated resistance to circumstance, to what seems to be an inevitable fate. In a society becoming increasingly capitalistic monasticism appears to have outlived the needs which men rightly or wrongly believed to lie before them; to satisfy those apparent needs men were then as always willing, nay eager, to abolish institutions without clear knowledge of what they would substitute for them. We may see ourselves in the monks.

Two-thirds of the volume is concerned with "getting," one-third with "spending." In the first twenty chapters devoted to "getting," subjects such as endowments, burial privileges, Masses, relics and the relic market, absorption of parishes and churches, "the scramble for tithes," trade and banking, feudal dues, are those receiving full treatment among others. In these the gathering doom consequent upon wealth is constantly before us. The medieval proverb, *qui terram*

habet, guerram habet, quoted by the author later in connection with monastic litigation, may well be said to be applicable to the story told in these first chapters, since it was the steady accumulation of property and the energy devoted to its interests which led to the waste and decay described in the succeeding fourteen chapters. These deal with *proprietas* and its growth, dispensations, the *commendam* system (an admirable exposition of a none too well-known practice), irregular bookkeeping (where monastic finance is said to be inferior to the best lay finance), causes of debt, payments to Rome, litigation, debt and repudiation, retrenchment and restoration; and there is an interesting chapter on dwindling numbers partly illuminated in one of the appendixes by a statistical table. Although the economic thread runs throughout the book, many other threads are woven into the texture, spiritual neglect, monastic aristocracy, trial by battle, etc. Even in the chapters where the captions would lead one to expect only economic questions to be discussed side-lights are thrown upon almost every phase of monastic life, often irrelevantly, but excusably so. Ample quotations from sources or from the writings of other historians appear throughout, always in English and for the most part admirably translated, although one balks at *turpe lucrum* as "common trading" (p. 252). For nearly every chapter there is an appendix of documents or elaboration of points made in the text, again all in English.

The amount of factual evidence incorporated in the work is astonishing, and not the least part of the author's skill lies in his ability to bring this into the text without wearying the reader unduly. He himself says the book is the material for a history rather than a history. In his use of this vast amount of material he has made great effort to avoid exaggeration and over-emphasis, to be "fair," to disarm some of his former critics, on the whole with greater success than many of his readers in years past would have thought possible. Occasionally, to be sure, one is led to suspect that the next volume may be largely a justification of the dissolution by Henry VIII, but that is only impertinent conjecture. Dr. Coulton claims to "have always insisted that the greatness of the Middle Ages consisted far less in what men actually did, than in what they tried to do." There will be readers of this volume who will wish that he had insisted a little more.

EUGENE H. BYRNE

Columbia University

The Life of Edwards Amasa Park. By Frank Hugh Foster. New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1936. 275 pp. $2.75.

"The world does not care what Edwards A. Park believed and taught." That is what another great teacher and scholar wrote to me when he sent word that Professor Foster, his fellow-Andoverian and my old teacher and friend, had died.

Those words are very true. New England Calvinism—including the modified "Hopkinsian" variety for which Park fought all his days—collapsed about 1880 with the retirement of Park from his professorship of theology at the Andover Theological Seminary, and of other elderly and revered teachers from their chairs in other orthodox seminaries. This system, so marvellously constructed from the writings of Paul and Augustine by the legalistic mind of Calvin, and modified by Edwards and Hopkins, suddenly went to pieces like the "One Hoss Shay," which Oliver Wendell Holmes meant to be a symbol of it in both its construction and collapse. A year or so ago—supreme irony!—a young theologian at the eleventh hour called off his installation as minister of a Unitarian church because he had just been invited to teach theology at the once orthodox seminary in Bangor! Even in those last strongholds of Calvinism, the Presbyterian and Reformed churches, Calvinism seems to be dying. Soon it may be said with truth that no well-educated American is a Calvinist—unless, perchance, Barth and his disciples can win some converts among us. Why, then, should one write—or even read—the life of the last great defender of this almost abandoned system?

Another reason is advanced for the belief that the work of Park hardly deserves to be remembered. A few of his former students have intimated that Park was more devoted to his "system" than to the truth. Thus Charles Fletcher Dole, in *My Eighty Years* (pp. 104 ff):

> Professor Park . . . had the mind and the methods of the advocate or prosecutor. He seemed to conceive of his office as if the Trustees of the School had given him a comfortable retainer to defend the ancient fortress of religion against its enemies. He never appeared to me as a lover of truth, or seemed to trust the truth. His mode of argument was elaborate: he loved to marshal a host of considerations—good, bad, or indifferent, lettered and numbered in front of a proposition, as one might build a barricade. Happily he knew how to tell plenty of stories to enliven his discourse, and he was none too scrupulous in evading embarrassing questions, or in throwing up a jestful barrage behind which to retreat. At the same time I think he re-

spected straight thinking, very likely with the kindred sympathy of a sceptical mind. . . . I cannot recollect a moment of enthusiasm or earnest spiritual feeling that his teaching ever inspired.

Bishop Lawrence, in his autobiography, *Memories of a Happy Life* (pp. 34 ff), has much the same story to tell.

Why, then, was it worth while to write the life of Edwards A. Park?

(1) In the first place, because Park was a remarkable preacher; Emily Dickinson thus describes the effect of one of his sermons on her, and on the students and townspeople of Amherst:

O Austin, you don't know how we all wished for you yesterday. We had such a splendid sermon from Professor Park. I never heard anything like it, and don't expect to again until we stand at the Great White Throne and Jesus reads from the Book, the Lamb's Book. The student and chapel people all came to our church, and it was very full and still, the buzzing of a fly would have boomed like a cannon. And when it was all over and that wonderful man sat down, people stared at each other and looked as wan and wild as if they had seen a spirit and wondered they had not died.

(2) In the second place, Park's life is worth the telling because for an entire generation he was the foremost intellectual leader in American Congregationalism. Between the years 1840 and 1870, Congregational ministers generally were in accord with his teachings in most respects. His influence was spread by his preaching, his writings, and (most important of all) through his pupils. At that time, Andover was incomparably the best Congregational seminary in the land; and, of the theological schools maintained by other orthodox denominations, only Union could rival it. It was at "the neck of the bottle;" and it must be confessed that seminaries in these days do not have, on the whole, the magnificent human material to work with that they had then.

(3) There is an even better reason for a life of Park. He was a great teacher, and great teachers are rare in any age. And why was he a great teacher? Let George Herbert Palmer give the answer:

"Born into a mystic age," he once wrote to Park, "and full of philosophy and poetry myself, I was not able at that time to accept in full your exact and strenuous system. But I was not allowed to remain in vague and idle dissent. You summoned me to active thinking and forced me to decide whether I did or did not agree with what was said. So your energy revealed to me both the subject and myself. And something like this must, I think, have been effected in all your hearers. Light as your touch always was, with wit

and playfulness abundantly summoned to your aid, you made every man feel that the subject was a tremendous one, and that everything else in life must be counted secondary to its understanding.

"That is the triumph of the teacher. I doubt if you have ever received praise enough on that score. Your pupils were all impassioned, for or against you. Nobody was listless. Nobody thought the things we were talking about of little consequence. If I could secure that result, I should care little whether I lodged my own beliefs in my pupil's mind. I should know I was putting powerful beliefs of his own there and saving him from negations and vacuity. . . . I profoundly thank you—the greatest teacher I have ever known."

Should not a teacher be known by his pupils? Among Park's pupils, besides Professor Palmer, were Professor Alexander V. G. Allen (the biographer of Edwards and Brooks), President William G. Ballantine of Oberlin (the translator of the Riverside New Testament), Francis E. Clark (the founder of Christian Endeavor), Charles Fletcher Dole, Professor George Park Fisher (the first—and greatest—American student of the history of doctrines), Professor Foster himself, Richard Salter Storrs, former President Charles Franklin Thwing of Western Reserve University; President William Jewett Tucker of Dartmouth; and, among those who are fortunately still with us, Bishop William Lawrence. And there were hundreds of others: ministers, and teachers in seminaries and colleges; some of them in positions of influence, many of them humble teachers and pastors, who made the Congregational ministry of their time respected above most others for its remarkable devotion to learning and to the essential things in religion.

Professor Foster's book was written at the instance of his loyal and life-long friend, President Thwing: and when Dr. Foster died, his friend arranged for its publication. There is a foreword by the editor, Professor Walter Marshall Horton of Oberlin, which contains a brief but adequate biographical sketch of the author; and there are several illustrations.

Dr. Foster has preferred to quote rather freely from his sources, such as the notebook of *Autobiographical Fragments* in Park's own handwriting, Richard Salter Storrs' remarkable funeral address, and G. R. W. Scott's biographical sketch in *Professor Park and His Pupils*. This may have been a mistake, particularly as the author has let various ends overlap one another; at any rate, it is interesting to read the words of certain gifted men who fell deeply under the spell of the

great teacher. But I am sure that even if this method is preferable to telling the story entirely in the author's own words, he made a mistake in not including unfavorable opinions, such as the opinion of Dr. Dole, already quoted. Readers would then see more clearly what Professor Palmer meant when he wrote to his old teacher, "Your pupils were all impassioned, for or against you."

Dr. Foster has wisely contented himself with a very brief outline of Park's "system," referring those who wish a more detailed exposition to the chapter on Park in his *Genetic History of the New England Theology* (Chicago, 1907). The emphasis is where it should be, on Park as teacher. Here and there throughout the book there are many vivid descriptions of the great teacher's pedagogical methods.

What a drama is here disclosed! a teacher and preacher who came to dominate the most learned of the orthodox denominations, and maintained his domination for a third of a century, his theology the theology of thousands of learned and keen-minded ministers; then, in a few years, the collapse of the entire New England system, and its immediate abandonment, after his retirement, by his own seminary, where for decades his had been the dominating spirit! What must have been his thoughts during his nearly twenty years of retirement, while he scribbled innumerable notes for the monumental life of Edwards and the "System" he was to publish (but never did), in characters that grew larger and larger as his failing eyesight grew weaker and weaker? No one knows what became of the "System." Did he, like his favorite pupil, Professor Foster himself, come to realize that the New England Theology was untenable, and take his precious notes and "pitch the whole thing into the stove?" That was Foster's belief shortly before he began the biography; I know, because he told me so himself. But in the book he emphatically denies this (p. 261). Possibly the great theologian became mellower towards the end, and came to feel that

> These little systems have their day,
> They have their day and cease to be,

and that God could be trusted to watch over his own.

At any rate, the life of Edwards A. Park is a striking commentary on intellectual pride.

JOHN GARDNER GREENE

Boston, Massachusetts

Contemporary English Theology: An American Interpretation. By Walter Marshall Horton. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1936. 186 pp. $2.00.

Professor Horton's latest book has a two-fold importance. In the first place, as its title promises, it offers a brief but comprehensive survey of current Christian thought in England. The exposition is mainly of men rather than of positions. Most of the more important minds in English theology at the present day come under review; the presentations are discriminating, eminently fair, and attractive; it is a fascinating portrait gallery to which we are introduced. The result is a valuable source-book and a quite invaluable introduction for students unfamiliar with British thought.

But the greater interest and significance arise from the wider setting within which the descriptive portraits are hung. This is the thesis which justifies the volume, and which may be summarized in three propositions. "The intellectual leadership of Western Christendom is about to pass from Germany to England." Within English theology, the rival parties which have claimed most of the vigorous minds in the recent past are losing strength, and there is beginning to emerge a 'central trend' which is "something more than the mere mechanical median or resultant of all the divergent trends" heretofore prevailing. The most noteworthy representative of that 'central trend,' "the theologian to whom all parties in England look up most respectfully, and to whose opinions there is widest consent" is the Archbishop of York, William Temple. It is to this focal and mediating position within English thought as typified by Temple that the attention of American theology is recommended.

. . .

In developing the first part of his thesis—that theological leadership in Europe is about to shift from Germany to Great Britain—Professor Horton reminds us that the history of European religious thought since the Reformation reveals a dialectic of alternation between these two foci. The initial impetus of the Reformation, both theological and practical, originated on the Continent. In the eighteenth century, after the first vigor had spent itself, the center of intellectual gravity shifted to England. With the opening of the nineteenth century and through the renewed energies of Romanticism

and Evangelicalism, leadership returned to Germany in the persons of Kant, Schleiermacher, Hegel and Ritschl. Now, that great wave of religious vitality which empowered theology in the recent period has, clearly, subsided. Not renewal, but merely correction, may be expected from its reactionary successor, Barthianism. At the moment when theology stands in desperate need of profound but sane guidance through the critical confusion of the present, Continental thought is peculiarly disqualified to bring help. But, at this very moment, English thinkers of previously conflicting schools are drawing together, discovering unsuspected unity, and rising to unexpected heights. Here, then, is promise of leadership for tomorrow.

In surveying so wide and varied a field as English theology, a principle of classification must be proposed. Professor Horton discovers three persistent traditions—the Catholic, the Protestant, and the liberal. Each is traced in its principal variant forms from its rise to its present most influential spokesmen. But, the author believes, each of the three traditional movements is displaying unmistakable symptoms of failing vitality. It is in the vacuum of their inactivity, and through secessions from their ranks, that a new and more promising position is beginning to take shape.

This may fairly be described as a 'central trend.' Its goal is defined as "a new 'Evangelical Catholicism' in which the values of the Protestant Reformation and of Modern Liberal Protestantism would be included and transcended." As a typical though especially able illustration of the development, the theism of Archbishop Temple is given fairly full exposition.

. . .

In so ambitious yet summary a survey, it is inevitable that there should be room for queries regarding points of detail. In his interesting suggestion of the dialectical alternation in European theology, Professor Horton does not face the question whether new vitality and greater significance have not always proceeded from the Continent, while previous shifts of leadership to England have usually yielded intellectualism and sterility, and therefore whether the predicted transition may be viewed with hope. It may be doubted whether the author's determination to consider *English* thought without reference to its *Scottish* connections can be justified in the light of history, pres-

ent affinities and the prospects for future interrelationship. It may be suggested that, in this volume as in his earlier *Theism and the Modern Mood,* Professor Horton has exaggerated his own intense postwar preoccupation with the problem of evil into a general trend, and in consequence, has seriously overestimated the importance of Studdert Kennedy as a thinker. It may be held that a number of the most fruitful contemporary thinkers—W. R. Matthews, O. C. Quick, H. H. Farmer, J. S. Whale, A. E. J. Rawlinson, Leonard Hodgson—receive attention quite inadequate to their influence within the English scene. The most serious criticism, however, might challenge Professor Horton's classification of English thought into the three traditions of Catholic, Protestant and Liberal. Both Catholicism and Protestantism have had their liberal and conservative wings. A more fruitful threefold classification is that proposed by O. C. Quick[1]—Traditionalism, Liberalism and Modernism—since all three of these positions have been fully developed within both the Catholic and Protestant heritages. But these are minor qualifications on what must otherwise be an appraisal of hearty appreciation. A large and bafflingly intricate task has been competently and skillfully handled.

With the underlying thesis of the book in its three propositions, the present reviewer finds himself in full agreement. It is an original, almost startling, suggestion. And it is one of immense consequence for the immediate future of American Christianity. Because of its importance, Professor Horton's book, entirely apart from the intrinsic value of the historical account, merits careful and critical attention.

Henry P. Van Dusen

Union Theological Seminary

On Being Human. By Paul Elmer More. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1936. vi+202 pp. $2.00.

The religious thought of the late Paul Elmer More moved in an atmosphere of delicate adjustment and nobly reasonable compromise. Like-minded persons found in his Platonized Christianity, or Christianized Platonism, a valid reconciliation of metaphysics and religion. Less sympathetic readers might complain that his Plato was too theistic to be truly Platonic, or might wince a little at his way of regarding Christianity as a happy device for bringing home to the human heart

1. *Liberalism, Modernism and Tradition.*

the eternal truths of Platonism. Dr. More himself would have been quick to repudiate the notion that his death should make impossible a candid opposition to some of his views. Only a very dull or very prejudiced critic, however, could fail to see in his writings a rare combination of critical, philosophical, and spiritual gifts. Nothing to be said in these pages should be construed as a denial of that fact.

In what has lamentably proved to be the last volume of "New Shelburne Essays" the author's Christian Platonism is merely to be inferred as the familiar background of his thought. The book does, however, illustrate yet another adjustment which entered into his personal conception of the *via media*—that between religion and the "new humanism." Whether such an adjustment is desirable or possible will be, for readers of this journal, the most important question raised by *On Being Human.*

At first glance the question may seem an obsolete one. "The inner check" and "law for man, and law for thing" are not at the moment trumpet-calls to battle. Nevertheless the movement continues. If less prominent in literary criticism than in recent years, its influence may plainly be seen in theories of higher education and in liberal theology. Though Irving Babbitt and Dr. More are dead, most of the contributors to *Humanism in America,* the famous symposium of 1930, are still quite literally "alive and kicking." Even now they may be preparing to launch a new manifesto. Perhaps this dark foreboding is groundless; perhaps the new humanism as a definite school of thought may be melting away into the diverse tendencies from which it was compounded. But even a dead humanism would remain historically important as one of the most interesting of modern attempts to be religious without having a religion.

For Dr. More, a humanist is not a person like John Dewey, or like Walter Lippmann, or least of all like Charles Francis Potter, but a person like Irving Babbitt. Though the wide variety of opinion expressed in *Humanism in America* leaves one in a state of some bewilderment, Norman Foerster's declaration may be accepted as authoritative: "Irving Babbitt is at the centre of the humanistic movement."[1] In Professor Babbitt's mind strong religious feelings mingled with a strong distaste for any organized form of revealed supernatural religion. A rigid Puritan in moral standards, he spurned both the Puri-

1. *Humanism in America,* p. xvii.

tan creed and the sentimental humanitarianism which had bloomed on its grave. His intellectual Toryism, his unrestrained passion for restraint, made him dislike whatever in life or thought was expansive, turbulent, warmly muddled, or eccentric. His severely classical tastes, in which high seriousness was not untinged with a less noble prudery, condemned the vagaries of romanticism. For him, what Arnold calls "this strange disease of modern life" was caused by the prevalence of two false naturalisms, seemingly very different but really sisters under their skins—the scientific naturalism of Bacon, and the sentimental or romantic naturalism of Rousseau. The former had made man a beast; the latter had made him a perverse Arcadian. Combined, the two naturalisms had produced a dreaming beast or beastly dreamer, a sentimental monkey with a dangerously expansive system of ethics.

The remedy seemed plain: man must be extricated from nature by a reassertion of dualism. The Emersonian distinction between "law for man and law for thing" must become the basis of a medicinal philosophy. According to Babbitt, what sets man apart from nature is the possession of the inner check, or will to refrain. "To work according to the human law," he says, "is simply to rein in one's impulses."[2] Consequently "humanists . . . are those who, in any age, aim at proportionateness through a cultivation of the law of measure."[3] This, we may interject, is doubtless a good definition of a new humanist, but it is a very incomplete and lopsided definition of a human being.

Although humanism is repeatedly described by Babbitt as critical, positive, and experiential, he grants that the phenomenal world does not supply the centrality demanded by the law of measure. To validate his philosophy, therefore, the humanist must appeal either to tradition or to intuition.[4] In the long run, the latter provides the more reliable support. "The final appeal of the humanist is not to any historical convention but to intuition."[5] The "higher immediacy" of humanistic intuition is to be distinguished from the "lower immediacy" of romantic emotionalism. To the uninitiated the difference is elusive, but Professor Babbitt assures us that the law of measure "becomes meaningless unless it can be shown to be one of the 'laws unwritten in

2. *Rousseau and Romanticism* (1919), p. 366.
3. Babbitt in *Humanism in America* (1930), p. 30.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

the heavens' of which Antigone had the immediate perception."[6]

This is a greatly simplified, but I trust not a distorted, sketch of the new humanism. Except for one or two critical asides it agrees with the description given by Dr. More in the review of *Humanism in America* which forms the first chapter of *On Being Human*. He declares that he is "in entire sympathy with the platform thus expounded," and that in what he is about to say "nothing should be interpreted as indicating a rift between myself and my comrade-in-arms of long standing, Mr. Babbitt, in our attitude toward the combined forces of anti-humanism."[7]

But Dr. More regrets that Professor Babbitt has not affirmed in clearer and stronger tones that humanism "must . . . for its driving force depend on religion."[8] Without such support, he fears, the humanist may have no guiding conception of the purpose of being human. The Anglican Platonist is grateful for his comrade's friendly gestures toward the supernatural, but finds it hard to grasp their exact meaning.

If Dr. More cannot understand Babbitt's religion, our own efforts at comprehension are foredoomed to failure. "Humanism," says Babbitt, "differs from religion in putting at the basis of the pattern it sets up, not man's divinity, but the something in his nature that sets him apart simply as man from other animals." Passing over the question of whether the basis of any but a deliriously romantic religion is "man's divinity," we may ask how, without religion, man's dualistic apartness from other animals can be validated. For Babbitt, however, the distinguishing trait of humanity is that free and "higher" will which intuitively perceives the law of measure, and this intuition he declares to be "a psychological fact, one of the immediate data of consciousness, a perception so primordial that, compared to it, the deterministic denials of man's moral freedom are only a metaphysical dream."[9] Dr. More quotes this remark with approval, adding, "So far the way of the humanist is clear."[10] But is it? Suppose we translated Babbitt's assertion into Dr. Johnson's simpler, "Sir, we *know* our will is free, and there's an end on't!" The difference is that while both men

6. *Ibid.*
7. *On Being Human*, p. 13.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Humanism in America*, p. 39.
10. *On Being Human*, p. 17.

appeal to intuition, Johnson's intuition is grounded upon that faith without which rhetorical flourishes about primordial perceptions are likely to sound rather hollow.

In *Rousseau and Romanticism*, Professor Babbitt generously grants that "humanism should have in it an element of religious insight," and that humanism and religion "are only different stages on the same path." "The honest thinker," he says, "must begin by admitting that though religion can get along without humanism, humanism cannot get along without religion."[11] But in the "Essay at Definition" contributed to *Humanism in America* he insists, contrary to T. S. Eliot, that humanism can get along very well without religion of any dogmatic or institutional kind.[12] Here also he observes that humanism "dwells on the danger of any attempt to pass too abruptly to the religious level; it holds . . . that the world would have been a better place if more persons had made sure they were human before setting out to be superhuman." The psychological background of this remark is his sense of the difficulty of being religious in any ordinary meaning of the term without being romantic. So strong is his distaste for "enthusiasm" that he wishes he might simply declare with Pope that "the proper study of mankind is man," refusing "to take sides too decisively in the great debate between the naturalists and the supernaturalists."[13] But he sees that in the long run the humanist must enlist in one army or the other, and so "For my own part," he declares, "I range myself unhesitatingly on the side of the supernaturalists."[14] Only through such an alliance can the reality of the higher will be established. But since we can nowhere discover what Babbitt means by the supernatural, we must conclude that the religion which humanism cannot do without is the special sort of religion which he calls "humanism."

In the second chapter of *On Being Human*, a delightfully intimate character-sketch of Irving Babbitt, Mr. More throws some light on his friend's religious philosophy. We learn that Babbitt employed "economy" in his propaganda, for he "was eminently practical in that he aimed at getting results and thought much of strategy in attack."[15] His strategy concealed a more violent antipathy to Christianity than

11. *Rousseau and Romanticism*, p. 380.
12. *Humanism in America*, pp. 37-38.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 38, 39.
15. *On Being Human*, p. 36.

he ever allowed to become explicit in his writings. "On the other hand," without being a Buddhist, "he was much closer to Buddhism than would appear from his public utterances."[16] This is the controversialist who once exclaimed to Dr. More, "Good God, man, are you a Jesuit in disguise?"[17] We are told that Buddhism appealed to Babbitt as being a non-theistic religion excluding the conception of grace which he so strongly disliked. In other words it enabled him to believe in the supernatural without believing in the superhuman.[18] Dr. More says all this very gently. He refrains from observing that the conception of a supernatural man in a godless universe is hard to distinguish from that romantic philosophy which the humanist regards as the root of all evil.

The same chapter, however, preserves a "confession of faith" orally communicated to Dr. More by the humanist leader shortly before the latter's death:

> There is in man as distinguished from the animal, he said, a something of which he is immediately, though it may be dimly, aware at the centre of his being, a something which exists apart from the desires and affections and ambitions and dejections of that lower self which is ordinarily thought of as our personality. It may be called the "ethical" will because, though not to be confused with the lower will which is active in the affairs of life, it does yet, in some untraceable manner, make its effects felt ethically in the plane of nature. To express this indefinable relation, while maintaining intact the distinction between the supernatural and the natural, the higher faculty may be spoken of as the will to refrain, the *frein vital* as contrasted with the *élan vital;* but though it can be defined only in negative terms, it is in itself real and positive, the highest reality and the supreme factor in that which we know as our individual character. At the same time, in this deepest stratum of our consciousness, we are aware of the great paradox that this ethical will is at once both individual and universal, so that he who is most himself is also most human, thinking and acting not as an isolated atom in conflict with other atoms, but as a being at one with the great heart of the world, strong in the strength drawn from that silence of the soul beyond the curtain of perplexing lights and noises, wherein all distractions end in peace.[19]

Thus the statement that Professor Babbitt did not believe in the superhuman must be qualified by saying that he was at least willing

16. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

to regard his personal temperament as the expression of universal law. He could see that the world must have a great refraining humanistic soul. Dr. More is not satisfied by this specimen of the "higher immediacy." He declares: "The refusal to admit responsibility to the superhuman, in the full theistic sense of the word, seems to me to deprive religion of its richest source of inspiration, and to leave it too often a sort of flimsy and unpractical sentiment."[20] Nevertheless he is more than half inclined to agree with a Hindu visitor's description of Professor Babbitt as "a holy man, a great saint!"[21] Without underestimating the real beauty of his friend's devotion to what he deemed a sacred cause, Dr. More might fairly have pointed out that Babbitt's humanism is simply one of the innumerable quasi-religious by-products of the decay of Christianity, and that, as such, it is much too romantic to be a useful weapon against romanticism. The chaos of modern thought cannot be regulated by means of a special aspect of that chaos.

But Dr. More and Professor Babbitt liked each other, and they both disliked Marcel Proust and James Joyce. Consequently, while More disapproved of non-religious humanism, he regarded himself as a Christian humanist, or humanistic Christian. The interesting essays in literary criticism which embody this viewpoint cannot be discussed here, but three chapters of *On Being Human* may be glanced at as pertaining more closely to religious problems.

Chapter VIII, "A Scholar-Saint," expresses warm admiration for Baron von Hügel tempered with regret that his mind was so torn by conflicts "between the immediacy of the inner light and the mediation of sacramental grace," and especially between the claims of divine immanence and divine transcendence. In a detailed analysis of this essay one might ask whether Von Hügel was quite so grievously tortured by "the demon of the absolute" as Dr. More would have been if he had been Von Hügel; also whether such difficulties would vanish if, as the author advises, we schooled ourselves to speak of "the ultimate" rather than of "the absolute."[22] But for our present purpose it is sufficient to observe that the "religious humanism" here proposed as a means of soothing the agonies of Von Hügel is quite unrelated to the humanism preached by Babbitt. "Our knowledge of God ends with what he

20. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-177.

ultimately is to us and for us; what if anything, stretches beyond that the humanist leaves reverently in the vast unknown."[23] Taken in its context this is simply Anglican common-sense supported by a philosophy which, coming from a foe of pragmatism, sounds rather pragmatic. If humanism is the non-theistic supernaturalism of Babbitt, there can be no possibility of an alliance between it and Christianity; if it is merely our old friend the *via media,* the humanists may as well join a confirmation-class and have done with it.

In Chapter VI, "Religion and Social Discontent," and Chapter VII, "Church and Politics," the author is more obviously Babbitt's "comrade-in-arms," for here he gives full scope to the humanistic distaste for both hard and soft humanitarianism. On this point I freely confess a conflict in my own ideas. It seems to me that Dr. More is very acute when, in the former essay, he argues that Dewey's social philosophy is motivated by belief in the supreme importance of discontent as a force for progress, accompanied by hostility toward any faith which would bring peace to man by distracting his attention from his immediate needs in this world. And in Chapter VII I admire his criticism of that feebly radical gospel of service which so many "progressive" clergymen have substituted for genuine Christianity.

But as one reads these vigorous attacks one hears the voice of an earlier Christian Platonist: "Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another." When the religious humanist discusses the bearing of religion on social problems, he seems to lose that poise which is supposedly the essence of humanism. It should be possible to expose the fallacies of pragmatic or sentimental naturalism without adopting so scornful an attitude toward the social significance of religion. The Christian had better not preach an economic gospel which, once established, would speedily liquidate its tender-hearted champions. He had better not suppose that the essence of religion lies in teaching poor little boys to play basketball. And yet there is a second great commandment which is "like unto" the first, and no perversion of the spirit of that commandment should tempt the Christian to forget its claims. Can there be a real Christianity which does not unite us in mutual love, and does this love mean much unless it makes us active workers for justice? I agree with Dr. Moore that Christianity is primarily a religion of personal salvation, but I hold that man ob-

23. *Ibid.,* 182.

tains personal salvation as a member of a corporate society of believers which, as the living body of Christ, must practically manifest Christ's love in the ugly world. This idea would be repugnant to Professor Babbitt, but the author of *The Catholic Faith* should not object to it. Sympathizing as I do with Dr. More's opposition to sentimentally naturalistic imitations of religion, it is not easy for me to say that at times his humanism blurred his insight into an important aspect of Christianity. But I cannot help feeling that the humanistic viewpoint implies a negativeness, a cold exclusiveness, a Tory intellectual *hauteur*, which cannot easily be reconciled with applied Christian love. For Professor Babbitt, the expansiveness of the father of the prodigal son might seem demoralizingly Rousseauistic. Certainly he was deficient in the will to refrain. Jesus was not a humanitarian in the unreligious modern sense, but he was much closer to being a humanitarian than he was to being a new humanist.

Defined as a spirit of ripe culture, serenity, and sweet reasonableness, humanism is an obviously desirable element in religious thought; but it is merely confusing to regard it as an independent system which may or may not be united with religion. In any case, humanism in this sense is not the humanism of Irving Babbitt. The professor's philosophy is too heavily permeated with a vague supernaturalism to be acceptable to the scientific naturalist, and too neglectful of the superhuman to be acceptable to the genuinely religious person. It does not merely fall short of belief in a transcendent deity, but is radically opposed to any such belief. If the humanist believed in God rather than in man be would automatically cease to be a humanist. How so learned and devout a Christian as Paul Elmer More could regard this arid and pretentious cult with anything but resolute hostility must always remain a puzzle to his admirers. His personal affection for Professor Babbitt, his naturally harmonizing temper, his feeling that opponents of the modern chaos must at all costs stick together—these are obvious explanations, but they leave us unsatisfied.

Hoxie Neale Fairchild

Columbia University

The Creative I and the Divine. By Karl Schmidt. New York: The Dial Press, 1937. 281 pp. $2.75.

The aim of the work, indicated by its subtitle, *Introduction to a Sys-*

tematic Philosophy, is "to give an account of all the different factors that must enter into our philosophy today, and to show how they must be understood so that they can be organized into a valid whole" (p. 15). The philosophy presented comes to the conclusion that such a valid whole necessarily includes the postulate of God. God, Dr. Schmidt says, is "the inescapable concern of the philosopher who tries to give an adequate account of the philosophy of mathematics and science" (p. 14). That account explains science as giving an explanation of the natural world, which is based on its own data, and which is in terms of its own theories. These theories do not include the postulate of God, who is no more needed as an hypothesis of physics than of La Place's astronomy. Not until the last chapter of the book is God introduced, to complete the philosophical explanation of scientific reality.

It would be hard to class this markedly original position with any school. The influence of the Marburg school, combined with that of contemporary science and mathematical logic, results in a conception of reality which is, roughly speaking, idealistic. The postulate method dominates the presentation.

The chapter, "The Architecture of Systems," develops this method, and gives a foundation and rigidly logical form to the philosophy. It establishes the basic importance of the problem as a structural element. On the valid formulation of the "generating problem" of any realm of investigation depends the truth of the system developed as a solution to the problem. Problems, as well as systems, it is later shown, must be tested by the criteria of truth (pp. 80-81). The validly formulated generating problem is essential to the postulate method as here understood, since the problem forms the justification of the postulates upon which all systems are based. Those postulates which are necessary for the solution of a generating problem must be made.

Before the concept of reality is introduced truth is defined by a set of criteria. They, too, are postulates, deriving their justification from their ability to solve the historic problem of truth, and explain the succession of systems of knowledge which have been accepted as true. They, too, if true, must satisfy the requirements of truth which they state. The criteria are those of logical purity (including consistency), adequacy, and simplicity. This establishment of criteria of truth without reference to a reality which is the object of truth results from the

non-empirical position of the work. Since true systems must have a non-empirical source, Dr. Schmidt rests their truth on postulates, demands of reason which must be made to explain experience. Postulates explain experience truly if they answer to the criteria of truth.

After truth is defined, reality is defined in terms of truth. It is this definition which rings most strangely on the ears of the reader; yet it is this definition which requires the postulate of God. Existence is that whose nature is defined and declared to exist by a true proposition, "warranted by a true proposition" (p. 95). It is thus relative both to knowledge and to the particular realm of knowledge where it is declared to exist. It is not "what exists absolutely, but what we think, declare, assume, assert exists" (p. 100). After a body of knowledge is shown to be a true explanation of its data, it may be said to delineate reality. For reality "is not given in sensory experience" (p. 96), but must await formulation by knowledge. Moreover, since knowledge is based upon postulates and since postulates are reformulated with the growth of knowledge, existence, too, grows with knowledge. Existence, which emerges with knowledge, may be called the creation of the formulator (p. 175). Hence the *Creative I*. And hence the *Divine*, whose creation reality is, who is the reason for the generality and authority of reality.

This general philosophic method is applied to mathematics, physics, ethics, aesthetics, psychology, and religion. Various philosophic problems such as those of the variable, universals, intuition, freedom, the relation of the critic to the artist, and faith are discussed from the standpoint of the main position. The creative I is finally defined in the psychology, which, while not denying the value of physiology, discusses problems more familiarly met with in a metaphysics of the self. It is held that there are problems relating to the nature of the knower whose answers presuppose a philosophical position on logic and knowledge and reality (pp. 264-5).

Finally, the philosophy of religion introduces the concept of God, to remove the subjectivity of a humanly created reality. Reality is a divine creation. After reality has been forged by human tools and warranted by statements which are true on human standards, it may be called the creation of God. It is impossible that an individual man should be the creator of a reality with such universality (in the sense of being common to different knowers), authority and dignity. The last

sentence of the work is: "God, the Creative Reason, is the ultimate justification of our trust in our own reason and its unquenchable creative power."

Innumerable questions arise; for the argument, besides being unfamiliar, is close-packed. The abstract argument is not clarified by illustrations and applications. Moreover, the work, calling itself an *Introduction*, only, to a philosophic position, merely outlines a method, and indicates how it is to be applied to specific fields, whose tenets are not formulated.

However, one question in particular may be of especial concern to the readers of the *Review of Religion*. With what right may the creator of reality be called God? Though God has been traditionally described as Creator and Author of the universe, he has not been known as creator of reality in the sense here presented. For, He has been an efficient cause of the physical universe, guiding its course through time. Here, He is no efficient cause, since natural sciences from astronomy to biology explain natural causes in their own terms. He is creator of reality in the semi-Platonic meaning of the "ideal" entities defined by knowledge. The creative process is not a physical process, but a process of knowledge. God cannot guide the natural course of events by any purpose. Moreover, He cannot be said to have purposes. For God, as here conceived, not being a reality but an "actuality," has not attributes derived from human knowledge, personal or otherwise. Therefore His purposes, good or bad, cannot be found in nature. The problem of evil is not mentioned. Certainly this conception of God is a radical departure from traditional conceptions. Its legitimacy remains a question.

EDITH WATSON

Elmira College

Christianity and the Social Revolution. Edited by JOHN LEWIS, KARL POLYANI, and DONALD K. KITCHIN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936. 526 pp. $3.00.

This book is the first important attempt on the part of Christians and Communists to write a book together on the relations between Christianity and Communism. It is safe to say that it is the richest and the most profound book on the subject. Professor Macmurray, who writes the concluding chapter, says that the only conviction

which the writers hold in common is that both Christianity and Communism are to be taken seriously. The writers range from Christian Socialists who are at home in the Anglican Church (including Conrad Noel who comes as close as possible to being a Christian Communist), to orthodox Communists whose rejection of Christianity is without qualifications. John Lewis (a Cambridge lecturer in Social Philosophy) writes with the greatest sympathy and insight about the revolutionary factors in Christianity, and especially in the teachings of Jesus, but seems to accept Communism, not only as the contemporary political implementation of revolutionary Christianity, but also as an adequate religious heir of the Christian tradition. Joseph Needham, the Cambridge biologist, also writes about the revolutionary character of Christianity, and, though he too seems to accept Communism politically, he completely rejects the Communist view of religion. Contributions by Reinhold Niebuhr and John Macmurray give good summaries of their thought on this subject. One of Macmurray's chapters is an account of the early development of Marx's thought, with a special reference to his relation to Christianity. Dr. Karl Polyani has a chapter on the ideological roots of Fascism. The book is introduced by the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, C. E. Raven. It is interesting to note that to a very large extent the book is a Cambridge product.

The book has three parts. The first is an exposition of the social meaning of Christianity in history. The second is a statement of the Communist position on religion by Communists for the most part. The third is a rather odd assortment of chapters, several of them attempts at a synthesis between Christianity and Communism. The first chapter of this section on Fascism provides a background for this synthesis by showing the complete contradiction between Christianity and Fascism, when Fascism is interpreted in the light of the philosophy of Othmar Spann and Klages, as radical anti-individualism and what seems a wild primitivism. The reader should not judge the book from the first chapter, which has bright and interesting spots, but which does not put the thought of the book forward.

On the whole, one is impressed by the superior coherence and sharpness of the Communist chapters. On the first reading there is a tendency to regard them as the best, but allowance must be made for the fact that the Communists speak with one voice (without

hindrance from the Stalin-Trotsky controversy), whereas the Christian writers speak with as many voices as there are individuals. The chapters by Christians—with the exception of a few historical chapters—are more impressionistic than the others. The efforts at synthesis amount to little more than a few suggestions. It is difficult to summarize the work of such a variety of writers, but I will mention some of the things which stand out most clearly after reading this book.

1. *The revolutionary resources in the Christian tradition.* These are brought out in two chapters on Jesus which would be dismissed as one-sided and impressionistic by most students of the gospels, and yet which represent a real aspect of Jesus. As John Lewis summarizes his argument: "The gospel is rich in social morality, in equalitarianism and revolutionary ethics. It is amazing with what obtuseness scholars and preachers move unheeding through its pages, or with heavy insensitiveness, busy themselves with taking the edge off the Sermon on the Mount" (p. 92). There are chapters on the Christian radical movements in the Middle Ages, during the period of the Reformation, in the seventeenth century England, and on the more recent development of Christian Socialism in England. There is no discussion of American developments.

2. *The Communist attack upon religion.* This is presented with complete frankness, and yet with discrimination, by the Communist writers. It is granted that religion has historically had a useful function to perform in society. Lukachevsky is quoted as saying that: "There have been phases in history when the proletariat fought its class struggle for emancipation under the banner of religion" (p. 267). Religion is held not to have been at all times an opiate for the poor, and even now is recognized as a stimulant of the rich. But Christianity is rejected as false in the light of science; as, at present, an obstacle to the social revolution; and as having no function in the Communist society. Since religion is thought of chiefly as a way of dealing with the frustrations of life, and since it is believed that there will be no frustrations in the Communist society, the need for religion will simply not exist in that society. The social movements within the Church are dismissed by Communist writers with contempt as devices "to make it appear that Socialism is unnecessary, and to divert progressive energy and thought into futile channels of impossible alternatives" (p. 286). Perhaps the sharpest challenge to the Church comes

from John Lewis who understands Christianity better than the other Communists. He says: "The reunion of Christendom may be in the last ditch of Fascist resistance to Socialism" (p. 502).

3. *The Christian criticism of Communism.* The criticism of Communism is presented chiefly on religious grounds. Niebuhr, Macmurray, and Needham present it most clearly. The chief point is that Communists are definitely mistaken in thinking that religion will have no function in a Communist society. Niebuhr shows that this is true because of the persistence of sin in the new order, and he subjects the Communist conception of man to rigorous criticism. Needham shows that there will always be what he calls "cosmic oppression" or "creatureliness, the unescapable inclusion of man in space-time, subject to pain, sorrow, sadness, and death" (p. 434). Macmurray, who also recognizes the fact of death as important, here also stresses the idea that Communism has nothing to say about direct personal relations, the relations of love which are the most important stuff of life. Those who planned this book were more concerned to convince Christians of the importance of Communism than they were to show the religious limitations of Communism.

4. *The degree to which Communism inherits from Christianity much of its ethical concern.* John Lewis seeks to show this from the Communist point of view, though he is not one of the orthodox Communists. Macmurray seeks to show it by indicating the dependence of Marx upon Feuerbach, and the dependence of Feuerbach upon ethical Christianity. As Needham says: "It cannot be a coincidence that Marxist morality grew up in the bosom of Christianity after eighteen Christian centuries. The phoenix of the Kingdom is rising from the ashes of the Church's failure" (p. 441).

5. *That dialectical materialism is in itself no serious obstacle to a reconciliation between Christianity and Communism.* It is this fact which more than any other Christians need to have impressed upon them. Materialism, as that word is used by contemporary Communists, makes room for all the realities which Christians include under the word "spiritual." It is no more than a protest against a dualistic interpretation of the material and the spiritual. The real difficulties which prevent reconciliation between Christianity and Communism lie in the Communist theory of the nature and function of religion, and in the Communist view of man, which in their optimism makes it

possible for them to think in terms of a human utopia in the future, and in terms of an immanentism which allows no place for God in the theistic sense. It is not impossible that, just as Communists themselves believe that a new society will in an experimental way cut the roots of religion, they will discover by the same experimental method that no new society can solve all human problems, and will learn that their theory of religion is false. If that does happen the theory of dialectical materialism will not in itself be a serious obstacle to the rediscovery of religion.

. . .

This book does not present with sufficient fulness or system the Christian answer to Communism. This answer would follow along at least three lines. One would be the development of the intellectual criticisms of non-theistic philosophies and the grounds for belief in God. Another would be an exposition of the ethical relevance of prophetic Christianity—something which is done implicitly in this book, but too much as though it were only a matter of history. The third would be the line of argument which shows that the Communist expectation that religion would have no function in a new order is based upon a false conception of man. This is done by several writers in the book, but too much from the negative point of view. It is not enough to show that there will always be sin and death and frustration. It is quite as important to show that what might be called the logic of human worship and loyalty cannot stop short of God, and that life gains meaning and positive enhancement from religion. One weakness of the treatment of the subject is that Communism is dealt with in theoretical and ideal terms, whereas Christianity is seen at all times in the light of the shortcomings of the Christian institutions of nineteen centuries. This is probably inevitable as it would be equally unfair to identify Communism with the existing situation in the Soviet Union, but allowance should be made for it at all times.

It is assumed throughout, except in a few of Niebuhr's paragraphs, that the only serious criticism of Communism is religious. One is left with hardly any alternative between acceptance of the *status quo* in company with the dispensers of religious opium who are described, and the embracing of political Communism, though the latter should be done in the opinion of most of the writers with religious reservations. There are many of us who must still refuse to accept either

alternative. Political Communism, and left-wing politics in all forms, are strangely blind to the problem created by the middle classes in a country like America. They are far too heedless of the importance of strengthening the cohesive forces in a society if it can hope to escape the fate of Spain. Moreover, the sectarianism of the political left seems to distract American radicals from their main job. Not enough attention is given to the resources which we have in a democratic society which can be used to prevent the development of Fascism, while those who are seeking more radical change move forward with the kind of patience which may be necessary to prevent the catastrophe of civil war. It is a part of this larger difficulty that this book gives no light at all to those Christians within the Church who still believe that it is not impossible to make the Churches important factors in preventing Fascism and counter-revolution. Niebuhr suggests that now that we know the sources of the moral confusions of the Christian faith, "these, once discovered, may be corrected" (p. 455). If there is any truth at all in that, a book of this kind should have a different perspective, and should give some guidance to those in the existing churches who are already convinced that Christianity rightly understood is on the side of social revolution, and who believe that it is not impossible to bring important groups in the churches to the same vision.

John C. Bennett

Auburn Theological Seminary

Is Christianity Unique? By Nicol Macnicol. London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1936. 222 pp.

This volume contains the substance of a course of lectures delivered on the Wilde Foundation at Oxford, and repeated at a number of institutions in the United States. In view of the fact that my attitude to the present work is mainly critical, I wish to place on record my high regard for much of the author's previous work which has embodied note-worthy contributions to Indian studies. The book here considered is written in a direct style manifesting the strength of Dr. Macnicol's convictions, and it discusses matters of the greatest importance.

In view of the widespread Secularism, Naturalism, and narrow forms of Humanism of our time, some of us have been presenting the case for religion transcending physical nature and human society,

with reference to the character of the great living religions as expressions of spirituality. Though quite conscious of the differences between these religions, the purpose we have had primarily in view has involved their subordination in some of our expositions. In these Wilde Lectures Dr. Macnicol undertakes the necessary and difficult task of bringing these differences into relief, and he rightly makes no apology for indicating clearly his relative estimates. Though he does not directly answer the question asked in his title, there are sufficient passages to show what his position really is. Having regard to the general character of his study I shall defer to the end of this notice an endeavour to state what I think he ought explicitly to have said in answer to his question in accordance with those passages. For a complete understanding of the author's motive such a statement must be finally considered.

The value which a reader will attribute to this book must depend in large measure on whether he does or does not accept the interpretations which the author gives to Christianity and to the non-Christian religions which he discusses. Throughout the volume he brings out from a variety of angles what he regards as a fundamental opposition. There are two types of religion: one denying and one affirming the reality of the world and human freedom (p. 36). Similarly there are two types of mysticism involving "the same cleavage that we have found to divide the religions of the world" (p. 189). For brevity these two types may be called pantheistic and theistic respectively. The essence of Dr. Macnicol's contentions with regard to these is that the former is hopeless, non-moral, or leading to moral stagnation; and that the latter is fundamentally ethical, involving purpose and continued significance in life. From my own philosophical position I have no quarrel with the main lines of the author's description of the contrast between the pantheistic and the theistic.

When, however, he involves in his exposition the theory that Hinduism and Islām are simply of the former type, protest must be made. It is true that some of the most influential thinkers have stressed this side of Hindu and of Muslim thought, but whether or not they are to be charged with inconsistency, it appears to me more false than true to give a picture of Hinduism and Islām as religions such as Dr. Macnicol implies. The fault lies in paying far too much attention to certain metaphysical ideas, and far too little to the actual religious practices and the wide range of ethical ideals.

Even his view of the metaphysics seems to me to be inaccurate through its inadequacy. "Qualityless Brahman" is not the only Hindu philosophical and religious description of deity. Though dressed in more fantastic mythological form than Christianity, Hinduism too has its concept of incarnation. Though from one point of view this world may be taken as *māyā*, from another it is *līlā*. With the prospect of the eventual attainment of "truth, reality, and bliss," Hinduism cannot rightly be described as hopeless. For a scholar of Dr. Macnicol's standing to maintain that the doctrine of *karma* involves a denial of freedom is an almost unpardonable misrepresentation. According to that doctrine the suffering or enjoying of the consequences of past action is regarded as inescapable, but the freedom of the individual to act in any "now" so as to produce different consequences in the future is not denied. In fact, it is involved in the Hindu theory of progressive attainment in rebirths. It could even be maintained that Hinduism and Buddhism give freedom a wider rôle than Christianity, for, according to the former the conditions into which a man is born are regarded as due to his right or wrong (right and wrong) uses of his freedom in previous lives; while the latter must explain those conditions by reference to Nature, or God, or the parents, or to all of these. To reconcile the principle of freedom implied in Hinduism with some of its conceptions of deity is admittedly difficult, but the reconciliation of human freedom with the asserted omnipotence of the Theistic deity is none the less so. Dr. Macnicol must know that in Hinduism and in Islām, as in Christianity, there have been conflicts concerning human freedom. The Qur'ān certainly gives no justification for the view that Islām involves a complete denial of freedom. In spite of varying theories in their histories the importance and seriousness of choice has been practically recognized in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islām.

That is all the space I presume to take to express my doubts concerning Dr. Macnicol's description of non-Christian religions. But it must be asked further whether he has done what he apparently meant to do with regard to Christianity. As I agree with his ethical theism as against pantheisms and absolutisms, I may suggest that his contentions in this direction favor Christianity just to the extent to which it is an ethical theism, and might equally well be accepted by a modern Liberal Jew or a non-Christian Theist. Nevertheless, it is

quite obvious from a number of passages (which taken together do not however form a great part of the whole) that he is concerned with Christianity in a more specific sense. Thus he talks of the Cross—but it is not clear what Dr. Macnicol means by that expression. He refers to "the Incarnation" as though in the traditional doctrine of a particular event at a definite period in human history. If I understand him rightly, it is Jesus Christ as God-man dying on Calvary and thereby saving mankind, that he should explicitly have stated as constituting in his interpretation the uniqueness of Christianity. Dr. Macnicol presumably knows the criticisms which serious Orientals urge in this direction, and why they will not accept these doctrines except as symbols in a manner which he himself regards as inadequate. For my part I think that he and many other ordained ministers are under a misapprehension as to the extent to which professed Christians in the West today really hold such beliefs. That thoughtful men reject such traditional ideas, as analogous in nature with some oriental myths, does not mean that Christianity or Jesus are necessarily rejected—it is simply that a particular view of these is rejected. Dr. Macnicol says that Christianity is "intransigent." If that were so in the traditional sense, then I should see no hope for it, for there seems to be implied a mode of activity of deity that conflicts with the best thought of which we are now capable. Those who are engaged in a more progressive interpretation and mutual co-operation of the religions may go forward with confidence, but it is a source of profound regret that a missionary like Dr. Macnicol, and a deeply religious philosopher like A. E. Taylor, still cling to the traditional views.

The ethical theism of Christianity has reached its present form with distinctive characteristics from different sources, and through a varied history. There are those who believe, not without justification, that non-Christian religions are going through a similar development. They maintain that there are many avenues to God, and that God is revealing Himself to all peoples who may know Him in their own manner and to the extent of their ability. As scholars they are unable to force religions into two types as does Dr. Macnicol in this book, and as religious men they work for that "fellowship of faiths," the extent of his sympathy for which is open to doubt.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

Duke University

Man's Search for the Good Life. By A. Eustace Haydon. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1937. viii+269 pp. $2.50.

This book covers in part the same ground as the author's earlier volume entitled *The Quest of the Ages,* but his survey of the history of religions is now focussed more explicitly on bringing to light appropriate general principles for the interpretation of religion. In stating and defending these principles Professor Haydon continues to champion the semi-pragmatic, semi-realistic humanism of which he is recognized as the foremost exponent in this field.

The first two chapters are devoted to the methods of explaining the history of religion which have prevailed in the West prior to the present generation. The third chapter offers a summary statement of the nature of religion from the standpoint of Haydon's humanism, and the last five chapters illustrate its contentions by appeal to familiar facts from the period of recorded religious history.

Historians of religion as well as theologians, according to our author, have condemned themselves to failure in the quest for understanding by confusing religion with the cult of gods. This is due to their unconscious heritage from Christianity, which has been a God-centered religion from the start, and which in the epoch preceding the modern era had carried this God-centeredness to the extreme, looking to supernatural grace to supply every religious good to man. When we widen our view, especially through a sympathetic appreciation of early religions, we see that not only is religion always more than worship of gods; no line can be drawn even between the religious and the secular. Man has always been seeking the good life, guided by whatever conceptions of ideal value and techniques for pursuing it that are approved in his community. Religion is just the living totality of this quest; its distinction from secular activities is simply the distinction of a whole from its various contributing parts, not that of a certain group of activities from others. The reason why so many are blind to this truth, Professor Haydon believes, is to be found in certain easily understood historical transformations that cultured religions have undergone. Early man took it for granted that whatever goods were to be enjoyed would be realized in the life of his community on this earth. He was thoroughly naturalistic in his religion, although that religion, viewed from our scientifically sophisticated standpoint, contained supernatural elements. His gods were natural objects—sun, sky,

dawn, rain, earth—in their emotionally heightened bearing on his weal or woe. His techniques were the natural processes, practical and ceremonial, which he gradually learned in the effort to make them serve his needs, and to provide a source of comfort and hope in the times of their refractoriness. But the gods were gradually personified, detached from natural objects, and metaphysically refined. When great social changes ensued, which led to despair of attaining the good life on earth, men in almost all cultures save China turned their hopes to a paradise in another realm where, through the gracious love of some divinity, they might achieve the blessedness denied them here. Our fundamental ideas of religion today have been largely fixed by the fact that they were formed in this historical context of frustration. Religion became the technique of securing otherworldly salvation; the ordinary activities of this life went on beside it, and they became, by contrast, secular.

The modern era, however, marks the return to earth. Physical science provides a dependable technique for achieving the goods needed to meet man's material needs; social science provides a method for understanding man himself and his manifold possibilities. Men are more and more turning to confidence in science for securing the values they desire, and they are less and less awaiting the joys of another world to be vouchsafed them by divine benevolence. In this humanistic age religion will again become natural and earthy, replacing the pathetic hope for illusory joys by the shared determination to enhance and render universal the joys which are available for man here and now.

There is a glowing optimism about Haydon's faith in man that is cheering in this disillusioned time. The very essence of religion, in all epochs, as he sees it, is the daring demand that man shall not fail in winning the glorious goods that prophetic geniuses have glimpsed as possible. In this demand he joins, and he unites with it a trust in the powers of science that will seem Victorian to many readers. I wonder with them whether, with special reference to the present state of social science, our author's exhilarating expectations are not a bit more ardent than the facts would justify.

In his exaltation of empirical science as pointing the way to the good life for man, Professor Haydon's philosophy is predominantly pragmatic; in his certainty that scientific method as now pursued is the

absolute road to truth, he is realistic rather than pragmatic. And is not this certainty in conflict with his fundamental assumptions? The all-determining factor in human experience is for him human desire, interest, need. Men's ideas in the past have reflected the influence of this factor; that is how we may understand them in their historical significance. But modern science would seem, in its distinctive concepts, to transcend the play of this powerful influence; in them, at last, we are able to understand the world and man as they really are. Here, I think, is a serious challenge to clarification. If the basic principles in terms of which Haydon interprets religion are sound, then science must be interpreted in terms of those principles also; its concepts, too, will be relative to dominant human needs and will be expected radically to change when the needs which support them change. Perhaps our author believes this, but he makes many statements which suggest the contrary. If science is absolute in any of its assumptions or methods, how argue with the orthodox theologian who demands that religious intuition be allowed an absolute competence, and one which will show science its proper and subordinate place?

Clarification of the use of the term 'social' would also aid some puzzled readers. Religion for Haydon is intrinsically social; it is an affair of group or shared life, its values and techniques are socially approved. But in this minimum sense of the term, rugged individualism is also social. I wonder whether there is not some unconscious passage here between history and persuasion, between the bare fact that religion has displayed many of its most interesting phenomena as matters of group participation, and the humanist ideal of a religion rendered more intelligently and courageously social in its controlling aims than any religion has actually been. The ideal I heartily approve; the mixture of two meanings in the use of a fundamental category of interpretation if such mixture there be) appears to me unfortunate.

E. A. Burtt

Cornell University

BOOK NOTES

The Foundations of Faith and Morals: An anthropological analysis of primitive beliefs and conduct with special reference to the fundamental problems of religion and ethics. (Riddell Memorial lectures, seventh series, 1934-5.) By Bronislaw Malinowski. New York: Oxford University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. 62 pp. 2/6.

These brief lectures contain more food for reflection than large volumes usually do. I know of no more stimulating treatment of genuine "foundations" anywhere. Dr. Malinowski here brings together in plain, direct language the conclusions he has reached as a result of his investigations into myth, magic, and ritual. His theory is that the complex of myth and faith has a "different function from that of either explanation or allegory; it . . . expresses man's pragmatic reaction towards life and its vicissitudes; it refers to his emotions, forebodings, and to the ritualized behavior in which these mental attitudes are expressed" (p. 21). These attitudes and "pragmatic reactions" are then reduced to two basic themes or concerns: providence and immortality.

On the basis of his own theory, it seems to me, though I am not competent to argue it in technical detail, Dr. Malinowski should have applied his analysis of myth and faith to these two supposed "foundations" or needs. Could it not be shown that neither providence nor immortality is literally the material for religious myth but an illustration of it? A more minute functional analysis of burial rites, fertility rites, etc., seems to me to suggest a more variegated and sophisticated psychology of foundations.

This is a secondary consideration, however. The chief thesis seems to me brilliantly demonstrated. The emphasis on miracles as essential to religious faith and doctrine, the explanation of a miracle as "an event in which supernatural realities are created by ritual acts" (p. 49), and the exposition of the basically dramatic character of religious expression seem to me one of the most impressive and far-reaching discoveries ever made in the science of religions. There is a speculative problem involved that would naturally tempt a philosopher, though it probably permits of no generalized answer: Are the "supernatural realities" merely dramatic creations of ritual, mere sanctions to explain "why we do this," or are they "the precedent of religious ritual" in a temporal sense as well? In other words, which comes first, faith or morals? This is probably no better a problem than that of the hen and the egg; nevertheless there is an important methodological issue at least, whether faith and morals are to be treated as parallel and co-ordinate domains with common foundations, or whether one is to be regarded as the foundation for the other.

H. W. S.

Studies in Greek Religion. By CLARA M. SMERTENKO and GEORGE N. BELKNAP. Studies in the Humanities, Vol. I, Bulletin 2. Eugene, Ore.: University of Oregon, 1935. 61 pp. 50 cents.

This Bulletin contains three papers by Mrs. Smertenko, edited after her death by her former research assistant, George N. Belknap, who adds two papers of his own. In the first paper, "The Political Relations of the Delphic Oracle" (pp. 5-12), Mrs. Smertenko deals with the short period during which Delphi, an oracle with a long history, enjoyed its greatest popularity, the 150 years preceding the Persian Wars. In this period Apollo appears in myths in which he had been unimportant previously (in Homer), myths such as those of Oedipus and of Orestes; and the poets, Solon excepted, delight in praising him. The oracle and the aristocracy support each other against the "rising commercial classes." Delphi brings hero worship into prominence, and the old families in turn exalt Delphi politically as a power against anarchy. By the stress upon purification of criminals, Apollo kept the law from developing, and increased the sanctions and prohibitions of religion. By sending with each group of colonists a leader from an established family, Delphi made sure of the conservative control in the new cities. When even the aristocrats became commercial and the social contest was for wealth and prestige, the oracle was helpless and its decline begins with the democracies of the fifth century.

In "Greek Drama as a Religious Ritual" (pp. 13-24), Mrs. Smertenko describes the drama in Greece as "a social confessional, wherein the god Dionysus acts as the priest, for all the citizens weeping together over life's vast and inescapable sorrows, laughing over its absurdities," an art which offered release from the "strain of civilization," the relief a confessor gives to an individual; as the population of Athens lived vicariously with the characters of the drama in the Dionysiac festival it could be free for the moment from the necessary restraints of daily life, but also hear its "primitive impulsions" resolved by philosophical choruses or gods. The audience enjoyed the sorrow of tragedy and the license of comedy as a reflection of its own unspoken and repressed moods, and the inconsistencies in religious views or ethical justices in the drama reflects the variety of everyman's doubts and faiths. Critics have wrongly tried to prove that the dramatists resolve all the problems of fate or life under a belief in kindly or paternal providence. None of the dramatists presents such a simplification of life. Though the ritualistic conventions on which drama as a form is based were probably often forgotten or instinctive with the Greeks of the great period, the rhythm of the form "heightens and intensifies" the emotions and actions of the play and the expectancy of the form adds to the pleasure of the audience, though Gilbert Murray's analysis of the form into "agon, pathos, messenger, lament and epiphany of the god" is one that varies in the plays.

"The Political Sympathies of Aeschylus" (pp. 25-27), by Mrs. Smertenko is here republished from the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol.

LII (1932) pp. 233-5. Aeschylus should be considered not as a democrat or an aristocrat, but "an advocate of reconciliation between opposing parties," parties which had not yet crystallized into distinct factions. His view is most distinct in the *Eumenides*.

In "Religion in Plato's States" (pp. 28-43), Mr. Belknap, from a study of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, concludes that "The positive value of religion in Plato's ideal and second-best cities consists principally in the protecting, conservative power of sanctity which it places at the disposal of the state at points of social stress and weakness," and that Plato has here "the first comprehensive social theory of religion in European thought."

In "The Social Value of Dionysiac Religion" (pp. 44-59), Mr. Belknap revises a paper he had printed in the *Revue de l'histoire des religions* CVI (1932) pp. 575-91. The stress upon magic as a source of Greek, and particularly of Dionysiac, religion must be guarded against as we realize that social values were as prominent in the cult as any inherited magical formulae. The constant human need for celebration kept Dionysiac religion vital even when magical forms had died or lost significance, in this cult which spoke to "the subtle physiological and psychological sympathy of the human organism with the rhythm of the living world as a whole." "The problem for primitive man is to allow a periodic breaking of social forms and yet prevent disintegration of the group life." The cult of Dionysus offered a solution by making, not for the individual, but for the whole population periods of release. The festivals were connected with the vine and the seasons, but the rituals were not strictly seasonal; nor were the tragic and comic forms that developed in them divided between gloomy winter and ecstatic spring attitudes. Dionysiac orgiastic ritual was "psychologically appropriate and probable at any occasion of real abandonment to the god," though "there can be no doubt that magic was originally the primary purpose of the winter rites."

This pamphlet closes (pp. 59-61), with an appendix by Mr. Belknap on the date of Dicaeopolis' Rural Dionysia in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes, which he would place, not in the winter month Poseidon, but at a date two or three weeks after the Lenaea. "If my argument has any weight we know more about the spring festivals and less about the winter festivals than scholars have thought."

H. Theodric Westbrook

Le Buddhisme: ses doctrines et ses methodes. By Alexandra David-Neel. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1936. iii + 257 pp. Fr. 15.

It is obviously unfair to expect to find a systematic and thorough-going philosophical exposition in a book with an avowed popular purpose. Madame David-Neel pretends to deal only with the essentials of Buddhist theory and methods of mental culture. Her hope is that in this current period of crisis the study of the conclusions and practices of Buddhism may help us

to conserve the valuable and to reject the worthless in our own "bagage d'idées et de principes."

Such a book may be suggestive and interesting, and this one is; but it is doubtful whether Buddhist ideas can be made clear to a Western reader without more painstaking analysis. And even within its limits, the treatment is unnecessarily casual. Madame David-Neel stresses classifications and lists, and there is a good deal of reduplication and overlapping, and even of conflict. Her translation of Buddhist terms cannot be criticized by one ignorant of both Pali and Sanskrit, but other translations (those of the Rhys Davids', for example) seem more clear-cut. And there is insufficient examination of the underlying ideas. Certain inconsistencies in the doctrine of Karma, as she states it, are apparently overlooked, and her treatment of the *Pratītyasamūtpada*, or "Twelve Interdependent Origins," is confused. This doctrine, which makes desire a subordinate cause of suffering, dependent on ignorance, is substituted for the second Noble Truth; the substitution is a natural one, though not wholly orthodox, but here it is somewhat unfortunate, partly because the reader has been led to believe that all the doctrines of Buddhism can be reduced to the Four Truths in their simple form, partly because the *Pratītasamūtpada* is a highly involved conception, demanding a careful account of Buddhist psychology and of Buddhist ideas on causality for its understanding.

All this confusion serves one good purpose; it does suggest the complexity of the subject-matter. No one could derive the idea that Buddhism is a homogeneous doctrine. Māhayāna and Hinayāna are on the whole clearly contrasted, and we are never allowed to forget the divergencies of teaching within the two "vehicles." It is the Tibetan point of view which is emphasized throughout, and here Madame David-Neel speaks with authority. She has had unusual opportunities for studying Tibetan Buddhism at first hand, not as an outsider, but as a professed believer; and this gives her account of certain practices—exercises in attention and meditation, contemporary interpretations of moral precepts, methods of escaping automatic sanctions, in particular the art of "dying profitably"—great liveliness and interest.

In its outline the book is conventional. The Buddha, the Four Truths (with the substitution mentioned), Karma, and Nirvâna are discussed in turn. The theme is the escape from suffering, or the illusory round of rebirths, through knowledge and love—knowledge that all phenomena are impermanent, and the ego a pure illusion, love which is a realization of oneness with all created things. There is no index. There are six appendices, consisting for the most part of excerpts from Buddhist writings. These, with the abundant quotations throughout the book, help to make vivid modes of thinking and feeling which are at the same time strange and challenging. This book provides a glimpse at least of Buddhism as a living religion, clouded with superstition, but profoundly speculative and full of mystical insights. ELIZABETH ROBINSON WOODS

A Venture of Faith. By Sir Francis Younghusband. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1937. 287 pp. $3.00.

A description of the World Congress of Faiths held in London, July 1936, written by its eminent organizer, and alive with his own enthusiasm for the cause of World Fellowship. Beginning with "A Personal Note," Sir Francis gives a moving account of his own spiritual pilgrimage throughout a long, eventful life in the service of his country—a pilgrimage which has culminated in this "Venture of Faith"—a world congress of all faiths. Through his eyes we see the Congress in operation, and receive his own impressions of the contributions made by the various speakers—Christian, Moslem, Buddhist, Hindu, etc. Perhaps another interpreter would have produced a quite different effect, but here we find great intelligence and sensitiveness, and a keen evaluation of the attitudes of the various religions toward the difficult problem of religious unity. The author's own personal conclusion is that "we shall have to amplify our religion to meet expanding requirements. We shall need greater religion. Not *a* greater religion. Not any *new* religion. But greater Christianity, greater Hinduism, greater Islam."

M. B.

A Hermit in the Himalayas. By Paul Brunton. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1937. 322 pp. $2.50.

Again Mr. Brunton brings a message from the East, this time a record of his own experience as a hermit in the Abode of the Gods. The book contains a great deal of interesting "local color" regarding holy men, wild animals, native princes, British rule, and the glories of nature, as well as a somewhat rambling exposition of the author's mystical philosophy. But the most vivid impression one derives from the book is a sense of actual experience of, and intimate communion with, those august deities, the Himalayas themselves. For that, if for nothing else, it is well worth reading.

M. B.

Bible and Spade: An Introduction to Biblical Archaeology. By Stephen L. Caiger. New York: Oxford University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. xii + 218 pp. $2.00

It would be difficult to overestimate the role played by certain great classics of mankind in providing stimuli for archeological research. Without the Homeric literature Schliemann would not have dug at ancient Troy. Without the Bible the interest taken in Babylonian, Assyrian, and Palestinian, and to some extent even Egyptian, archeology would be unthinkable. To illuminate the faded pages of Israel's literary records has been the primary motive of most of the donors who have made excavations possible, as well as of many of the archeologists and philologists who have labored in the field or in the study to recover and interpret the record

of these ancient civilizations. The advance of knowledge and the progress of discovery ever and anon elicit popular books covering the general field. Mr. Caiger's *Bible and Spade* (a title taken without acknowledgement from a book by the Rev. J. P. Peters, excavator of ancient Nippur) is of this sort. It communicates some of the more vivid facts of Oriental archeology which actually, or supposedly, illumine the Bible in a brief and interesting manner. But it is a question whether books of this sort should be written by men without first-hand knowledge of these fields of research. The author every now and then betrays the fact that he belongs to the noble order of dilettantes. The seriousness with which he discusses the weighty question of how Moses may have signed his name, the misspellings of Sumerian nomenclature, the naïve acceptance of Langdon's claims for the Dilmun epic as "the Epic of Paradise, the Flood and the Fall of Man," his reliance on a statement of George Smith (peace to his *manes!*) concerning a Babylonian parallel to the story of the tower of Babel, his obvious ignorance of the fact that the Gilgamesh epic and "the Seven Tablets of Creation" are not the same, are sufficient indications that he never studied Assyriology. His harmonistic approach to critical difficulties which enables him, e.g., to reconcile Sennacherib's account of his siege of Jerusalem with the story of 2 Kings seems to show that he has little appreciation of historical method. But perhaps these insufficiencies and defects will make little difference to the "layman" for whom the author is writing. We will readily concede that such a one will find here in brief and convenient form a considerable amount of valuable information that will give him a more vivid appreciation of the Old Testament. The excellent illustrations deserve especial commendation.

EMIL G. KRAELING

The Rise of the Karaite Sect: A New Light on the Halakah and Origin of the Karaites. By DR. ZVI CAHN. New York: M. Tausner Publishing Co., 1937. 128 pp. $1.50.

Working from recently discovered fragments of Karaite and other sectarian writers, Dr. Cahn has developed the following thesis with regard to the history of the Karaite Schism: 1) That Anan was not the original schismatic, but that the Karaites were in existence before the time of Anan. 2) That Anan's sect, the Ananites, fell midway between the Karaites and the Rabbanites in their laws. 3) That the laws of even the most extreme groups of Karaites were far closer to Rabbanite Halakah than has been granted by previous writers. 4) That Karaism arose as a protest against the incorporation of Persian material in the Talmud.

The book is extremely well documented, and by the care which the author has shown in analyzing the sources a great many of the assumptions of previous writers on the subject have been cleared up. It is to be regretted that many proof errors have been allowed to remain uncorrected, and that the style of the book is poor.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

Exégèse Talmudique des Prophéties Messianiques. By JEAN-JOSEPH BRIÈRRE-NARBONNE. Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1936. 109 pp. Fr. 50.

The present volume is the forth in a series of monographs on rabbinic exegesis of messianic prophecies in the Old Testament. It contains a brief introduction to the literature of the Targums, which are the Aramaic versions of the Hebrew Bible used in the synagogue service (pp. 1-9); a bibliography of editions and commentaries (pp. 10-12); the texts themselves with French translation and brief explanatory notes, including references to parallel passages elsewhere in rabbinic literature (pp. 14-88); a synoptic concordance of passages in the various Targums on the same biblical verse and an index to the messianic passages of the Old Testament (pp. 94-99); and finally an index of subjects, such as Messianic names, symbols, places, etc. (pp. 100-101), and a table of contents (pp. 102-108). Thus it will be seen that the book is conveniently organized. The author shows competence in editing the Aramaic texts and translating them. A critic with primarily linguistic interests might take exception to the vocalization of certain forms, but as the author's purpose is not linguistic these slight inadequacies need not be emphasized. The work would, however, have been more useful to the theologian who is not a specialist in rabbinic literature if the author had been more generous with explanatory notes. He devotes only two lines to Armillos the "Anti-Christ," who appears, for example, in the Targum to Is. xi. 4, and does not cite the parallel in Paul's interpretation of this verse which also makes reference to the Anti-Christ. On the whole, however, the book is very useful and deserves a place on the reference-shelf of Christian as well as Jewish theologians. It is to be regretted that, since the book had to be photolithographed rather than printed from type, the author did not typewrite the French translation and notes, or at least write them in a simple literary hand, instead of using a style of writing which is very ornamental but not very legible.

RALPH MARCUS

L'Apocalypse et les Cultes de Domitien et de Cybele. By P. TOUILLEUX. Paris: Librarie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1935, 192 pp. Fr. 30.

The Apocalypse, or the Revelation, of John has influenced the art and the religious thought of the Western World to a degree not paralleled by any other book of the Bible. Its history is almost synonomous with the history of Christianity.

As has been the case with the majority of commentaries during a period of almost nineteen hundred years, a recent commentator, P. Touilleux, has been interested less in this history than in the book itself. His concern is with the first century A.D. and with the political and religious situation which gave birth to this great example of apocalyptic literature. His conclusions, although admittedly hypothetical, certainly constitute a coherent hypothesis, a contribution which workers in the field can not afford to overlook.

According to his reconstruction, the Apocalypse was written in the last years of the rule of the Emperor Domitian, probably in 95 A.D., during Christian persecutions instigated in the name of the Imperial Cult. The seer, however, consciously set the scene of the vision back to the year 68. According to this artificial time perspective, the letters to the Seven Churches described the situation as it existed in Asia Minor between the years 62 and 68, just prior to the vision. The Plagues of the Seals, the Trumpets and the Bowls represented an actual series of political events and natural phenomena which occurred between 68 and 95. These disasters, which the seer's contemporaries would easily recognize, culminated in the persecutions of 94-96 when the two great opponents of Christianity were the Imperial Cult and the Cult of Cybele. These cults were symbolized in the image of the two Beasts. The Number of the Beast, 616, suggested the seal of the sixteenth year of the reign of Domitian, DCXVI, and also a dedication to the Great Mother, "to Attis."

Such a résumé does little justice to the mass of data brought to bear upon the hypothesis. In keeping with the current tendency to admit the importance of the Mystery Cults to the formative stages of Christianity, the author draws heavily upon the Cult of Cybele, as well as upon the more commonly recognized Judaic sources, in his discussion of the symbols used in the vision. Incidentally, he attributes the typically apocalyptic doctrine of the resurrection of the body to purely Judaic-Christian sources, however much the ecstatic mysteries may have influenced the spirit of the seer's faith.

The problem of the identity of the seer himself is not touched upon. Nevertheless, it is clear that one of the most significant results of the acceptance of this hypothesis would lie in the change it would effect in the character of the seer. To the Bible student John is one of the most inspired poets of all time. To such a conception it would be necessary to add that of an artistic craftsman, not only emotionally aware of the political and religious problems of his day, but also intellectually cognizant of the best manner of meeting them. The history of the Apocalypse from its beginning to the present would tend to uphold this broader view of John the Seer.

MARIAN W. SMITH

Der Sarkophag des Iunius Bassus: Ein Meisterwerk der frühchristlichen Plastik. By FRIEDERICH GERKE. (Bilderhefte antiker Kunst herausgegeben vom Archäologischen Institut des deutschen Reiches, Heft 4) Berlin: Mann, 1936. 37 pp. 48 ill. RM 5.60.

The sarcophagus of Junius Bassus is the most richly sculptured Christian tomb of the fourth century, and has been ardently discussed by students of early Christian archeology ever since its discovery in 1595 in the crypt of St. Peter's. Despite the inscription referring to the burial of Junius Bassus, a prefect of Rome who died in 359, the date of the tomb has long

been in question. Scholars have assigned it to the third and second, and even to the first, century, because of the resemblance of the sculptures to classical art; and these variant datings have been used in turn to support particular theories of the history of late antique or early Christian art. Only recently has it been possible to confirm the dating of 359 by a more systematic comparison with authenticated works of that period. In the representations from the Old and New Testament embodying ideas of salvation and transcendence, the sarcophagus shows a new conception of funerary imagery, differing, on the one hand, from the tombs of the pre-Constantinian period in the subordination of the buried individual and his worldly life to spiritualistic and cosmological allegories, and differing, on the other hand, from the earlier Christian works with Biblical subjects in the conception of Christ as triumphant in heaven and as associated with Peter and Paul. With great keeness and with a thorough knowledge of the art of the period, Dr. Gerke brings out the iconographic uniqueness of the sculptures. He shows how the themes are theologically interrelated and realize the underlying religious conception; and he observes the mild, ingratiating and assured character of this religious conception when applied to the tomb of a prominent, aristocratic Roman official newly converted to Christianity. The analysis of the sculptural forms is neglected—for that we must await another work promised by Dr. Gerke—, but he has provided here an extraordinarily fine set of illustrations, including large views of single details, which permit a far greater intimacy with the sculptures than was possible through the older reproductions. There is, finally, a lengthy bibliography, intelligently presented with reference to specific questions.

MEYER SCHAPIRO

The Development of Religious Toleration in England. By W. K. JORDAN. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936. 542 pp. $5.00.

This is a worthy and elaborate study of the progress of toleration in England from the accession of James I to the convention of the Long Parliament (1603-40). It follows a former volume, published in 1932, which dealt with the same subject from the beginning of the English Reformation to the death of Queen Elizabeth. The author confesses that he has somewhat changed his views in the later volume, and he shows more appreciation of the "moderates," and more criticism of the "radicals," than he displayed in his earlier work. The book is well documented and evidences careful and patient work.

C. C. R.

Histoire exacte des apparitions de Notre Dame de Lourdes à Bernadette. By R. P. H. PETITOT, O. P. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1935. 290 pp.

The late Father Petitot was one of the busiest writers of his day in Catholic circles in France. He was well equipped for the place he won for himself, for he was a man of indomitable energy, with a keen interest in

the phenomena of sanctity, as readers of his work on Sainte Thérèse of Lisieux well know. In the present book he gives us a fresh account of the whole case of Bernadette Soubirous. He contends that the apparitions were real in the sense that Roman Catholics attach to them. Bernadette was not the victim either of hysteria or mental delusion; she was as matter-of-fact, apparently, as Joan of Arc is said to have been. He adds an appendix on the historical value of the principle works having to do with the "apparitions." He is quite candid about Henri Lasserre's *Notre-Dame de Lourdes*, "un peu romancé," he calls it. The book is well printed, and enriched with a full Table of Contents.

MADELEINE MURRAY

Der Stand der völkischreligiösen Bewegung 1937. (Stoffsammlung für Schulungsarbeit. Nr. 56/57 [4. Reihe Nr. 1/2]) Berlin-Spandau: Apologetischen Centrale, 1937. 24 pp. 30. pf.

Germany's New Religion: The German Faith Movement. By WILHELM HAUER, KARL HEIM, KARL ADAM. Translated by T.S.K. SCOTT-CRAIG and R. E. DAVIES. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1937. 168 pp. $1.50.

These two publications of the year 1937, a German bulletin and a small book of translations from the German by two Englishmen, have both been prepared by editors of Christian sympathy and allegiance. The most evident, general "tie that binds" their little books, however, is the underlying sense of Christianity's loss of power in Germany, and of a necessary fight for Christ's hold upon the nation. For widely divergent are the perspectives and interpretations offered of the situation and its issues.

The German bulletin is a sequel to one published in 1935 on the movements of German "folk-religion," and attempts to indicate principal changes and trends since that time.[1] It has bibliographical importance as a "Who's Who" of the principal neo-pagan and national-church groups, their leaders, publications, aims, and activities. Its chief general conclusions are as follows. Serious "religious" motivation and outlook in these groups is virtually confined to a few leaders, among whom Professor J. W. Hauer, Count Reventlow, Professor H. Mandel, and Professor Ernst Bergmann are mentioned as outstanding. In the groups themselves political themes and interests increasingly prevail over religion. The character and activities of the groups permit a main division into (a) those whose chief interest is politico-cultural propaganda against Christianity and the churches, and (b) those who want to "confessionalize" and make a cult of national-socialism in a German national church with or without Christian features. The cult efforts seem to become more and more splintered, the propaganda,

1. The earlier bulletin of 1935 is *Heft Nr. 40 (2 Reihe Nr. 9)* in the same series, *Stoffsammlung für Schulungsarbeit.*

on the other hand, more and more widely diffused. The "folk-religion" groups are unstable and not large, but political ideology with anti-Christian sentiment continues to flow fast and loose over the land. The "science" of German origins, race, culture, and religion has taken on a decidedly anti-Christian bias, presumably in the interest of politics.

In contrast to all this the translations offered in *Germany's New Religion* are selected to impress the English reader with the fact that there are fundamental religious issues in the conflict over "German faith." The method chosen to accomplish this is to translate three speeches by Professor Hauer of Tübingen, a reply from the Protestant side by Professor Karl Heim of the same University, and a Catholic statement by Professor Karl Adam also of Tübingen. It must be questioned in how far these materials fairly represent "Germany's new religion."

The speeches by Professor Hauer are interesting, and advance the following principal ideas. Race and religion go together. For ages there has been a world-conflict between Indo-Aryan and Semitic religion. Christianity is chiefly Semitic and is fundamentally alien to Germany. Its claim to be the sole way of salvation, its universal creedalism, Biblicism, stiff, transcendent monotheism, its belief in final judgment and damnation, in vicarious sacrifice and redemption, in material resurrection—all this deserts the genius and destiny of the German nation which is once again a vital focus of religion. Professor Hauer's positive views of the religion emerging from this vital focus are vaguer. He repudiates the attempt to revive old pagan cults, and stresses rather the immediate sense of divinity in nature, person, family, folk and nation. He emphasizes chiefly that religion must be free, and that moral responsibility and guilt must be faced by men themselves as part of their destiny. He points to the inadequacy of traditional commandments to decide present questions of social morality (e.g., the sterilization problem), and also favors the development of new national festivals and rites. The person of Jesus will continue to have its inspiring side, but can not be normative for German religion.

The Protestant rejoinder by Karl Heim and the Catholic statement by Karl Adam both make large and significant concessions to current German tendencies. Thus Professor Heim writes:

> . . . the antagonism between "German Faith" and Protestant Christianity does not lie in the fact that the former elaborates a national and racial code of ethics, while the latter has based its ethics on supranatural and supraracial foundations. . . . The Protestant view of life has as complete an appreciation of "native genius" and heroism as has the "German Faith Movement" (Pp. 112-113).

And Professor Adam says:

> Nothing is more perverse than to attend only to the soft, tender notes in his [Jesus's] message, to its pity and humility, its peace and love, and to miss the fiery element, its eschatological intensity, the heroic impetus of its attack. The hot breath of the heroic permeates not only his message but his whole personality (P. 149).

Jesus and the Christian man should be fully acceptable, he seems to think,

to the Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean vitalists. He insists finally that Christian Redemption has to do, not with repairing a rent in nature, but "rather, with supernature; . . . it is an event beyond our natural existence." And the Protestant Heim's only fundamental objection to Hauer is equally transcendent. It consists in declaring that there is moral danger in man's facing his own guilt as part of his destiny. "He must answer for it to God, his eternal Judge."

Thus, in these two instances Christianity seems to fight for its existence, partly by accommodation to current tendencies, and partly by reaffirmation of its ancient mysteries and dogmas. There is no evidence here of new creativeness, or of an actual joining of new issues in concrete life. In their brief Introduction the English translators themselves find the warfare of contemporary German theologians for Christianity a bit "strange" in character, and take refuge in the thought that in other nations it would surely be conducted differently.

H. L. F.

Character and Christian Education. By STEWART G. COLE. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1936. 249 pp.

In this book the President of Kalamazoo College discusses the problem of integrating "two cultural movements [that] challenge the children of America," as he sees it. The first of these is one of secular idealism such as inspires efforts at "character-education" in schools and youth organizations. The second is the heritage of Protestant Christianity carried on by the churches. In the first movement President Cole finds "inarticulate religion" in the recognition of indispensable values in the common life of today. In the second movement he sees "articulate religion" which is also a good and an inescapable force, in his opinion, but which lacks vitality if isolated from daily life and generally fails, therefore, to realize Christianity at its best. The thesis of the book is that everyone would benefit if these two movements were less estranged and more fully joined in their best strengths.

The author realizes that such a development involves new interpretations as well as new will. In Part One of his book, entitled "The Religious Quality of Character," he gives his interpretation of the biological and experiential factors involved in "character-education." In Part Two, called "The Christian Orientation of Character," he expounds his ideas on "the interfusion of secular and religious cultures in the interests of Christian character." With respect to "character-education" President Cole's leading idea seems to be that "socialized behavior" is the desideratum on all age-levels, and that the emergence of character means the development of power to achieve such behavior with growing personal initiative and command. He wisely recognizes the inevitability of conflicts in the child and youth, but does not equally face the persistence of them in adult life and the implications of this. As a consequence his religion, both "articulate" and "inarticulate," retains the predominant accents of popular American optimism.

He cites a long and various list of recent American books in the fields of child-study, psychology, religious education and philosophy of religion.

President Cole's thought as to what "articulate religion" should strive to become again typifies a widely current yet vague actuality. He defends the permanent value of the Protestant Christian symbols "God," "Jesus," and "Christ," but wants them to be symbols of expanding "experience-centered" religion. Against "Deweyism" he supports specific liturgies and worship. The fundamental problems from such a point of view are obviously *what* experiences to cultivate by articulate religion and *how*. With respect to the first problem the author's main answer is, of course, the actual living experiences of achieving socialized character in contemporary America. The cultivation of these experiences with the symbols of our articulate religious heritage somehow adds to the moral and utilitarian aspects of character-development cosmic and appreciative aspects. But the somehow of this process is nowhere clarified in this book. And the competition of Protestant Christian symbols with other symbols, old and new, that also claim to give character-development in contemporary America "a religious quality" is another neglected topic. The author is satisfied that for the majority of our people Protestant Christian tradition is the only influential force of "articulate religion."

H. L. F.

The Psychology of Christian Personality. By Ernest M. Ligon. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935. x + 378 pp. $3.00.

The purpose of the author is "to study carefully the emotional attitudes which are implied in Jesus' teachings, and to ascertain whether they are integrating or disintegrating factors in the personality." The Sermon on the Mount is used as the best source of Jesus' expressed ideas and the attempt is made to demonstrate how contemporary psychology really but affirms what long ago had been stated by Christ. In this "affirmation" the writer, unfortunately, often goes to rather great lengths to preserve a seemingly consistent picture, as, for example, when he states (p. 20) that "By their fruits ye shall know them" shows that the scientific method of experimental induction is inherent in the principles expounded by Jesus. Criticism on this point is, however, forestalled by the writer's frank admission that he is "prejudiced toward finding a favorable interpretation of Jesus' teachings."

Since the author's avowed purpose in writing the book was not really to "prove" that modern psychological conclusions were a part of Jesus' teachings but only that they might be "implied" in his Sermon on the Mount, one can find little to quarrel about. In fact, if one reads the book with this reservation well in mind, one will discover that a great deal of very practical and valuable mental hygiene has been incorporated in its pages—mental hygiene which should be a part of the equipment of every religious educator.

Henry J. Wegrocki

Independence, Convergence and Borrowing in Institutions, Thought and Art. (Harvard Tercentenary Publications). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1937. x + 272 pp. $3.00.

A collection of papers read by eminent scholars at one of the three symposia held in connection with the Harvard Tercentenary Celebration. Of special interest to the student of religion are the following: "Jewish Folklore: East and West," by Louis Ginzburg; "Hellenism and Christianity," by Charles Harold Dodd; "Medieval Universalism and its Present Value," by Etienne Gilson; "The Indianization of China: A Case Study in Cultural Borrowing," by Hu Shih; "East and West: The meaning of their Cultural Relations," by Masaharu Anesaki; and "The Royal Tombs of An-Yang," by Paul Pelliot.

Kaiser Constantin und die christliche Kirche. By EDUARD SCHWARTZ. 2nd Ed. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1936. viii + 160 pp. RM 4.50.

In the light of new discoveries and research Dr. Schwartz has revised his five noteworthy lectures published in 1913. Particularly in his treatment of Athanasius and the Meletian schism (pp. 134 ff.) does this new edition prove of value.

Lui et nous: un seul Christ. By ABBÉ CHARLES GRIMAUD. 2nd Ed. Paris: P. Tequi, 1937. 324 pp. Fr. 12.

A companion-piece to the author's *"Ma" Messe,* undertaking a popular exposition of the doctrine of the mystical body of Christ, and the mystical union.

Un mystique Protestant: Auguste Quartier-laTente (1848-1936). By GEORGES BERGUER. (Extrait des *Archives de Psychologie,* T. XXVI) Geneva: Librairie Naville, 1937. 145 pp.

A well-presented case record for the psychology of mysticism.

Étude critique sur le dogme trinitaire. By HENRI-L. MIÉVILLE. Lausanne: Imprimerie La Concorde, 1937. (Extrait de la *Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie,* Nos. 101-102.) Swiss Fr. 1.50.

Figurine di divinità e amuleti egiziani trovati in tombe etrusche. By Fr. W. VON BISSING. *Studi e materiali di storia delle religioni.* Vol. XIII, pp. 1-9.

Some Phases of Religious Feeling in Later Paganism. By CAMPBELL BONNER. *Harvard Theological Review.* Vol. XXX, pp. 119-140.

Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. By F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON. *Chronicle.* Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 8-10.

Immediate Need of Confucius. By EZRA POUND. *Aryan Path.* Vol. VIII, pp. 354-358.

À propos de Tch'e-Chouai. By M. C. HAGUENAUER. *Transactions of the Meiji Japan Society.* Vol. XLVII, pp. 1-6.

The Buddha. By HEINRICH ZIMMER. *Vedanta Kesari.* Vol. XXIV, pp. 18-25; 60-62; 105-109.

Textes alexandrins et bouddhiques. By HENRI DE LUBAC. *Recherches de Science Religieuse.* Vol. XXVII, pp. 336-351.

Early Days. By CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS. *Buddhism in England.* Vol. XII, pp. 3-7.

The First Buddhist Mission in England. By CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS. *Buddhism in England.* Vol. XII, pp. 50-57.

Animal Sacrifice in Hindu Religion. By MUHAMMED AHMAD. *Muslim Review.* No. 4, pp. 50-57.

Bhagavan Śri Kṛṣna: The All-round Perfect Avatar. By HIS HOLINESS JAGADUGURU SRI SANKARACHARYA SWAMI SRI 1108 SRI BHARATI KRISHNA TIRTHASI, MAHARAJ OF SRI GOVARDHANA MUTT. *Kalyana-Kalpataru.* Vol. IV, *seriatim.*

Problems of the Bhagavadgītā. By DEWAN BAHADUR K.S. SASTRI. *Kalyana-Kalpataru.* Vol. IV, *seriatim.*

Siva in the Madura Temple. By K. S. SRIKANTAN. *Vedanta Kesari.* Vol. XXIII, pp. 468-471; Vol. XXIV, pp. 34-37.

Reminiscences of the Holy Mother. By a DISCIPLE. *Vedanta Kesari.* Vol. XXIV, *passim.*

The Koran as Magic. By ALLEN DONALDSON. *Moslem World.* Vol. XXVII, pp. 254-266.

Doctrine of Fana Baqa and Liqa. By M. WAHED HUSAIN. *Muslim Review.* Vol. XX, No. 4, pp. 43-50; No. 5, pp. 30-35.

The Origin of Deuteronomy. By JOSEPH REIDER. *Jewish Quarterly Review.* Vol. XXVII, pp. 349-372.

Aethioper und Juden in der antiken Literatur. By HANS LEWY. *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.* Vol. LXXXI, pp. 65-71.

Hebrews and Greeks before Alexander. By ROBERT H. PFEIFFER. *Journal of Biblical Literature.* Vol. LVI, pp. 91-102.

Symbolism in Hellenistic Jewish Art: The Problem of Method. By ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH. *Journal of Biblical Literature*. Vol. LVI, pp. 103-114.

The Synagogue of Claudius Tiberius Polycharmus. By A. MARMORSTEIN. *Jewish Quarterly Review*. Vol. XXVII, pp. 373-384.

Die Erste Benediktion des Achtzengebetes. By ARTHUR SPANIER. *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*. Vol. LXXXI, pp. 71-76.

Der Ort der Vorsehungslehre nach der Ansicht Maimunis. By LEO STRAUSS. *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*. Vol. LXXXI, pp. 93-105.

Bucer's Plan for the Jews. By HASTINGS EELLS. *Church History*. Vol. VI, pp. 127-135.

Religious Civilization: The Universal Aspect of Judaism. By NATHAN A. BARACK. *Reconstructionist*. Vol. III, No. 5, pp. 7-11.

Modern Criticism of the Historical Jesus. By BERTRAM L. WOOLF. *Congregational Quarterly*. Vol. XV, pp. 188-198.

Jesus in Modern Research. By D. W. RIDDLE. *Journal of Religion*. Vol. XVII, pp. 170-182.

"Le cose sante ai cani.„ By I. ZOLLI. *Religio*. Vol. XIII, pp. 272-277.

War Petrus in Rom? By BERTHOLD ALTANER. *Theologische Revue*. Vol. XXXVI, pp. 177-188.

Les fondements de l'assurance du salut chez l'apôtre Paul. By MAURICE GOGUEL. *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses*. Vol. XVII, pp. 105-144.

Die Kirche als Braut in der ostsyrischen Liturgie. By H. ENGBERDING. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*. Vol. III, pp. 5-48.

Les caracteristiques et les attributs des saints dans la peinture cappadocienne. By GUILLAUME JERPHANION. *Analecta Bollandiana*. Vol. LV, pp. 1-28.

Sur une question de methode: à propos de la datation des peintures cappadociennes. By GUILLAUME JERPHANION. *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*. Vol. III, pp. 141-160.

Ortodossia orientale e unificazione nazionale. By CONSTANTINO ANDREESCU. *Religio*. Vol. XIII, pp. 164-189.

Franziskanerlehrer um die Wende des 13. und zu Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderts in zwei ehemaligen Turiner Hss. By F. PELSTER. *"Gregorianum.„* Vol. XVIII, pp. 291-317.

The Lollards. By R. GLADSTONE GRIFFITH. *Religions*. No. 20, pp. 7-21.

Do We Inherit from Calvin? A Reply to Dr. Micklem. By A. E. GARVIE. *Hibbert Journal*. Vol. XXXV, pp. 356-364.

Irvingism as an Analogue of the Oxford Movement. By PIERCE BUTLER. *Church History*. Vol. VI, pp. 101-112.

The Effect of Disestablishment in Wales. *Modern Churchman*. Vol. XXVI, pp. 637-640.

Rumanian Ruminations and Resolves. By R. D. RICHARDSON. *Modern Churchman.* Vol. XXVI, pp. 658-671.

Kirche und Bekenntnis. By JOHANNES STEINBECK. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 97-111.

Zur Problematik ur Bekenntnisfrage. By HORST STEPHAN. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 152-157.

Bekenntnis und Recht in der kurhessischen Kirche des 19. Jahrhunderts. By W. MAUER. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 112-131.

Die Deutschen Christen zwischen Bekenntniskirche und Deutschglaube. By HERMANN MULERT. *Christliche Welt.* Vol. LI, pp. 363-368.

Volkskirche oder Kirche der Auserwählten. By JULIUS RICHTER. *Christliche Welt.* Vol. LI, pp. 460-463.

Vereinung der christlichen Glaubensformen. By KARL BETH. *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie.* Vol. X, pp. 101-106.

Unkonfessionalistisches Luthertum. By MARTIN RADE. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.* Vol. XVIII, pp. 131-151.

Zur künftigen Verfassung der Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche. By JOHANNES KÜBEL. *Christliche Welt.* Vol. LI, pp. 430-432; 507-512; 636-639.

The Basis of Christian Faith and Action Today. (Church Congress Syllabus No. 1, Part I.) By FREDERICK C. GRANT and JOSEPH F. FLETCHER. *Anglican Theological Review.* Vol. XIX, pp. 112-131.

The Application of Christianity. (Church Congress Syllabus No. 1, Part IV.) By J. HOWARD MELISH and D. A. MCGREGOR. *Anglican Theological Review,* Vol. XIX, pp. 191-209.

Non-Theological Barriers to Church Unity. By HENRY S. LEIPER. *Christendom.* Vol. II, pp. 219-227.

The Archbishop of Canterbury's Call to the Nation. By J. H. MUIRHEAD. *Hibbert Journal.* Vol. XXXV, pp. 321-326.

The Crisis of Christianity. By NICHOLAS A. BERDYAEV. *Christendom.* Vol. II, pp. 228-240.

The Present Religious Crisis. By Rt. Rev. E. W. BARNES. *Modern Churchman.* Vol. XXVII, pp. 233-247.

Christianity and Communism. By JOSEPH NEEDHAM. *Modern Churchman. Vol.* XXVII, pp. 322-332.

The Church and Communism. By PAUL TILLICH. *Religion in Life.* Vol. VI, pp. 347-357.

Christ, Marx or Huitzilopochtli? By HAROLD E. DAVIS. *Christendom.* Vol. II, pp. 265-272.

The Catholic Crusade Against Communism. By LOUIS MINSKY. *Reconstructionist.* Vol. III, No. 7, pp. 5-8.

Christianity and Fascism. By SIR ARNOLD WILSON. *Modern Churchman.* Vol. XXVII, pp. 333-341.

The Church and Fascism. By CORNELIUS KRUSÉ. *Religion in Life.* Vol. VI, pp. 358-367.

Christianity and Democracy. By H. G. Mulliner. *Modern Churchman.* Vol. XXVII, pp. 342-356.

The Church and Democracy. By Georgia E. Harkness. *Religion in Life.* Vol. VI, pp. 368-380.

The Church and the Economic and Political Situation. By Canon Guy Rogers. *Modern Churchman.* Vol. XXVII, pp. 279-292.

Christianity and Civilization. By Roger Lloyd. *Modern Churchman.* Vol. XXVII, pp. 248-255.

Is Christianity Imperialistic? By Paul E. Johnson. *Aryan Path.* Vol. VIII, pp. 204-207.

Christianity and Supernationalism. By J. T. McNeill. *Congregational Quarterly.* Vol. XV, pp. 199-204.

Platonism and Christianity. By J. Herbert Sleeman. *Religions.* No. 19, pp. 21-37.

St. Augustine's Conception of Time. By Herman Hausheer. *Philosophical Review.* Vol. XLVI, pp. 503-512.

Cardinal Newman's Theses de Fide and his Proposed Introduction to the French Translation of the University Sermons. By H. Tristram. *"Gregorianum.,,* Vol. XVIII, pp. 219-260.

Vom Sein und Sinn Gottes. By Max Wiener. *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.* Vol. LXXXI, pp. 3-12.

Der Menschensohn. By Leo Baeck. *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.* Vol. LXXXI, pp. 12-24.

Credo ut intelligam. By Alfredo Poggi. *Religio.* Vol. XIII, pp. 241-246.

La connaisance de Dieu au miroir de l'âme et de la nature. By H. Leisegang. *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses.* Vol. XVI, pp. 145-171.

Spiritual Ideals: Personal and Impersonal. By Swami Jnaneswarananda. *Vedanti Kesari.* Vol. XXIII, pp. 451-458.

Le "Ressentiment" dans la vie morale et religieuse, d'après M. Scheler. By Yves de Montcheuil. *Recherches de Science Religieuse.* Vol. XXVII, pp. 309-325.

La Représentation Sacrée. By Jacques Copeau. *L'Art sacré.* Vol. II, pp. 109-116.

Sur Picasso et les conditions actuelles de l'art chrétien. By P. Couturier. *L'Art sacré.* Vol. II, pp. 99-101.

Address at the Parliament of Religions. By Rabindranath Tagore. *Visva-Bharati.* Vol. III, pp. 1-8.

Correspondence Relating to the Alleged Collapse of the T.S. at the Close of the 19th century. By C. J. Ryan and H. R. W. Cox. *Theosophical Forum.* Vol. X, pp. 292-308.